~ BANNED IN EUROPE! ~
| My Webpage
| |
"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Monday, December 4, 2006
There and Back Again
My unit recently returned from Iraq, as part of the 4th Infantry Division. While there, I was a "Fobbit": I never went outside the wire. For most of the tour, though, I worked at Sather Air Base, BIAP, and thus had an opportunity to interact with a lot of soldiers stationed throughout the Baghdad Area of Operations.
What great insight does that give me? None. Do I have the answer to "the Question"? No more than anyone else. I would say that overall my experiences - and that of just about everyone there - may give them some knowledge of a little slice of the war, but overall I don't think I know more than I would have had I been "at home" the whole time. Something to keep in mind, always, whenever people disparage those who haven't gone as "chickenhawks" and imply that they have nothing to contribute to the debate (unless, of course, they are against the mission).
"It'll Be a Mess"
During my deployment there was a two-week period where me and some buddies were assigned as the "admin guys" assisting a Special Forces team in the selection of new trainees for the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOFOR) Brigade. The SF Team assisted/oversaw a team from the ISOFOR, Iraqi NCOS, who were essentially the "Drill Sergeants" in charge of the Selectees/Trainees. The Iraqi NCOs were eager, as were the majority of the Selectees, but somewhat disorganized. "Training the Trainers", the job the SF Team was there to do, was clearly an ongoing process. Yet according to one member of the team, who I'll call "Mark", theirs was the last Team that was going to be assigned to this mission, and they would be present for only one more "class" of ISOFOR trainees. I asked him what would happen after, and he smiled and said "it'll be a mess."
Now, things change, and I don't know whether another SF Team ended up being assigned to continue on with it or not. But clearly this is one of the things we need to do more of, and keep up with.
Corruption is a real problem. Throughout the two-week selection process, which is somewhat similar to reception at U.S. Basic Training but also a tool for testing and weeding out, the ISOFOR Command Sergeant Major was often present, sitting and watching. One of the interpreters said "Oh, he shouldn't be here so much, interfering with the training. He should be with the rest of the brigade, and let the trainers do their jobs." (By which he meant the Iraqi trainers). But "Mike" told me later the CSM was a great help. Why? He was running interference, keeping the Iraqi officers away from the Selection process.
That was important because many of the recruits had paid bribes to get in. Some of them because they wanted a job, others because they were infiltrators, loyal to militias or even the insurgency. Indeed, an entire company was composed of people the SF Team suspected of having gotten there through bribes, with a tough Iraqi NCO/Drill Sergeant over them. The goal: Weed them out (recruits could quit at any time, and many did). They figured they got rid of most of the infiltrators, but that probably a couple had slipped through.
The ISOFOR CSM's reward for that was, when selection was over, a letter of reprimand from the Iraqi command (the SF Team told him to tear it up and ignore it). So what will happen if/when the Americans are gone? Will such a man have "cover" to do that? Unlikely. "Mike" was candid that the NCOs were onboard with the anti-corruption efforts "because they know we [the SF guys] don't like it".
What's the lesson here? It will take time and patience to inculcate a sense of professionalism in the Iraqi NCO Corps, but there is promise. People in the States - usually ignoratii on the Left - sometimes talk about how quickly we're able to turn a recruit into a Soldier. Well, the difference is they are incorporated into a functioning, organic system, with strong traditions of professionalism, and the NCOs are the backbone of our Army. But an NCO isn't created overnight. It can take 10 years or more for someone to become a Platoon Sergeant, and that's in an Army where they are surrounded by mentors who have "gone before.".
The further lesson is that it will take a lot longer, and quite a bit of work, effort, to bring even that level of professionalism to much of the Iraqi Officer Corps. Remember: The ISOFOR is one of the better units. But the Iraqi Officer Corps seems to be at least partly made up of political appointees. It will take time to separate the wheat from the chaff.
"This is My Death Sentence"
One day, before we wrapped it all up, one of the Iraqi interpreters who worked with us was talking to me, during down time. He held out his ID card and said "know what this is"? I said an ID card. He said "this is my death sentence". Every day he puts it in his shoe. His fear? If he's found with it, at one of the "checkpoints" between the base and his home off post, he might be shot. By insurgents? No, by sectarian militias.
That's what awaits guys who work with us, after we leave.
Plan of Action
So, what's to be done? My tour was fairly safe. I was stationed at a large FOB, and didn't really feel I was in much greater danger there than I would have been at home (if one exchanges dangerous highways at home for the occasional mortar or RPG fired off by people with such bad aim that they would aim at the airport and literally miss it by a kilometer or more). I'm not going to apologize to anyone for the comparative safety of my deployment compared to many others who were out there, in more harrowing FOBs, and those outside the wire. I went where I was told. So did thousands of others at Liberty/Victory, Balad, &tc.
But Victor Davis Hanson is closer to the truth, and those counseling us to reposition our troops so that they are in bases, ready to be "rapid reaction forces" as-needed but otherwise draw back from the fighting and "let the Iraqis take the lead" are wrong. Too many people are concerned with cosseting the troops: They're all about body armor, safety, putting as many as possible behind the wire, protected by concrete barriers, and not about what needs to be done. We need to get more of out troops outside the big basecamps, and working directly with Iraqi forces as mentors. We also need to expand greatly the embedment of other departments of our government, and allied nations, with Iraqi counterparts, to build civil-society infrastructure.
We need to reduce the megabases, the situation where Fort Hood is essentially being re-created opposite the terminal of Baghdad International, and get more of us out working with the Iraqi soldiers. We need to "embed" more troops among the Iraqis, mentor them more.
