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"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Thursday, March 25, 2004
EUObserver Observer
Kick 'em while their up, kick 'em while they're down. That's how the song goes, right?
Joe at Winds of Change remarks briefly on the previous post, and in the comments, Randy Paul points out an error I made:
Minor, minor, minor quibble: The Azores are part of Portugal, thus Spain did not host the meeting P refers to.
D'oh!
My bad. I did know that. . .*grrr* I'm sorry to make an error like that. It's a sloppy error.
Joe found my angle interesting, given my usual views on Europe. My views on the EU can be separated from my views on European countries, I hope. I possibly don't do as good a job as I could in making that distinction. For example, Romano Prodi, a mouthpiece of the EU, isn't the same as our coalition members in Europe.
In my opinion one of the problems in the post-3/11 commentary on this side of the Atlantic has been a failure to keep such distinctions. How the Romano Prodis or the Dominique de Villepins of the world react is one thing, how Spain goes is another. I'm not for placating the former, but IMO we could have done a lot more to convince the people of Spain - and should do a lot more to convince the people of Italy, Poland, Britain, &tc. that the choice their governments made was the right choice. We shouldn't necessarily call them cowards when it's largely a matter of divergent views and the fact that though we convinced the governments, it never reached the majority of the people in those countries.
A hard road, to be sure. I know that in some ways saying this is similar to what A.L. says about making the case, but I'll again note that he emphasizes the Administration's efforts and deficiencies in this area but I'm talking about us - all of us, governmental and private. It includes people who have, post-3/11, written in a vein that is the flip side of the coin of so much of European post-9/11 commentary, about what our reaction should have been and reeking of contempt when it didn't.
Yes, more ranting about the ChiComs. Continuing from where I left off yesterday.
I mentioned the hope held by many that China will make a peaceful or relatively peaceful transition to democracy. After all, there is the example of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but also of Spain, Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea. The last four nations all made the transition about as smoothly as can be expected, and while the former SovWorld countries are more of a mixed bag there are certainly positive examples, where the unrest and bloodshed was minimal and democratic institutions and the rule of law seem to be taking root in at least some of them. Even Putin's Russia isn't entirely bad, though I wouldn't call it a democracy.
Spain, Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea were all classical Autocratic Dictatorships however. That is, the regimes were based on the rule of one man - sure, he had lackeys and hangers-on, but power rested in the hands of a single ruler. Since the death of Deng, this has not been the case in China. China has evolved into a Self-Perpetuating Oligarchy. Sure, one member of the oligarchy may have more influence than others, but power is no longer exclusively his. Indeed, this is the aspect of things that make some people look at China and see the possibility for a breakup into warlordism: power is no longer concentrated exclusively in one person's hands, but has devolved into multiple hands. They chose a first-among-equals but rule in concert.
This makes the potential for internal friction among the ruling claque more likely, but also makes the system more resistant to change of the sort people are hoping for. It's not a situation akin to that of Chile, Spain, Taiwan, or South Korea where if the dictator just gets old or tired or dies and decides to be succeeded by democratic processes rather than another strongman, he can make that decision and it will stick. In China, the regime is self-perpetuating and no one can make that choice.
Well, what about the SovWorld, then? Arguably, the "coup plotters" who infamously bundled Gorbachev off to the Crimea and claimed to be the real government believed that the Soviet Union had made a transition to Self-Perpetuating Oligarchy. But that was never the case in the Soviet Union, and when the dictator was removed the agencies loyal to him did not prove loyal to the would-be oligarchs. They instead stood down while Russia succeeded and the Soviet Union fell apart. This was even more the case in the Warsaw Pact countries, which were ruled by dictatorships propped up by a foreign power (the Soviet Union) rather than oligarchies. So comparisons between China and that of the SovWorld do not apply.
So then what will happen in China? It's difficult to say, but it is unlikely to resemble what happened in nations that made the transition from sole-rule (dictatorship) to democracy, because that is not how China is governed today. Fragmentation is possible to the extent to which oligarchs build up local power-bases and come into conflict with each other. Unrest as a growing middle class pushes for more political liberty and input into how they are governed is certainly also a possibility, but any transition is likely to involve more strife than it did in Eastern Europe, much less the "Asian Tigers". Economic stagnation as China fails to make a transition to the information age on account of the oligarchs' desire to control access to information is also likely - unlike in India, and that is one reason to be more positive about India's future than China's. That will likewise lead more to problems than to solutions, and China's oligarchy will likely do what similar regimes always do in such situations, and displace blame for conditions to foreign devils (just as the Saudi oligarchy has) and export the resulting violence.
