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"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Friday, January 16, 2004
Failures of Intelligence and Failures of Imagination
Kenneth Pollack writes a candid and clear-eyed assessment of the intelligence appraisals that led up to the Iraq war. For the most part it's fairly straightforward, but the former Clinton Administration official cannot stop from putting the boot in. Lets look at he piece. His essential premise is:
The Administration stretched those estimates to make a case not only for going to war but for doing so at once, rather than taking the time to build regional and international support for military action.
We'll have to see if this thesis is born out based on the information Pollack himself outlines. That is, whether broader international support for military action was likely to build over time, or grow more distant. With that in mind we'll have to remember the history of things: how the previous decade went and whether international support for resolving the matter grew or became less likely. As you read ask yourself if, in the wake of Resolution 1441 and the return of inspectors to Iraq, were the French, Russians, and Germans more or less likely to agree to support military action if the Bush Administration had been more patient with the process? If military action was delayed, what would be the likely outcome? Saddam complying and giving up his WMD ambitions? Or something along the lines of what happened in North Korea: an "international agreement" - in that case, the "Agreed Framework", in Iraq the return of inspectors with a promise of removing sanctions if nothing was found - and the dictator continuing to pursue his goals while everyone patted themselves on the back for a job well done?
Lets give Pollack credit where it's due, though. I don't mean to be too harsh on his article. Unlike many Democrats in the political arena, Pollack is fair in pointing out that the intelligence wasn't just manufactured by Bush, Cheney, Rove and the rest in Texas, but has roots going back to the '90s:
The U.S. intelligence community's belief that Saddam was aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction pre-dated Bush's inauguration, and therefore cannot be attributed to political pressure. It was first advanced at the end of the 1990s, at a time when President Bill Clinton was trying to facilitate a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and was hardly seeking assessments that the threat from Iraq was growing.
Which is very candid, both about the Intelligence and Clinton's interest in it. Furthermore, it wasn't just the U.S. intelligence community that came to the conclusions Pollack outlines in the piece. It was the broad consensus of Western intelligence agencies:
Other nations' intelligence services were similarly aligned with U.S. views. Somewhat remarkably, given how adamantly Germany would oppose the war, the German Federal Intelligence Service held the bleakest view of all, arguing that Iraq might be able to build a nuclear weapon within three years. Israel, Russia, Britain, China, and even France held positions similar to that of the United States; France's President Jacques Chirac told Time magazine last February, "There is a problem—the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right ... in having decided Iraq should be disarmed." In sum, no one doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.
Of course, Chirac's solution was to argue that the pressure should be taken off Saddam, sanctions lifted, and business as usual resumed. This was the position of the French (and Russian) government during the '98 crisis, when Clinton was pushing for international consensus, through the UN, to take strong steps against an intransigent Saddam Hussein. This is important to remember, because the mirage of forming a broad international consensus for action forms the keystone of Pollack's assertions about the Bush Administration.
The perceived nuclear threat was always the most disturbing one. The U.S. intelligence community's belief toward the end of the Clinton Administration that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and was close to acquiring nuclear weapons led me and other Administration officials to support the idea of a full-scale invasion of Iraq, albeit not right away. The NIE's judgment to the same effect was the real linchpin of the Bush Administration's case for an invasion.
"Not right away": how long were we supposed to wait? Note that intelligence estimates are always inprecise, estimates based on the best available information. Our intelligence didn't predict Pakistan was ready to build a nuke until they already had and it was too late. The implication then that we can time things perfectly, wait till the precise moment with no downside to delay, is a delusion. But one thing is clear and has been borne out in the aftermath of the war, and that is that Saddam's intentions to acquire such weapons never changed:
What we have found in Iraq since the invasion belies that judgment. Saddam did retain basic elements for a nuclear-weapons program and the desire to acquire such weapons at some point, but the program itself was dormant. . .
Iraq made determined efforts to retain some capabilities for biological warfare. It maintained an undeclared network of laboratories and other facilities within the apparatus of its security services, and as Kay put it, "this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW-capable facilities, and continuing R&D—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production." To disguise its biological-warfare programs Baghdad had scientists working on overt projects that were closely related to proscribed activities.
A great deal of other information substantiates the idea that Saddam at first decided to try to keep a considerable portion of his WMD programs intact and hidden. His efforts probably included retaining some munitions, but mainly concerned production and research elements. In other words, Saddam did initially try to maintain a "just-in-time" capability. However, it became increasingly clear how difficult this would be. In the summer of 1991 inspectors tracked down and destroyed Saddam's calutrons. Their discoveries may have convinced him that he would have to put his WMD programs on hold until after the sanctions were lifted—something he reportedly thought would happen within a matter of months.
So what is clear is he never gave up on his goals in this area, despite the fact that these were the terms Iraq submitted to in the wake of the Gulf War as ratified by the UN. Apparently, however, when Saddam violates the "consensus of the International Community" it is no big deal and taking action can wait.
Also important to remember here in light of Pollack's belief that an international consensus for action was right around the corner if only the U.S. waited longer is that Saddam had a good reason to believe things would turn out well for him: French diplomatic efforts were either by design or by accident working for sanctions to be lifted.
Given this precarious situation, Saddam probably decided to scale back his WMD programs (with the likely exception of work on proscribed missiles, which could be concealed by Iraq's permitted missile program) by destroying additional equipment, keeping the bare minimum needed to rebuild them at some point, in order to reduce the risk of further discoveries. . .
In short, Saddam switched from trying to hang on to the maximum production and research assets of his WMD programs to trying to keep only the minimum necessary to reconstitute the programs at some point after the sanctions had been lifted.
So we're arguing, in essence, over whether it was wrong to take action based on intelligence estimates that proved off the mark or "let inspectors do their work", find little, create the preconditions not for an international consensus on action to remove Saddam but for letting him off the hook, lifting sanctions, and leaving him to get back to the work he never intended to stop.
This is a prescription not for resolving the problem, but for following the same path Clinton put us on with respect to North Korea's weapons program: a mirage of a solution that lulls the "international community" into somnolence while the dictator quietly pursues his goals once attention has shifted. We know how well that worked out.