But this is really not about "them", or at least not only about "them" and "their deficiencies" and whether we can help them rectify those deficiencies or not. It's also about us: A country where "Fighting Dems" mean not Democrats like Lieberman who want to make sure we're doing our utmost to fight our enemies abroad, but partisans ferociously fighting their domestic political opponents at home, a country where few people say "well, I was opposed to the war, but Congress had a vote, and we're in it as a country, and we need to figure out how best to win it." Instead half the country's attitude is that "it's Bush's war and we're not going to help let him off the hook, we're going to stick him with it, and use it to discredit people we don't agree with at home."
But I don't want to hit the "partisan politics" head too hard, because that is not the biggest of our problems. Those who are for the war, myself not excluded, have done a very poor job communicating. We have not convinced the American people that the sacrifices are necessary. We have not explained that conflicts like this generally take a decade, and that are losses are historical not in there extreme nature, but in how low they are. But beyond that, we have not maintained support: You can hardly convince someone that even low losses are worth it if they don't believe the mission should continue in the first place.
Admittedly, given the nature of things, those who favor going forward and striving the best we can to be successful, have an uphill battle in the public communications department, given the slant of the media. But this is hardly an excuse: We did not face a favorable MSN when advocating the war to topple Saddam, but we succeeded then, so it's hardly complain now of being unable to reach people because of media bias. The fact that we have a media that regurgitates insurgent propaganda unskeptically and unquestioningly but claims our own information efforts are propaganda to be dismissed out of hand is certainly one of the problems we face, but it is not insurmountable.
As for the idea of discussions with Iran and Syria over Iraq's future, well, if we're not able to convince the American people of why that would be a bad idea and why any concession to them on Iraq's development would be counter to our interest and Iraq's, well we should pack it in. Instead, we should do more to put the pressure back on those countries - to fight fire with fire. The cost they pay for destabilizing Iraq and Lebanon should be destabilization and our financing of opposition groups, and even insurgents against them. If after that they decide to play nice, and cease the mischief, then we should be willing to meet them halfway. But unilateral concessions on our part as a means to put a happy face on turning Iraq and Lebanon over to their not-so-tender-mercies would be a disgrace that, while "realists" at home would believe in, everyone else in the world would know for what it was: Capitulation.
What needs to be done is to adopt a plan capable of success, which I believe increased embedment of American and allied personnel would be, then we need to explain what is being done to our fellow citizens, and why, and the patience that it will involve. But also that it can work: Similar efforts are bearing fruit in the Balkans and elsewhere. We need to not be satisfied with explaining it one time, however, but keep up with the public persuasion efforts, because those on the other side (both at home and abroad) don't stop repeating their negative talking points of doom and withdrawal ("redeployment" by any other name). Their repetition needs to be continually countered.
Also, we need to increase the size of America's ground forces. Those of us who favored this effort, and others, should be ashamed that we did not insist upon an increase in the force structure of the Army and Marines years ago. Many of us were for it, but were not stronger in our advocacy. Troops to maintain our efforts while also deterring meddlesome powers like Syria, Iran, and North Korea simply don't exist because we did not push harder. It is a sign of near unseriousness that we tolerated budgets that prioritized continuation of expensive programs to fight aerial dogfights 20 years from now against a non-existent "near-peer" enemy air force instead of paying for additional boots on the grounds (the "legacy-costs" of that being unbearable, in a way that apparently the "legacy-costs" of the F-22 are not).
We should have pushed for an increase in the budget. We should have called the bluff of those at home who keep calling for "shared sacrifice in a time of war" by offering to cut frivolous non-defense spending programs, on the promise that for each dollar of cut we get this year (not "cut in rate of growth" cut, either), we'll pass a dollar's worth of tax increases next year. But doing that would have required a Congress serious enough about the war to put their "earmark spending" on hold. But we can still push for additional troops, and the Democrats might pass a budget that increases the authorized troop strength, because they want to burnish their bona fides on the issue. It can be easily done without a draft; we had considerably more people in our Armed Forces when our population was 50 million people fewer than today.
Because, if this is to be a "long war", we need the soldiers, and the patience, to fight it seriously.
We need to be tough-minded with Iraqi politicians, too, not just with our own. When they tell us not to go after those who have captured our soldiers, or to take the pressure off of Sadr City (and Sadr), we need to be prepared to tell them that they are in charge of the country, but there are consequences for their choices. Not just consequences from our enemies (which give elements like Sadr a one-sided advantage), but steps we'll take, too. We can start with offering to withdraw not just from the pursuit, not just from Sadr City, but withdraw our protection teams from the politicians who tell us to back off.
There's more, of course. That is just the end of the begining of what we need to do.
Update: Biggest differences between what I see as needed and what the ISG recommends is that I wouldn't be withdrawing troops. If anything, I think the "surge" idea of 20-30,000 additional troops is closer to the right tack, if done within the context of increasing the size of our ground forces, but the increase should be kept there as needed for security. Also, unlike the ISG, I don't favor a policy of issuing ultimatums to our friends on the one hand and giving concessions to our enemies on the other. That would just place America further down the road of becoming "a harmless enemy and a treacherous friend", as Bernard Lewis has been quoted saying.
Now early word has it that The Fabulous Baker Boys (straight from the political boneyard and known formally as the Iraq Study Group) will recommend withdrawing U.S. combat troops from Iraq by 2008, while leaving behind our embedded trainers and vulnerable support units.
This is the sort of nonsense that sounds great to civilians with no military experience. To veterans, it's nuts.
The ISG was proud of "compromise", each giving a bit to get a bit in the final recommendation. But a good plan isn't necessarily one created by groupthink and compromise, and ideas aren't necessarily better just because they're generated through consensus. Our first priority shouldn't be an "exit strategy" arrived at via compromise, it should be victory.
(See also here on engagement with Syria and Iran).