Speaking of that, Alastair Mackay wrote via e-mail in response to yesterday's post as follows:
re. China's ascendancy, there was an interesting future-history novel that came and went a few years back that imagines a resurgent China picking a fight with a Clintonesque administration, starting by occupying the Spratley Islands. In the novel, the vague yet fuzzy "demonstrations of force" by the US military do not fare well against the countermoves of the technologically inferior PLAN, guided by a ruthless, savvy, and Westernized Politburo. The twist in the story is that the CCP finances their war through Soros-style futures and derivatives trading, via cutouts of course. A fun albeit depressing read.
Glenn Reynolds links to a bunch more stuff that Clarke said in the past that contradicts his current storyline, and asks if he's forgotten or is out there as as a means of discrediting Bush's enemies in the press and beyond.
But given that all these things were reported in the press at the time, one has to also ask if the news media has forgotten - or if they just want their audience to. They can't all be part of Carl Rove's insidious plot to use Clarke to discredit them. So at least some of them must be dumb - or so blinded by their partisanship that they're doing dumb things to advance it and hurt Bush.
Richard Neumeier sends a link to this piece by Jonathan Rauch, on the formation of a caucus of democracies within the UN. The real question is: can the UN be reformed? I'm dubious, but as the teaser at the beginning of the article states, this might be a step towards its replacement. Perhaps by a Commonwealth of Democracies (also here and index). The goals down the line may be ambitious, but even the limited near-term goals have problems:
Eventually, officials say, the United States would like to see the caucus shape
policy not just in the Human Rights Commission but throughout the U.N. system. As of now, that seems ambitious. Getting the democracies to coordinate their committee nominations is about as big as anyone is thinking.
Well, France is a democracy, but they'll still vote to nominate scumbags for committees if it will screw over America. South Africa is a democracy, but they don't want to do anything that will upset Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, such as, say, condemn or ostracize him.
But consider the long-term potential. By the time the Community of Democracies becomes strong enough to act coherently inside the U.N., it will also be strong enough to act coherently outside the U.N...."
Probably, to be effective, it will end up being a subset of democracies at first rather than all of them. Then if this group manages to change the incentive structures, the others will come along. But this is likely how we'll end up with something along the lines of the "Commonwealth of Democracies" I propose: attempts to create a caucus of all democracies within the UN structure which founder on the fact that some democratic countries are less helpful than others. There will be a number which will work together, though, and they'll find that to work together effectively and coherently, it will be outside the UN. Because the UN's problems are inherent:
According to polling by the Gallup Organization, 60 percent of Americans rate the U.N. as doing a "poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face." The reasons for disenchantment go deeper than last year's tiff over the Iraq war. The most fundamental is that the United Nations is built on an obsolete premise: that countries governed by their people and countries governed by thugs, thieves, or tyrants should meet on equal terms, one vote each.
That's the problem with the UN as it stands, and also the obstacle to reforming it. That's one of the things that I think should change as we go forward. Regional blocs are also a problem with the UN structure:
To add injury to insult, democracies at the U.N. are disproportionately weak. The U.N. is dominated by a cluster of regional and ideological caucuses. African countries, for example, are pressured to vote together, with undemocratic governments often calling the shots and democracies going along to get along. Tyrants thus routinely exempt themselves from human-rights resolutions, while log-rolling ensures that condemnations of Israel sail through.
and that, too, would be changed in an organization based on behavior rather than regional unity and treating every nation, no matter how thuggish and dictatorial, as being just as good as any other - except that they aren't held to the same standards. Under the UN system, no one seems to mind that Saddam Hussein or Fidel Castro, or Hugo Chavez, or Robert Mugabe, etc, violate international law, or tries to hold them responsible in the same way they do when some democracies try to enforce such norms. International law and sovereignty are instead invoked to protect these despotic regimes, as a means to prevent action against them. The current system is corrupt in that it has it backwards, effectively privileging dictatorships at the expense of democratic governments - and allowing corrupt regimes like the French to line their pockets to the tune of billions of dollars in the UN's oil-for-blood program, if they're willing to sell their votes to such dictatorships. It will have to go.