Pollack then enters the realm of speculation as to Saddam's motives. Who can say if his conclusions are right? The only thing this section shows is that reasonable people can reach a variety of conclusions based on available information. Are Pollack's right? Were there other considerations Saddam had, including a means for revenge against the U.S. at some future point? A combination of factors may have been involved - real life isn't usually cut-and-dried. In any case, the restrictions Iraq was bound to were not based on Saddam's motives and psychological dramas: he either complied with the ban, or he did not. Everything in Pollack's article points to the fact that Saddam had no intention of complying with the Resolutions, that he always intended to continue to violate them and pursue banned weapons programs.
Saddam used levers available to him, such as the "Oil for Food" program to divide the "international community" and get the very countries that Pollack insists would have, given more time and patience, come to support strong action against Saddam to argue for exactly the opposite. Pollack should be familiar with this because it is the situation the Clinton Administration faced. I don't know why Clinton officials don't seem to have learned from French intransigence. Pollack comes right up to the edge of perceiving this:
By 1997 the international environment had changed markedly, in ways that probably convinced Saddam that he didn't need to cooperate with the inspectors. The same international outcry?against the suffering inflicted by the Iraq sanctions?that prompted the United States to craft the oil-for-food deal was creating momentum for lifting the sanctions completely. At that point it was reasonable for Saddam to believe that in the not too distant future the sanctions either would be lifted or would be so undermined as to be effectively meaningless, and that he would never have to reveal the remaining elements of his WMD programs. Only in 2002, when the Bush Administration suddenly focused its attention on Iraq, would Saddam have had any reason to change this view.
But ultimately fails to make the connection.
Regarding the intelligence failures themselves, Pollack writes:
Everyone outside Iraq missed the 1995-1996 shift in Saddam's strategy?that is, to scale back his WMD programs to minimize the odds of further discoveries?and assumed that Iraq's earlier behavior was continuing more or less in a straight line. This misperception took on considerable weight in the following years.
Note that this section is titled "The Perils of Prediction". Much of what follows in the form of criticism of the Bush Administration's "manipulation" of the intelligence (in the section titled "The Politics of Persuasion") boils down to difference of opinion on which downside risks weighed more. On the one side there are those who believe that the worst-case-scenario was that the worst reports were false and believed we would overestimate Saddam's capabilities and intentions and take precipitous action. The unwelcome surprise would be that Saddam's programs weren't as robust as we feared. They wish we would have downplayed the intelligence on Saddam's programs. On the other side there are those whose worst-case-scenario was that the worst reports were true and the unwelcome surprise would be an attack. Arguably, one is a pre-9/11 mindset and another is a post-9/11 mindset.
Intelligence failures don't come only in the form of overestimating an enemy's capabilities. It can also come in the form of nasty surprises, and the downside risk may be worse things happening to you. Pollack emphasizes the case of those who believed making too much of Saddam's continued refusal to comply with the post-Gulf War cease fire terms was unwarranted, but even he acknowledges that people can come to differing conclusions:
From my own experience I know that it is hard enough to figure out what the reliable evidence indicates?and vast battles are fought over that.
But he does it in the context of emphasizing those who saw no urgency in resolving the situation.
There were many reasons to go after Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of September 11th. If the WMD case was emphasized, it is because people urged the Administration to go through the UN. Saddam's ongoing violations of UN Resolutions was the best case to argue in that forum. Nothing Pollack says indicates that Saddam ever had any genuine intention to comply with them or ever gave up his ambitions in this area. People who argue in effect for putting off the problem and delaying resolving it have yet to show that this would have improved matters. They take a welcomed surprise - that Saddam wasn't able to attack us with WMDs when we went after him - and turn it into a negative, as if we should have waited until he did have that ability.
They also argue as if it is a given that if we had allowed for more time, an international consensus to take strong action would have formed. The reality is that since the Gulf War the movement in the "international community" was away from taking serious, concerted efforts and towards a return to business-as-usual with Saddam. This, too, constitutes an intelligence failure of a very real sort: failure to accurately evaluate the policies of other countries and come to the right conclusions regarding their aims, goals, and attitudes towards us and our enemies. The fact is that France, for example, wasn't simply taking a "wait and see" approach, prepared to join us in due time. They were actively working against us in the diplomatic arena. Ultimately there is this:
The war was not all bad. I do not believe that it was a strategic mistake, although the appalling handling of postwar planning was. There is no question that Saddam Hussein was a force for real instability in the Persian Gulf, and that his removal from power was a tremendous improvement.
That, too, is an argument the Bush Administration has and is using. It is a correct argument, especially in light of September 11th, the event that also precipitated a re-evaluation of the sort of risks we're willing to take when it comes to "forces of real instability" that are antagonistic to the United States and its allies. Pollack recognizes this:
What's more, we should not forget that containment was failing. The shameful performance of the United Nations Security Council members (particularly France and Germany) in 2002-2003 was final proof that containment would not have lasted much longer.
But then fails to make the connection that greater international consensus (which always meant the support of France and Germany in particular) would not be forthcoming and was in fact a illusory prospect, growing less likely, not more likely. So when Pollack writes immediately after this about the "Administration's reckless rush to war", I have to wonder why Pollack fails to make the connection and what reasons he would have for further delaying action. This "rush to war" was, after all, in the wake of a dozen years of Saddam's intransigence and continued existence as a "force for instability" in the region, and a dozen years of drift in the "consensus" of the international community. How much longer does Pollack think we should have let this go on, and, more to the point, what good reason does he have for letting it go on? At what point were we not ultimately going to have to deal with Saddam? If we were ultimately going to have to deal with him, what would be the reason to delay it? Letting Iraq and the Middle East fester for a few more years is not a good reason.
As for Pollack's suggestions of intelligence reforms, I support most of those. But if we're to admit to the world that we overestimated things - something not quite proven as of yet - the rest of the world's governments need to come clean and admit that their intelligence agencies had reached the same conclusions and ours was not alone. They will also have to openly admit that Saddam had not nor ever intended to comply with the UN Resolutions, and face the conflict between their assertions of the authority of the UN combined with their policy of indifference to Saddam's violations of that authority when it came to cutting deals with him. Loss of trust cuts both ways, and in my opinion we have a greater reason to distrust the intentions of some of our so-called "allies" than they do with respect to us.
