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"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Wednesday, January 26, 2005
The Tsunami and America's 21st Century Foreign Policy
Longtime readers will remember the series on America's 21st Century Foreign Policy. Well, Colin May has written an article on America's response to the Tsunami that bears on it:
This leads us to the second event. While American diplomats derided Egeland’s slip of the tongue, the US engaged in an activity that said far more than any words could regarding the new international order. Without any concern for the UN, the US proceeded to set up a core group of nations to deal with the disaster. Partners in the group were Australia, Japan and India. It is this alliance that will matter most to the US in the future. The four big Pacific democracies, three with strong Anglo-Saxon histories, will most likely develop into the central alliance of the twenty-first century.
I've been saying we should develop closer ties with India, which may be the rising democratic nation and hopefully will play a positive role in any Commonwealth of Democracies. Responding in effect to those who see China in such a role, May writes:
Beyond these considerations there are the political ones. China remains a dictatorship with a highly centralized authority. Now, this fact isn’t simply a function of the continuing communist regime. China has tended to strong central authority on the imperial model for centuries. This is unlikely to change, and though it can be drawn upon to fuel impressive economic growth, it can also hinder entrepreneurial innovation.
For its part, the US isn’t simply waiting for China to dominate the Asian region either. In fact, the big four alliance of Japan, India, Australia and the US is precisely contrived to surround and hem in China, and here special light has to be thrown on the Indian case. During the Cold War, India was a key player in the non-aligned movement. Today, the world’s largest democracy is a key American ally, both politically and economically.
Then, of course, as Glenn Reynolds pointed out, there is the Anglosphere aspect:
There is, of course, another key factor to consider here – the Anglo-Saxon angle. The United States, Australia and India are all countries with a strong Anglo-Saxon heritage, further adding to their status as natural allies. Along with Britain, Australia was the Americans’ staunchest ally in the Iraq war, and, unlike Spain, we see that this alliance did nothing to harm the electoral success of Australia’s ruling pro-American government. From time to time, the notion of the Anglo-Saxon bond has been floated as a basis for a global alliance, and of course this alliance did figure prominently in World War II which, along with Russia, was largely fought by Americans and members of the British Commonwealth.
And of course the predictable opposition to it:
That this alliance seems to be coming to the fore is not lost on its most vehement critic: the French. France has long derided the dominance of les Anglo-Saxons in the world, though this dominance largely came about through deft interventions on the part of the British during attempts by France to dominate its continental neighbors. In response to the Anglo-Saxon alliance, France has once again attempted to dominate Europe through the EU while interfering with American foreign policy goals when strategically possible. Chief among such actions is the effort by the French to curry favor with the Chinese dictatorship, as well as with left-leaning Latin American nations, most notably Brazil. The problem with this traditional French strategy is that it leaves the pays des droits de l’homme in league with the world’s most reprehensible regimes.
Check out this piece by Arnold Kling, which I'm just getting to. It has some observations on the Power Law and Weblogs thing from awhile back, that I still think is interesting. The Kling piece shows why even small sites are important.
Oh, and someone remind me to post on some good Policy Review pieces that happen to be up now, and City Journal pieces, too.
We have yet to find a serviceable framework for the application of our military power in the war on terrorism; in view of potential catastrophes of which we have a great deal of forewarning, we have yet to provide adequately for what used to be called civil defense; and we have no policy in regard to China's steady cultivation of power that soon will vie with our own. Though any one of these things is capable of dominating the coming century, not one has been properly addressed.
Emphasis added to the first sentance. I don't agree with Halprin's full criticism in the article, I think the goals are worthy and do constitute a mission. But I find the situation in Iraq increasingly worrisome to me, as there does not seem to be the kind of progress there should be. By that I mean the curbing of violent attacks. A couple weeks ago I read a report in The Economist by their enbed in Iraq that was troubling in the extreme (I read it in the print edition, I don't have an online subscription, myself).
It was not unsympathetic, but it was stark. It recognized the conundrums our soldiers faced. But the methods we're using now don't seem designed to produce the outcome we desire. Indeed, on the ground they seemed to have given up on the idea it was achievable at all - at least the ones the enbed reported on. That was the one that caused me to "start to go wobbly" on the war. Again, I was for it and remain supportive and am not one of those people who will say "I was had", I went in with clear eyes, and still hope we can make a difference there. It's not hopeless yet, but it is not looking good.
Will the elections change anything? The transfer of sovereignity was supposed to change things, but didn't. The elections won't move the people who are fighting us there. They will need to be defeated, preferably by Iraqis. The question will be: Will the elections, and improving training and confidence, motivate the Iraqis to fight for their own freedom against the Ba'athists and radical theocratic terrorists?