It's looking more and more like what I expected it was all along: a political hit-job in campaign season. Check out this transcript of a press interview with Clarke, in particular the parts Glenn highlights in his post.
Alert reader Daniel Aronstein sends in this link on what Clinton-appointee George Tenant has to say:
Tenet told the commission, "Clearly there was no lack of care or focus in the face of one of the greatest dangers our country has ever faced."
After the Bush administration took office, officials "immediately understood what we were talking about here and bin Laden and al Qaeda became an agenda item early on" with national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Tenet said.
Which is in line with what Clarke was saying back then, rather than what he's saying today.
Sorry for the lightish and latish posting of late, especially yesterday. I'm working at a place atm that does have computer access, but yesterday was bizarre, one of those days filled with countless little snafus starting with the pdf that wouldn't download completely and ending at home with the three-state power-outage. Plus the place we were going to go for dinner was closed even before the power outage, so we ended up going home - and cooking in the dark.
All that meant countless little interruptions. It's been sort of a week+ like that. For example, the other thing I have to apologize for is that I haven't replied to everyone's letters yet, including some folks that I owe a thanks for having hit the Amazon tipjar. Every time I mean to, something comes up that pushes everything back. I'll try to get back to people as soon as possible. Till then: remember, Doc - keep smiling!
So I've gotten back into watching TechTV after a long break, especially The Screensavers and Call For Help. Leo Laporte hosts both shows, and on the later his co-host is Catherine Schwartz. Anyhow, so I signed up for their daily newsletter, I did. Today's was written by Cat and I'm probably taking it more seriously than it was meant. I'm pretty confident it was written to provoke a response - judging by how she gives out her addy on the show, she seems to like feedback. In any case, what are blogs for if not taking stuff more seriously than they should be? We need to break up the somber posts on the issue du jure from time to time anyhow.
Well, here's what Catherine wrote about the future, and the Brave New World that will have such people in it:
I just started getting Wired magazine in the mail. If you don't get it, I highly recommend you subscribe. While I was pondering the contents of the latest issue, I started pondering the idea that tangible objects are an unnecessary aspect of my life. Virtual is my life now. The mag I had in my hands could just as easily be read online. I have no land line, only a cellphone. I use email instead of snail mail. I queue up the ultimate playlist in iTunes instead of putting in six discs and hitting Random. I'm constantly using the camera on my cellphone instead of a film camera.
The "I started pondering the idea that tangible objects are an unnecessary aspect of my life" reminded me of those people, like Ed Begley Jr., who think that electricity comes from electrical outlets and thus no polution is produced anywhere when they power up their electric automobile's battery with energy produced by the local coal-burning electrical plant. What Cat's talking about isn't really an intangible world, but a world where you're not tied down by wires. The infrastructure may be "off-site", but it still exists. Just how intangible is her computer, or her cell phone? Yes, we're being increasingly freed from having to plug something in and be tethered to a wire. We're instead able to send signals to something that is somewhere else, which we do not have to be physically connected to. Items are also obviously smaller and easier to lug around.
It kind of scared me and excited me at the same time. Isn't the world we live in amazing? Will the day come when our lives really become like the sci-fi movies and all we need to do in order to feel satisfied is take a pill that makes us think we just ate a Ruth's Chris steak and went on a date with Lenny Kravitz? What would your pill make you think you did last night? While you're thinking about that I'm going to tell what's on tap for today's show.
Thank you, but I'd rather not take soma, thank you. Look, I'm certainly not one who rejects fantastication or tools like gaming - online or off-line - for living a vicarious, imaginary existence. But I do think the implication here, the distinction between fantasy and reality being blurred obliterated, be it by drugs or some other means, till people lose touch with reality and really think they ait at Ruth's Chris and went out with Lenny Kravitz, well that's not a good thing. (Pointless aside: is it just me, or are people's tastes in dates. . .off? I mean, he's talented and all, but. . .well, she also likes Howard. Yeash. Well, I guess it's just me.)
So I know it was a lighthearted mail aimed at getting people to muse about the possibilities of the future. But sobering because, yah, some of the possibilities are more frightening than exciting, and I guess this break from somber posting wasn't much of a break after all. . .