Update: Paul Craddick has more on WMD & Intel here. I agree that it's too soon to tell for sure. Just the other day some shells were found that had been buried for ten years or more. I'm not saying that's "The Find", but does illustrate that we don't know what's buried out there. Also, the WMD-to-Syria prospect continues to persist. For me the whole issue never really was what Saddam had on hand: it was the capability and desire to pursue WMDs. They had posessed them and maintained both the knowledge and intent to produce more, and intransigent antipathy to the United States and its allies.
There were of course multiple other good reasons to go after Saddam, and Saddam - not the Bush Administration - painted a bullseye on himself by his ongoing violations of the cease fire terms which created a casus beli. We could have either continued sporadic bombing and policies (such as sanctions) that affected Saddam not at all and left the Iraqi people in their plight and the problem unresolved, or dealt with the problem at its source. Those who castigate the Bush Administration seem to think the former would have been the more ethical policy, but there are good reasons to see this as wrong.
Do I want to get the intelligence right? Yes, I do. But I also recognize that if anyone's playing political games with the intelligence, it is at least as often as not the critics of the Bush Administration rather than the Administration itself, and though they ask questions, they don't face up to tough questions themselves when it comes to their own position on the matter. Their alternative consists of handwaves and platitudes.
Additional: William Pilgrim writes, via e-mail, to emphasize this point:
Throughout, Pollack fails to point out that the burden of proof in the whole matter rested, not just legally and formally, but substantively, on Iraq -- not on US intelligence. Iraq was under unique
international legal obligation to demonstrate in complete detail that it had abandoned all WMD-related activities. Iraq had over many years demonstrated its utter recklessness, duplicity, and capacity for titanic miscalculation and aggression (well-documented in Pollack's fine book). I think it's indefensible
that his whole analysis not be placed in that proper context. It was very reasonable for US policy makers to worry about the worst-case scenarios, very
reasonable for US intelligence analysts to give such scenarios full and even generous consideration.
I'll have a "substantive" post up later but it's taking me more time to write it than I thought it would. In the meantime, I saw the last episode of Cowboy Bebop yesterday. Which doesn't mean I've seen the whole series. I came in a bit over halfway through.
The animation artwork and the creativity that went into settings is really bonus-a-um. The characters kick ass, but they're possibly the most hapless bunch of characters who ever existed. Don't get me wrong - they're cool and competent, if damaged, people. But they're the most unlucky people who have ever existed (arguably having created their own fates, but ill fortune follows them even in small ways). In one episode, Spike ran out of fuel and was in a decaying orbit and had to be rescued by friends flying a beat-up, jury-rigged Challenger Space Shuttle (oops - we know that can't happen. It'll have to be a different shuttle). These high-flying bounty hunters spent most of the episodes I saw scavenging for food. In one episode they scored a bunch of shiitake mushrooms (that they had initially mistaken for the other kind of 'shrooms) and in another the Untouchable Shrew Woman returned from hanging out with a dilettante bounty hunter who Spike hated 'cause he was too much like Spike with "souvenirs" - a bunch of canned goods festooned with the abhorred Bounty Hunter's grinning visage. Easy come, easy go.
Thus, the biggest surprise in the final episode was when Spike returned to the Bebop and asked Jet if he had anything to eat, and Jet actually said yes! They actually had food on hand. *Stunned look*.
The rest of the episode unfolds pretty much without surprises even if I hadn't had any "spoilers". Which doesn't mean it isn't poignant. It had to happen that way, and how things unfold is still both cool and tragic - all around I would say. Also, it's pretty clear why it's Cowboy Bebop. It may be a Samurai/Ronin epic, but there is a lot of commonality between that genera and a Western Epic. I'm not saying they're identical, but they are similar. People die not empty, pointless deaths but for reasons, and if the hero (or one of the heroes) dies, he knows why and comes to terms with it.
Which does not alleviate the tragedy. In some sense, I think there is a reason that, for all that Faye is a bitch and all, selfish and the like, there is a purpose to identify with her and for similar reasons: we don't want Spike to go to his death, but for our own reasons, our attachment to him as a character. Why should it end, and like this? There are almost shades of Grace Kelly's character in High Noon in this, though Amy Kane in the end comes to see why Will Kane must do what he does. In Bebop this aspect is embodied in Jet. Part of oneself can still feel what Faye does in "not getting it" while another part understands why Spike needs to confront Vicious, and roots for him, and thus identifies with Jet in understanding that and not objecting. Jet asks Spike before he leaves "one question - are you doing it for her?" When Spike says no, Jet understands that Spike is doing it because he needs to, and that's all Jet needs to know: He doesn't just let Spike go without question, but once he gets an answer he is satisfied. But Faye will miss Spike, and so too will fans who became attached to his character. But there's always Roger Smith at least.
I do have to say one more thing, related to an earlier episode. If I answered the phone and a dog was on the other end of the line, I'd be the happiest person in the world. Dogs are good people. Ultimately, I think that's the real lesson of the series. After all, they don't call Jet the "Black Dog" for nothin', right?
Related to the Guest Blog post from this morning is a post at Airstrip One on the Entente Cordiale's centenary. There's also this on the EU's "undead Constitution". Both posts well worth following the links to check out.
In another part of campus, one of my Molecular Biologists friends, a woman, tried to "build bridges" with fellow female faculty members at a panel discussing "Women and Science." She was rudely shocked when she was attacked verbally and even shoved once because she spoke up to say that she didn't think "scientific facts" were either male or female! Further, she unwisely added that she didn't think there was any "female way of knowing" in science, and what she had seen thus far looked like a blend of mythology and wishful thinking! She told me afterward that she had discovered a great truth, "These women were not just confused about science. They were against it." Needless to say these women were from the social sciences and the humanities, and even now probably teach about current science as an evil part of a patriarchal plan to quash women'?s attempts at discovery. My friend by the way was called a "fascist" and a "tool of the Patriarchy" for her efforts, and will not soon be trying to build anymore bridges. . .