I have become a reader of Wretchard's Belmont Club over the last several months. His post Monday (3/22/04) on further focusing of the WOT contained a reference to the Congress of Vienna. This was interesting to me in the way that economic changes (a rising middle class - see the last paragraph) led to the break up of the empires as the sense of nationalist identities emerged.
One of the reasons that this bit of history caught my attention is a story I read today about comments by the Shi'ite leader, Ayattolah Sistiani, about the proposed Iraqi constitution being a recipe for partition. Of course, I gather that is just what the Kurdish people would like to see. Do you think it is at all possible that, as part of the promotion of liberal democratic values, the US will selectively support a "new wave" of nationalism, based not on the colonial divisions that served as templates for the foundation of "independent" colonies after WWII, but upon cultural (linguistic, etc) templates? The tribal/cultural/linguistic strife in the former Yugoslavia, much of Africa, and probably elsewhere certainly seems to beg for such a "solution" if rational economic and political bases could be cobbled together in some way (granted, a big IF). Of course, India stands, at least from my meager point of view, as an exception, maybe due to the pervasiveness of English, Hindi, and Hinduism. I wonder how long the Chinese "empire" can withstand the emergence of economic middle classes? Just wondering,. And, as I belatedly realized, you may have already written about this.
I don't think that's what we're trying to do, and I probably wouldn't support it if we were.
The Kurds are like the Armenians, a people buffeted by history and arguably deserving of a state. The Armenians now have theirs, the Kurds still have only their aspirations. But I doubt we'll be helping them carve out an independent state, if only because Turkey is still an important ally and it would be very messy. If the Kurds got their state, their future, surrounded by Arab, Persian, and Turkish nations hostile to the idea, would be precarious. The better option for them is a Kurdish region within a multiethnic, hopefully federal, Iraq, that respects its citizenry of whatever ethnic or religious stripe they may be.
Moving to India, it would probably not hold together as well as you think in a new global wave of nationalist separatism. The biggest reason India still uses English as one of their official languages is not because of a deep, abiding respect for Britain (though it arguably should be). It is because India is a nation where hundreds of languages are spoken.
As for China, I haven't written on this aspect of things but it is one of the factors in the background of my recent posting on China. There are several ways things could go in China. The optimists say that the rising middle class and developing economic prosperity will lead to a push for democratization. They perhaps forget that in most cases these transitions have not been without troubles. The smoothest was, perhaps, in England but even there it included the "Cavaliers vs. Roundheads" and Cromwell. In continental Europe it was expressed in over two centuries of bloody upheaval starting with the French Revolution in 1789 and ending (?) with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Of course, it's always possible that China will have its own version of a "velvet revolution" or the transitions to democracy that South Korea and Taiwan experienced. But in a country of over a billion people, if things get messy, they'll get really messy.
Another way things could go is the one Richard alludes to: it results in fragmentation. Likely this will make the breakup of Yugoslavia seem like a pre-season exhibition game compared to the intensity of a Super Bowl. The breakup of China has the potential of being very ugly. The other possibility is the one the Chinese government is pursuing. That is things continue on their current trajectory of Nationalism and Socialism with the mixed economy of private and semi-private businesses under state direction (pioneered by Mussolini) until China is strong enough to challenge first the regional and then the global order, to throw it's weight around to secure what they see as their interests, including Taiwan and restoration of China's traditional hegemony over the region. This is also the option France is supporting and pushing the EU to support, with their recent arms sales and joint military ventures like the one that "happened" to coincide with Taiwan's election last week.
None of these possibilities are without risk to us. Obviously the first, with it's hopeful outcome of a "velvet revolution" of democratization and world peace. There is of course one other possibility, referred to in some of the articles I've linked to in posts on China: their economy overheats, the bubble bursts, and global recession follows along with upheavals in China that will likely result in one if not more of the downside consequences mentioned above, just a little sooner. I like to think that good and improving relationships with India, and a democratizing Arab world, will be an "insurance policy" against the potential downside in China. How that might work is an important matter. How important? So important we'll take it up in a future post at some point.
Today is a good day to reprise the rebutting the spin post, as various Clinton functionaries claim they presented Bush with a plan to go after al-Qaeda and others with questionable motives, which the media never question because they're part of the Kerry Campaign now, claim Bush didn't pay enough attention to terrorism before 9/11 and if only he had, none of this would have happened.