If the University is not mired in student protests, it is probably because the majority of the faculty is already marching to that familiar (and temporally distant) drum. As I have noted, the students are constantly being asked to believe that the United States is the font of all political evil in the world and that 9-11 was something we brought on ourselves because of our bigotry about "others ways of thinking" and our supposedly limitless and knee-jerk hatred of any nationality or race other than our own. I find this appalling, but I am somewhat soothed by the fact that many students seem to give such information a sleepy nod and go about their business. Occasionally, one will object privately to me as an advisor that she hates hearing her major in Business Administration referred to by the correct thinkers as a major in "Pre-Wealth"; another will object to being tricked into expressing a dissenting opinion, only to be pounced upon self-righteously by the professor. . .
If anything has remained truly the same, it is the Romantic hypocrisy of saying one thing then undercutting it by personal action, all the while pretending it isn't happening or that it somehow doesn't count - and what is Marxism or the current philosophy of the Left but a form of Romanticism. As I have pointed out in class, the assumptions of utopian thinkers, social planners, and neo-Romantics are arrogant ones: that the Romantic thinker can and should speak for people who can't speak for themselves - whether they actually can speak for themselves or not. That the social engineer is able to see The Big Picture much more clearly than selfish individuals and so builds a "community space" or a downtown mall that is unusable except by the homeless, the druggies, and an occasional pure-hearted leftist. Leftist philosophers, social engineers, and Romantic poets, we learn, believe themselves to have special insights and sensitivities--not to mention intellects--which see much deeper and ponder more cogently than do ordinary people. That is why they should be listened to - even put in charge. . .
It goes hand and hand with the automatic shame and condemnation students seem to feel for their country, and guiltiness about being white, middle-class, or of more than average intelligence. All in all, the New Left teachers have trained the majority of students to despise who and what they are.
Related of course to Steven Den Beste's series, which I commented on here in a post that contains the links to the USS Clueless posts thus far. Then, related to his most recent post is this section of the same Frontpage article:
In my own classes I see a real timidity and hesitation about interpreting a text in the fear that the evidence which emerges may be politically incorrect. These kids have been beaten into shape through the K-12 system and know better than to say anything untoward?or even to think it. The University, far from opening their minds and encouraging critical thinking, normally simply repeats the orthodoxies.
Some experiences from my classroom may illuminate this. In a seminar I taught called "The Indian Captivity Narrative." we read an account by Fr. Issac Jogues, a 17th century French Jesuit, about his tribulations among the Iroquois. They proceeded, after capturing him, to cut off his fingers and make him eat them, then jammed sharp stakes laterally into his arms to the elbows. A nervous female student suggested uneasily that we "shouldn't criticize the Indians for their beliefs" and that imaginative torture was "just their way of doing things." I agreed that it was but that its Native American nature did not make it any less painful or barbaric. I then asked the class a broader question: were we never to criticize another's beliefs? Was there a universal standard of human decency that should prevail irrespective of culture? After all, I pointed out, some could say that the Nazis were just "practicing their racial beliefs" about Jews, gypsies, homosexuals and Slavs as well.
The class was obviously profoundly disturbed by the question and what followed was first a tentative, then eventually a full-blown discussion which ended with basic agreement that some beliefs should be criticized. (But not those of Native Americans.)
The real "stifling of dissent" comes from those who don't want us to discuss things candidly, be they with respect to American Indians or the state of the Arab world and Saudi society.
Note, however, how the Frontpage piece starts. Things were not always as bad as they have become, the "academics" (or intellectuals) are not this way by force of nature. There has been a change or ongoing change, a worsening:
Has the university changed? Yes and no. It is less morally honest than it used to be; it is less self-critical; it is more professionally intolerant of other views, and more accommodating of intellectual nonsense; it also continues relentlessly to teach its students self-loathing. In this, I guess, it unfortunately reflects the terrible trends in the rest of the country.
One might argue it's been a change percolating from some time, and what we're observing is it bursting forth in it's full glory (or ignominy), into hypertrophy. One might date its origins to the aftermath of the Great War and the disillusionment that set in as a result combining with theories that spawned forth in tandem with that, as I have in the past in posts like this one or further back in history. Steven locates it with Plato as an original expression of it, I would say the Sophists were perhaps a more apt an early expression of this. But it doesn't have to be nearly as bad as we've let it get.
See also this post from last weekend for how fixing this at home relates to winning the war abroad.
Steel tariffs return - in China - as the EU goes further into trade war mode and the German economy shrinks. John Lott explains unemployment statistics in America. I say: employ 'em all. Let God sort 'em out..
Part III in Tom Friedman's War of Ideas appears, and Joshua Muravchik has his own thoughts on Arab democracy and its prospects. Jim Hoagland on doubt vs. hope and the transatlantic rift. See also the below post for related musings, and related to that post is an article on military and other resources: America's. Connected to that is our pledge to defend Taiwan. The Washington Post also wants us to stand up for Hong Kong and the democratic movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan. I can get onboard with that.
TWO WEEKS BEFORE CONGRESS PASSED THE IRAQ CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION WESLEY CLARK MADE THE CASE FOR WAR; TESTIFIED THAT SADDAM HAD 'CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS'
Less than 18 months ago, Wesley Clark offered his testimony before the Committee On Armed Services at the U.S. House Of Representatives.
"There's no requirement to have any doctrine here. I mean this is simply a longstanding right of the United States and other nations to take the actions they deem necessary in their self defense," Clark told Congress on September 26, 2002.
"Every president has deployed forces as necessary to take action. He's done so without multilateral support if necessary. He's done so in advance of conflict if necessary. In my experience, I was the commander of the European forces in NATO. When we took action in Kosovo, we did not have United Nations approval to do this and we did so in a way that was designed to preempt Serb ethnic cleansing and regional destabilization there. There were some people who didn' t agree with that decision. The United Nations was not able to agree to support it with a resolution."