First, follow the link. Everything I said then still applies now. This is part of revisionist history, necessary to tear down Bush so that Kerry will look acceptable by comparison. But it's the same old crap, and the only reason it is treated seriously is because it isn't given thoughtful scrutiny.
Lets again look at it the other way, though. Pre-9/11, what do you think the reaction of Democrats and Liberals would have been if Bush announced an aggressive campaign to go after al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies in Afghanistan? Just a distraction from Florida and war hysteria.
All these latest episodes prove is that if there is anyone in America politicizing the war and seeing it completely in partisan terms of political advantage, it is the Democratic Party and most - with honorable exceptions - Liberals. While some of us are trying to fight a war, others are waging partisan war at home which, when you look at it and what policies they propose in the alternative, which are not serious, is really a war against the war. Their main policy position, as advocated by their standard-bearer, John Kerry, the man they're trying to get elected with these tactics, is to go back to pre-9/11 methods in the war.
The simple fact is, before 9/11, we - as a country, in a bipartisan fashion - did not treat the threat as seriously as we should have. Those who are trying to spotlight Bush in that are the ones being partisan and politicizing the war. But the real choice in this election is what policies we'll follow going forward. The implication of their charges against Bush, that this should be treated more seriously than it was then, is belied by the policy position they have, which does the opposite. If nothing else does, that highlights that they see this mainly as a political exercise.
Every time I think I understand what Sistani's up to and think it's benign, he throws another curve ball past me. The latest in the form of a letter denouncing the interum Iraqi Constitution:
At the time, Shiite members of the Governing Council said Sistani objected to two key provisions in the constitution: a clause that gave Kurds effective veto power over a permanent constitution and another that allows either of the deputy presidents -- likely a Kurd and a Sunni Arab -- to reject decisions of a Shiite president. While most groups in Iraq contest the precise figures, Shiites are believed to number about 60 percent of the population, with Sunni Arabs and Kurds the largest minorities.
In the letter released Monday, Sistani specifically mentioned only his objection to the three-member executive. He said it "lays the foundation for sectarianism in a future political system." Supporters of the arrangement have contended that the veto power of the deputy presidents was the most decisive way to protect the interests of minority Sunnis and Kurds. But it clearly curbs the authority of a Shiite president, and Sistani said he believed it would create deadlock that could only be broken by foreign intervention.
The Ninth Doctor will be Christopher Eccleston. Lets hope the return of the series to the air will be a good one. I wonder if, after such a long hiatus, they'll be able to recapture the show's atmosphere and vibe.
For one thing, the continuity is broken as never before. Their had in the past always been overlap: the Doctor's transformation was mitigated by the "hold over" of Companions. The storyline has also been snapped. Not that all the storylines towards the end were anything to write home about, but it'll be. . .different.
Another consequence of the election in Spain is that the once moribund draft EU Constitution has been given new life. Therefore, it makes sense to revisit it once again (for past posts on this topic, enter "Constitution for Bureaucratopia" into my search engine). Jonathan Kallmer had a piece on it in the last issue of American Enterprise. He writes, in part:
The problem is not precisely that the constitution is too ambitious; constitutions should be ambitious. The problem is that it is ambitious in ways that exacerbate the problems it was meant to remedy.
I think it's a question whether the drafters meant to remedy those problems, or just want people to think the Constitution addresses these things (which we'll get to) while actually deepening the degree to which the EU is governed by a impersonal bureaucracy, insulated from the governed.
An effective constitutional document not only sets out the core rights of citizens and the basic structures of government, but does so in a way that is clear, concise, and accessible. A constitution is for people, not bureaucrats, and it is imperative that it speaks as plainly as possible. The European draft constitution shows few of these procedural virtues.
Is it an accident, an unwitting mistake, that the EU's draft Constitution is written in the manner it is? By bureaucrats and for bureaucrats? I think not.