Clark continued: "There's no question that Saddam Hussein is a threat... Yes, he has chemical and biological weapons. He's had those for a long time. But the United States right now is on a very much different defensive posture than we were before September 11th of 2001... He is, as far as we know, actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, though he doesn't have nuclear warheads yet. If he were to acquire nuclear weapons, I think our friends in the region would face greatly increased risks as would we."
More Clark: "And, I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem. As Richard Perle so eloquently pointed out, this is a problem that's longstanding. It's been a decade in the making. It needs to be dealt with and the clock is ticking on this."
Clark explained: "I think there's no question that, even though we may not have the evidence as Richard [Perle] says, that there have been such contacts [between Iraq and al Qaeda]. It' s normal. It's natural. These are a lot of bad actors in the same region together. They are going to bump into each other. They are going to exchange information. They're going to feel each other out and see whether there are opportunities to cooperate. That's inevitable in this region, and I think it's clear that regardless of whether or not such evidence is produced of these connections that Saddam Hussein is a threat."
Responding to the Steven Mayer article on the irrelevance of NATO that I linked to here, John Farren writes, via e-mail, a detailed critique. Unlike some "guest blog" posts, I agree with pretty much everything Farren writes here.
Mayer's Perspective is Wrong by John Farren
My overwhelming thought on reading this article was "good God, this could have come straight from the Quai d'Orsay!" The end of NATO and its replacement by an alliance nominally European, effectively directed from Paris (albeit practically useless) seems to me to have been a consistent French long-term goal since the end of the Fourth Republic.
They were unwilling to push this while the Soviets remained a threat, and West Germany unprepared to jeopardize the vital alliance. Now (Meyer is right on this, of course) the Soviets are history. And so now Paris is able and eager at last to make its move, and Germany is no longer obliged to see the US protection via NATO as its overriding priority.
French policy over Iraq has, I think, to be analysed in this context. Though reflexive anti-American mischief making, courting autocrats, appeasing Islamists, and domestic posturing, have been part of the rationale for French diplomacy over Iraq, I suspect the main motive has been Germany. using Schroeder's domestic problems with the anti-American Left and popular pacifism and reactions to US military actions, France has manoeuvred Germany into an anti-American stance. (In this Russian association was useful as cover if Schroeder was nervous, but not essential). France has found the crack it has desired for so long, wedged in a pry bar and is levering away with all its might.
This prize for France is so tempting that bad relations with the US are seen as a price worth paying. (Which only goes to show the sheer frivolity that passes forpolicy in Paris these days - I suspect even de Gaulle, anti-American though he might have been at times, would have regarded it as folly, but that is another matter.)
For much of the rest of Euro-NATO this would be disaster. The choice would be sign up to a French dominated EU defence, or try for bilateral agreement with the US and risk being punished politically/economically by a Paris-Berlin dominated EU. The UK (and Poland?) might be able to tough it out but a lot of others (Italy? Spain? central Europeans?) are likely to cave. Even in the UK, it might initiate, post-Blair, the replacement of broadly bipartisan strategies since 1945 into pro-US alliance Conservatives and pro-EU alliance Labour and LibDem camps.
This is not a good idea.
Meyer says of European states in relation to the US that "to have one's security and foreign policy agenda set by another is the height of servitude", but entirely ignores the reality that this also applies between European states. So "dividing Europe and thereby damaging the Europeans' efforts to find common ground" is not necessarily a bad thing, either for Americans or Europeans (except from the the viewpoint of Paris).
Granted, it would not be much of setback for US security if NATO does fold, given the political unreliability and/or military incapacities of many of its members. But nonetheless, NATO could still be a useful political forum, which gives the US an institutionalized input into European affairs, may be some use in anti-terror coordination, and is also a long-term insurance policy against emerging, perhaps unexpected, political/military threats. If the burdens on the US can be reduced, as by the redeployment of 1st Armoured and 1st Infantry, and pressure on Europeans to take a larger role in the Balkans, NATO in itself is not so harmful as to warrant being discarded entirely. Though for "out-of-area" operations, it can be forgotten. (The ideal solution would be to somehow engineer a French walkout, but I doubt they'll oblige.)
I hope I can be forgiven a rather selfish British perspective as well. Despite my misgivings over the abomination that is the draft constitution (daft is more like it) and unwillingness to sign up to the euro (at least at present), I remain inclined to favour the EU so long as it remains at bottom a treaty based association of sovereign states that respects British interests. A Franco-German dominated EU "common" defence and foreign policy is well beyond this limit. On the other hand, though a bilateral alliance with the US is an option, allowing the near Continent to be dominated by a Power or alliance from which the UK is excluded is a policy which goes against the lessons of history. So for the UK, NATO is an good solution.
Also, a bilateral alliances as an alternative would need to be highly formalized to avoid the occasions when countries have regarded America (justifiably or not) as disregarding ally interests simply because, after political shifts in Washington, previous arrangements are seen as no longer binding, and lack essential support in Congress or the Executive.
Extended Comments by Porphy: This was much the thrust of my own reaction. I will note that the French did, in a way, walk out of NATO once. They officially remained a member but ceased to participate in joint military planning and a number of other things. But I think that what they've learned from that experience is that they can cause more mischief as a full member of NATO than not, which is why they recommitted themselves to NATO: to bore from within as one of the tools to promote their dream of a Europe-only military alliance. On the one hand, their behavior in NATO reduces its effectiveness, thus providing them with ammunition to argue for a European defense structure, which will naturally be lead by France.
But of course they don't put their money where their mouth is, which is why they need Britain so very much. Britain has the military resources that the scions of France and Brussels believe is their prerogative and which would be at their disposal if only the world's military capabilities were distributed on the basis of worthiness rather than on the basis of who actually pays for them. It's a relative of the equalities and the redistributionist inclination, and is often (but not invariably) held by people adhering to that philosophical mindset. Thus, for example, there are periodic pushes that the US and Britain share our military technologies with "Our European Allies" who refused to express any interest in joining in developing them (that would have cost money!) They believe it is their right to be given them for free (and then compete to sell them in foreign markets for example to the Chinese or the next Saddam, having little interest in controlling the spread of military technologies to potentially hostile states) simply because we're all members of the international community and allies and friends and should share and share alike. Well, to a certain degree. They, being the vanguard reserve the prerogative to retain things for themselves and exempt themselves from the rules they expect others to adhere to. The simple fact is it is the French who have the hegemonist ambitions to impose their authority on others. That is one reason why the EU's rules are always more "bullying" than anything coming from Washington has ever been. The EU and its draft Constitution being driven by diktat disguised as cooperation and consensus.