One could argue that it is impossible to draft a constitution that is both succinct and unambiguous. The U.S. Constitution is wonderful in large part because of its simplicity, but that has not stopped successive generations from arguing over how to interpret its more imprecise terms. However, the vagueness in Europe's version does not approach the rich ambiguity found in phrases like "freedom of speech" and "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Actually, those terms had specific meaning at the time the U.S. Constitution was written. They were defined in common law. The problem our succeeding generations have is that we've become disconnected from that common law, and indeed the rule of law generally (though not as much as in Europe). So that, for example, the Supreme Court can decide that when the Constitution says "Congress shall make no law", it actually means they can, if they really really want to (see the below post). But just because we ignore the meaning of the Constitution doesn't mean that it was ambiguous on these points. Kallmer next writes that the EU draft Constitution's problem is "is unacceptably vague because in many instances it has no meaning at all," but I'm not sure about that. They do have meaning to the intended audience. Earlier in the piece, Kallmer writes:
Whether the intrepid eurocrat can understand such terms is irrelevant. Constitutions must be written so that ordinary citizens can understand them.
That's what we think. That's probably what the typical citizen of the EU thinks. But the drafters of the EU's Constitution do not. One can discern what someone believes from their actions. All these phrases that have no meaning to the typical person are understood by its intended audience - which is not the voting citizens of the EU, but precisely those "intrepid eurocrats" for whom the EU is being built. Kallmer writes:
An essential characteristic of a well-drafted constitution is that it establishes an equilibrium of power among institutions, lest one institution become structurally capable of dominating the others. This notion is at the heart of the "checks and balances" that typify the American Constitutional system. The proposed E.U. constitution, however, largely fails to establish such an equilibrium. Despite delivering some modest gains to the European Parliament, the institutional structure proposed by the document (when it is clear enough to be discerned) systematically favors the centralization of power in Brussels.
Now, I would agree with Kallmer on what a well-drafted Constitution should do, as would Steven Den Beste who looked at the Iraqi interim Constitution and found it doing that. But the drafters of the EU Constitution do not have that view. They believe that a system that puts power in the hands of those who know best is the preferred way to go. Anything that would check that power and make it difficult to do what the vanguard/visionaries know needs to be done is an impediment to good government in their eyes, not a positive feature. The view Kellerman has is one held by people who believe in limited government, and that limited government is essential to the preservation of liberty. Continental Europe hasn't really had that tradition. It's alien to their experience, which holds that government power in the right hands is necessary for progress (see the French Revolution and succeeding efforts along these lines). A separation of powers that allows one branch to check things just holds things back and prevents progress. That's why the draft EU Constitution is actually designed, to the extent currently possible, to reduce the ability of any one part of the EU, be it a member-state or states or one institution of the EU vs. another, to obstruct the enaction of something. It's also why the draft EU Constitution enforces within it what policies the EU must have, taking them off the table and insuring that political debate is reduced to how to advance those policies rather than a debate over what policy should be. It is designed to enforce the vision of its drafters and make it impossible for their policies to be overturned or resisted by something that might check or balance them. So for them, what Kallmer sees as a deficiency in the draft Constitution is a strength. Indeed, for EU proponents, the problem isn't that it reduces checks and balances too much, the problem is that it doesn't go far enough in centralizing power and giving the EU "competencies" over matters. If you read the pro-EU press commentary on the draft Constitution, that's what they highlight: they praise the steps taken in that direction but see more still to do in the centralization of power and removal of limits that curb the EU's ability to advance its goals. That, they say, will be addressed in the future.
Update: Regarding the different views of what governments are for, and thus what a well-drafted Constitution would look like, Gabriel Gonzalez writes in the making of French foreign policy the following observation:
[W]hereas state power is perceived as inherently dangerous by Americans in our historical tradition of scepticism towards official power, the French centralized state is glorified by its citizenry as the ultimate protector of citizen interests, rather than as a danger to them. As a result, the citizenry has little interest in the details, substance or moral dimension of foreign policy, which are fully delegated and blindly entrusted to this Collective Protector.
Note that this also implies that Constitutions aren't written for the people to understand, but as technical documents for those in power.
I really only have one thing to say about this latest thing (more here), and that is this: Those who say that "Campaign Finance Reform is hurting the Democrats" always fail to take into account the degree to which the so-called "news" shows act as infomercials for their cause.
There was, after all, a reason why the press championed the Political Speech Regulation Act (aka "McCain-Feingold") and were the most vocal advocates for its passage: to limit competition in the airing of views and stifle opposition that might contradict the views they try to promote. Of course, the whole thing was about curbing voices who question those in power. Not only was it an incumbent-protection act, but it was a big-media-protection-act, and that's why they championed it.
Over at Enter Stage Right I have a piece up on 3/11 and the difference in reactions on the two sides of the Atlantic.