I'll also note that, as with redistributionist arguments among individuals, the arguments for redistribution-of-power in the international arena creates envy and spite. This is a meme strongly pushed by France which believes it should have more power than it does and this should come not by France devoting its own resources to that end but by others giving them what they believe is their due, and almost inarguably France's foreign policy towards both the U.S. and Britain is driven primarily by envy and spite.
Additional: A pointless aside, but John also asked in his mail "what is this South Park you speak of, paleface" and this morning my friend Solmyr said, via ICQ, that he hadn't seen Dr Strangelove 'cause they never show it (in Finland) and it isn't even available to rent. And I'm all, like "what the hell?!?" No wonder the rest of the world doesn't "get" Americans and we don't "get" them. You all are being culturally deprived!
Update: Here in this article is an example of the equalitarian view at work as it expresses itself in international relations:
The rest of the world also watches in disquiet as the US tries to widen its military lead with new technology.
I have little or no interest in Howard Dean's personal relationships. In my opinion, there are plenty of reasons to oppose him and anything along those lines is well down the list. It seems that, if one goes by recent trends in polls, potential primary voters have begun to see that, too. I tend to discount polls somewhat in these two states, but the trendlines have been clear.
Yes, Dean has a temperment problem, but that's already noted and it can be discussed in legitimate ways without recourse to last-minute hit-jobs of the sort I despise when they're aimed at Republicans. My dislike of them does not change simply because it's an internecene Democratic thing now. One might wonder, for example, who leaked the Dean letter to Clinton when they did. I highly doubt it was a Republican, because it doesn't suit their political interest (timing is wrong) and a Republican is unlikely to have had a copy of the letter. But at least that was a legitimate policy-related item. This latest thing, which I won't link to, smacks of the "Bush Drunk Driving Arrest" item from 2000.
If it's not cool when such things target "our side", it's not cool when it targets "theirs" either.
Here's a good interview with Dennis Miller. A key point that I wish more Liberals would grasp is Miller saying:
I guess I fall into conservative when it comes to protecting the United States in a world where a lot of people hate the United States.
It's not that no Liberals react the same way. But all too many, when confronted with or perceiving hatred of the United States, react as of that means we're in the wrong. Do they do that when someone expresses hatred of Moslems? Or of Blacks? Or Gays? Or Jews?
Well, I guess more and more do when it comes to the later, react as if the target of the hatred is the problem. As Miller puts it:
I can't imagine anybody not saying that. Well, I guess on the farthest end of the left they'd say, `That's our fault.' And on the middle end they'd say, `Well, there's another way to deal with it other than flat-out protecting ourselves.' I just don't believe that. People say we're the ones who make them hate us because of what we do. That's garbage to me. I think they're nuts. And you've got to protect yourself from nuts.
Read the whole piece, including his opinion of Lenny Bruce, the comic that is exalted by many as the gold standard of comedic social criticism.
As the election season campaign heats up and America's progressives tell us "you never had it so bad", here's a book to read by one of the few remaining optmistic Liberals, Gregg Easterbrook. Here's a quote from the book in a good review of it:
American life expectancy has dramatically increased in a century, from 47 to 77 years. Our great-great-grandparents all knew someone who died of some disease we never fear. Our largest public health problems arise from unlimited supplies of affordable food. The typical American has twice the purchasing power his mother or father had in 1960. In 2001 Americans spent $25 billion - more than North Korea's GDP - on recreational watercraft. Factor out immigration and statistical evidence of widening income inequality disappears. The statistic that household incomes are only moderately higher than 25 years ago is misleading: households today average fewer people, so real dollar incomes in middle-class households are about 50 percent higher today. In 2003 we spend much wealth on things unavailable in 1953 - a cleaner environment, reduced mortality through new medical marvels ($5.2 billion a year just for artificial knees, which did not exist a generation ago), the ability to fly anywhere or talk to anyone anywhere. The incidence of heart disease, stroke and cancer, adjusted for population growth, is declining. The rate of child poverty is down in a decade. America soon will be the first society in which a majority of adults are college graduates.
And lots of other stuff to remember this year when political candidates try to tell you that the country is falling apart, everyone's getting poor, the economy is collapsing, the ecological sky is falling, &tc &tc ad infinatum ad nausium peddling doom and gloom and pumping a boundless well of pessimism for political gain.
Amir Tahiri isn't buying Iran's "cooperation". The UN is at least consistent. Meanwhile, new Iraqi border guards are being trained by us. If they're as effective as our border security. . .um, er, nevermind I guess.
David Brooks on the Brooks Democrats (former NYC Mayor Ed Koch has more) and Max Boot on the blind seeing. Stalin supporter honored with a stamp. Only in America. Or Cuba, or Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, or North Korea, I guess.
Well, maybe I was wrong in saying Sharpton wouldn't have Jackson's influence. But it's too soon to say for sure.
We picked up Number 54 on the "Most Wanted" list in Iraq, while the new NATO chief says we need more guys in Afghanistan. See yesterday's post related to the subject, but here's Kristof's take on the Democrats trade positions:
Perhaps the candidates are simply pandering to unions, or bashing President Bush. But my guess is that they sincerely believe that such trade policies would help poor people abroad ? and that's why they should all traipse through a Cambodian garbage dump to see how economically naïve these schemes would be.
Read the whole piece for why.
Criticism from conservatives angers Soros, sugar daddy of Moveon.org. Of course, from the point of view of guys like him, freedom of speech is protected and advanced by silencing criticism aimed at him and the Left, which tends to chill such delicate flowers. Soros proves again that the Left can dish it out better than they can take it.
That's today's roundup; check 'em out, Space Cowboy.
Oh! I almost forgot another thing that happened yesterday that I didn't get a chance to blog. First Joe Gibbs comes back to the NFL, now Dan Marino. The only other things that could happen is if Tom Flores went back to coach the Raadahs.
Well, that and the Second Coming of Vince Lombardi, but people are saying the Tuna covers that. If so, it's at the wrong team.
Following up on the previous post, I don't mean to imply that whatever Bush does in backing off from the "new tone" on agricultural subsidies will be because the Democrats Made Him Do It. What I am saying is that Bush has already shown a willingness to trim on these things for political gain, and I expect the election campaign will bring that out again. Also, separately and for their own reasons, the current Democratic crop ranges from a little worse to very much worse than Bush on this.
The fact is, Clinton had better policies on this subject - up until the Seattle '99 fiasco. It's been downhill ever since, in a bipartisan way. Now, I'm not saying Clinton was perfect on the issue before then - just better. But when he jettisoned it in '99, so did the rest of the Democratic Party, which never was very keen on it in the first place and went along grudgingly. Things are worse now, in a bipartisan way, and Bush hasn't exactly shown unqualified leadership when it comes to trade liberalization. He's said, proposed, and done some good things but then undercut them with bad policies such as the Farm Bill and Steel tariffs. Do I expect him to stick to his guns on going forward with negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating agricultural subsidies if it will cost him votes in key "toss up" States? Nope, I wouldn't put a dime on that bet and it's not because The Devil Made Him Do It. He's responsible for his own behavior, just as the Democrats are responsible for theirs.
The Summit of the Americas ended with at least some mention of the Free Trade Area. Of course I've made no secret that I think this is right:
Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo criticised Washington for refusing to reduce agricultural subsidies, while asking the region's poor nations "to play ball in the free trade court".
But America, perhaps unlike the EU, is moving in the right direction on that front - though I have my doubts about how well that will hold up this election year. Especially considering how far the Democrats have gone in the wrong direction. Whoever the Democratic candidate is will pound Bush on any concessions of agricultural subsidies, to curry favor with the farm vote - a vote the Dems have been losing and want to regain. This will, I'm betting, cause Bush to go the same route. It's not "All the Democrat's Fault" that he will, though: he's already demonstrated a willingness to do such things for reasons of domestic politics. All I'm saying is that both parties will be pulling each other in the wrong direction, and share the blame for it.
We're also getting on better with Canada, which is good news. Apparently the problem wasn't simply the Evil World-Hungry Americans, as many non-Americans and most American Democrats seem to think. The change in Prime Ministers in Canada seems to have played a role - which shows that not everything boils down to what America does. The attitudes and behaviors of others play a role as well. I'm not saying American leaders never do anything wrong, but I am saying that the governments of other countries are not infallible, nor are they simply receptacles that respond to the stimuli we give them. They act as well, and they too, not just American governments, can either contribute to poisoning relations or improving them. Too many people let them off the hook because it is in their interest to put the onus entirely on us - something that also does nothing to improve relations, by the by.
Brazil's Lula, for example, decided to take the Blame America approach, claiming that widening inequality between rich and poor countries was the problem. His method of solving that seemed to be telling America to change its economic policies so we wouldn't keep prospering so much. Lula's polemics are actually somewhat at odds with his policies, however. For all the Leftist-Socialist rhetoric, in office he's actually governing with some fiscal restraint and trying to improve the business environment - something that has raised the ire of other Leftist pols in Brazil. Lula may be Brazil's Mitterrand. If one thinks back to the early '80s, Mitterrand came into power in France with a full-bore Socialist agenda, but soon moderated his actual policies.
So I did manage to blog a fair amount yesterday despite the hub-bub of Packing Day. But it wasn't wide in range. Here are some "yesterday's news" things.
First, heh. Some thoughts on Dean: he's not running as he governed Vermont, or speaking as he has in the past. Either he's changed a lot in the last couple years, and IMO not in good ways, or he's being insincere in order to appeal to the "Core Democratic Voter".
Now, all politicians do that to some degree. But Dean has either changed very much, or he's setting new standards in duplicitous campaigning and insincerity, while claiming he should be supported because he's the only truth-telling sincere candidate out there. This seems especially weasel-like to me, and I'm not some naif who thinks politics is full of straight shooters. But he seems to have elevated it to beyond-Clintonian levels, ironically while running against the Clintonian control of the Democratic Party.
Elsewhere on the campaign trail, here's a picture of Clark (AKA Gen. Jack D. Ripper) pondering purity of essence and what the Bushies plan to do with his precious bodily fluids if they win re-election.
However, not every Liberal or Democrat is like that. Here are several discussing Iraq. If any of the Democratic candidates recognized what Paul Berman (referenced here) or Tom Friedman has - that just because Bush is for something that doesn't mean opposition to it is axiomatic - and campaigned that way, then I wouldn't be as disturbed by the prospect of a Democratic victory this November as I am. Joe Lieberman comes closest to such a candidate, but it's only so close and his chances are negligible.
Two other items I want to mention, unrelated to domestic politics. The first is that in Iran, President Mohammed Khatami seems to have found his missing spine. Sort of. We'll see how well he follows through.
The other one is the suicide of serial killer Harold Shipman in England. On the one hand, the family members of victims feel cheated, in part because Shipman's death denied them the answers they sought. But were they likely to get answers to "why" from Shipman? Straight answers? Or was it more likely they'd have gotten the kind of things Ted Bundy gave out over the years?
Put this in context with Shipman's suicide, which is characterized as Shipman exercising control. If he had lived, any statements Shipman would have made would have been in the same vein - a way of manipulating others, keeping them on a string. They would have been distortive, self-serving, and designed to further his self-gratification, not straightforward and candid.
Look, I understand why people would want some answers, feel they need to know why this was done. But they weren't going to get such answers from Shipman no matter how long he lived. They'll have to search elsewhere for what they seek.
Here is Haiti today. Rather than people saying "we told you so" to the Clinton Administration, though, it might be something to keep in mind regarding Iraq (relevant to the Will piece). Those of us who are optimists on Iraqi democracy have to recognize the potential pitfalls, and learn from past experience to avoid mistakes.