Check it out, but I want to add one thing here. It's not that I think the Spanish response, or European response generally, is one that will produce the right policies for dealing with the menace of terrorism. But I can imagine a retired engineer in Barcelona writing thoughtful, critical essays quoting from American commentators and blogs, making the point that America is proving to not be a real ally because their reaction to 3/11 isn't what we wanted it to be. I can imagine that writer's words being read not only in Spain but in Italy, Poland, England, and elsewhere, reaching a wide audience.
I can also imagine persuading that writer on the merits of what strategies and policies will work and should be adopted. But I don't think that saying he has no cojones will be effective or persuasive. Calling them cowards, that they're on their knees, capitulating. A lot of what has been written in the wake of 3/11 are things I agree with, including the disappointment over the change in government. I too believe, and have written as much, that the election of a Spanish government which is saying they will pull their troops out of Iraq only encourages the terrorists to think that these methods work. People don't stop doing what they think works.
Arguing that point is one thing, but quite often commentary is also sprinkled with remarks that are guaranteed to cause a European reader to do the same thing so many of us have done: say "fuck you". Does it matter? Remember, we're not talking about France and Germany here. We're talking about a country that hosted the meeting, in the Azores, announcing the coalition's determination to go into Iraq. How we react and what we say is a big deal. Much of what's been written here since isn't likely to win friends and influence people in those European countries that do matter and are or have until now been by our side throughout this. It's something we need to keep in our minds as we write: how will this affect things? Will it help persuade, or turn people off? Am I writing something that will make that engineer in Barcelona see me as someone who does share the same goals and interests but is trying to persuade me that the way he thinks we should handle it is the right way, or will that reader conclude that I am just a condescending blowhard, the American equivalent of so many European commentators?
Israel has killed the founder of Hamas, "spiritual guide" of the terrorist organization. The BBC, of course, manages a sympathetic bio of this man with blood-stained hands.
I guess I don't have much good to say about the man to add to what the BBC does. So I won't say more about him. But I do congradulate Israel for a success in the fight against terror.
Nato was hoping a strong show of force by the first of its 2,000 reinforcements deployed throughout Kosovo at the weekend would restore calm, after three days of bloody violence by ethnic Albanian mobs.
United Nations and Nato officials, earlier caught off guard by the violence, began counting a grim toll of losses for Kosovo's ethnic minorities, mostly Serbs who bore the brunt of the attacks.
Caught off guard? You mean they weren't prepared? They didn't anticipate every eventuality in their pre-war planning? Despite the fact that critics warned that things like this could happen and violence might get out of control? You know, if only the Kosovo war had been sanctioned by the UN beforehand, things like this wouldn't be happening, right?
Maybe not, but color me dubious. The article does continue:
Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, also strongly condemned the security breakdown, in which rioters had forced some of Nato's 17,500 troops in Kosovo to retreat from positions guarding Serb communities. . .
Resurgent violence is forcing Nato and UN officials to reconsider their strategy and expectations less than 12 months away from the anticipated start of talks on Kosovo's final status.
Look, I'm one who thinks that things would likely be considerably worse if it wasn't for the intervention in Kosovo and efforts to bring stability to the Province. But this is just one example of how the operation in Iraq isn't unique for its flaws. Indeed, I'll again emphasize that if there was this kind of religious & ethnic strife in Iraq forcing coalition forces to retreat from their positions, it'd be splashed all over the front pages in lurid detail and the news channels would be running 24/7 reports on how things in Iraq have gone awry - as they should if that happens.
But Iraq is noteworthy because far from descending into a situation like this, progress continues. The terror attacks in Iraq have focused on precipitating just this sort of conflict. That has not happened. The Iraqi people have not succumbed to incitements aimed at inflaming internal strife, but have instead shown increasing steadfastness in rejecting that pitfall, and a commitment to peaceful political settlement of their disputes.
Note also that the UN presence in Kosovo that we're all repeatedly assured will be a salve that provides legitimacy and increases security and prevents a decent into violence in Iraq hasn't achieved that in Kosovo. But one is left wondering how well those connected to the UN have done for themselves in lining their pockets in Kosovo, as they did with the UN-supervised oil-for-cash program in Iraq. How many lives will be lost and fortunes looted before the world wakes up to the fact that sanctifying the UN may be a cost the world cannot afford?