American Armor is leaving Germany for Iraq. This is as good a time as any to read an article by Steven E. Meyer on the irrelevance of NATO. The countries of Continental Europe really have only themselves to blame, for all that they try to scapegoat the U.S. for this. Their failure to devote sufficient resources to military modernization and the rather haphazard way they dealt with the Balkans crises, leaving the U.S. to do the dirty work but expecting command authority.
The counter-argument is "well, what about Afghanistan? Isn't NATO making a contribution there?" Yes, but that only illustrates the limits of their abilities. It is all the nations of Continental Europe can do to keep a few thousand troops in the environs of Kabul. The rest of the country is left as the responsibility of America and a few other Anglosphere nations. The Continental European nations say they can't do any more - something to remember, by the way, when people argue that if only we had brought them on board and gotten their support in Iraq the security situation would be different because of their presence. There probably wouldn't be much.
The fact is, for all that the countries of Continental Europe blame America for this, it is the result of decisions they made. Successive American administrations have tried to keep NATO relevant, tried to convince the countries of Continental Europe to devote more to military modernization, but unlike the EU the "bullying American hegemon" doesn't impose things on them by fiat. So, naturally, they spent their resources on the things the EU mandated (social charter stuff, for example). America is the target of their ire mainly because they do not believe that decisions they made should have any unwanted consequences and do not understand trade offs and opportunity costs, at least as it applies to them. The fact that they made choices that affected their relevance is something they refuse to face. This is one reason debate in the European establishment is skewed in ways not too different from how Mark Steyn describes the Arab world in the paragraph quoted in the post below. Stepping out of that consensus can cause you problems - being declared "un-European" and even fired for challenging certain assumptions. See also the essays at Innocents Abroad that I linked to here.
In the U.S., though, things like this are true because we don't impose an opinion monolith (or "consensus") on everyone, even in the Army. Of course it's true that some in the U.S. military agree with that piece. We don't demand uniformity of views, and open debate - if constructive and when constructive - is a benefit to us. One wonders if this is understood in Continental Europe or in the offices of the BBC EUBC.
Update: Sandy Peterson writes, via e-mail:
Wes Dabney (soldier) used to have a site. He commented on it something along the lines of, "I'm sure it's just a coincidence that Germany's economy started to tank around the time we started moving our troops out in the 90s."
He was stationed in Germany on 9/11, and they found they had a very loose perimeter. Caught a lot of people where they shouldn't have been spying on us.
One reason why the Arab world is in the state it's in is because one cannot raise certain subjects without it impacting severely on one's wellbeing. And if you can't discuss issues, they don't exist. According to Ibrahim Nawar of Arab Press Freedom Watch, in the last two years seven Saudi editors have been fired for criticising government policies. To fire a British talk-show host for criticising Saudi policies is surely over-reaching even for the notoriously super-sensitive Muslim lobby.
Of course we in the West will be subject to the same perils if topics are rendered taboo on the grounds of sensitivity.
Two City Journal articles relevant to the war. One, by James Q Wilson on What Makes a Terrorist takes a historical view and looks at the entire spectrum of terrorist motivations. The other, by George F. Will, asks if we can make Iraq democratic and takes a wide view as well.
Both are long but well worth reading thoroughly. I may come back to one or both with some thoughts of my own but time is somewhat limited today. We're packing for a show at work and blogging may be intermittent.
A quick mention of this piece by Heather MacDonald. Just so people aren't confused, it doesn't argue that most illegal aliens are out committing crimes (well, other than violations of immigration laws). But there are those who do. One law-enforcement technique has long been that if you have a known criminal but not enough evidence to convict on the main crime(s) right off the bat, you nail them for lesser offenses to get them out of circulation. The famous case of Al Capone's tax violations is an example of that. Our refusal to use violations of immigration laws to take suspected troublemakers out of circulation was one of the things that was brought up regarding the whole Sept. 11th bunch. They could have been deported for visa violations, but weren't. It's a disgrace that this is still the case today, and Bush's new proposal doesn't address the enforcement side of our problem.
Ultimately, I understand that most - probably the vast majority - of illegal immigrants are just here to work and don't want to cause trouble. I also recognize that we're not just going to deport them all. But our method of handling things so far is not aimed at fixing the problem in the sense that the enforcement side is still a void. This means not only that the problem will continue even if a guest worker program is implemented, but also we're still not "securing the homeland". People who are lawbreakers, criminals, can and should be deported for violations of immigration laws when that is possible. Ultimately, this issue is related to the war as well.
I took down what was originally here, for the only good reason that exists. But it left me with a quandary. Simply removing it without explanation might make it seem like it was insincere. But I can't give readers the explanation (sorry, and don't ask for one).
So I'm going to turn it into a post on something else. Life is often full of quandaries. Satisfying one very reasonable thing can mean sacrificing something else. I've mentioned that life is full of trade-offs before. Were it me, left to my own, I might do things one way. But other people who are perfectly reasonable people might see things another way. Accommodating your principles and those of others is harder than people sometimes think. (An aside that cannot be helped: I'm not alluding to any specific people here. I am speaking generally). Sometimes two equally worthy things, ideals, concepts, goals, whatever you might think of are mutually incompatible. One must then use judgement to decide which to pursue and which to sacrifice in the pursuit of the other.
In doing that, we'll sometimes err. Lets take war, for example: who can disagree with the abstract principle that war should be avoided? But in avoiding all wars at all costs, what other principles are sacrificed along the way? Is that sacrifice worth it? We went to war last year for reasons I believe were good ones. In my opinion, many of the common objections to it are unworthy and based on falsehoods and distortions, but that does not mean that there are no objections people raise that aren't reasonable. Some very reasonable people, thoughtful people, believe it was a mistake. And yes, for the folks who read this blog and the person writing it, some of those people are on the Left. Some of them are Liberals, and some of them are further Left. Just because a lot of the criticism and disagreement with the policy seems inane to us does not mean all of it is.
Reasonable people can come to different conclusions. One then lives with a decision, for good or ill. This is, by the by, one reason not to be too harsh on past administrations for not doing what, in retrospect, we think should have been done in tackling terrorism. It's also a reason why I think people who criticize the Bush Administration in intemperate ways might want to be less harsh. Has
