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"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Saturday, August 30, 2003
America's 21st Century Foreign Policy Part V
This post continues the series that started here with a look back dealing with some of the arguments often raised about our status, continued through Part II, with a discussion of why a global power or organization is needed, proceeded through Part III which outlined the main options and analized each. Then we have linkage to related sources on understanding the Fourth World War, followed by Part IV on the generational task ahead, which will be woven into future posts. See also War & Legitimate Questions and Of Course You Know, This Means WAR!, and Transnational Institutions or International Order for other related posts, mostly dealing with domestic "foreign policy" politics. I also recommend this post, including the discussion thread which developed several of the ideas that I am presenting here. For Part V we're going to return to some of the themes adressed earlier, and advance them further.
The Perils of Power And This Too Shall Pass
One of the concerns dealt with in Part I on is the ephemerallity that people ascribe to Empires or other strong powers and then drawing the conclusion that the more America comes to resemble an Empire the closer we come to our end. Well, in Part III I rejected "Empire" as a model for us to follow. But, in any case, the theory that people advance regarding Empires and their instability is misleading. Not incorrect as such, but misleading in the sense that, as an observation, applying it to Empires is applying it to a subset of things that are ephemeral and unstable. It can be applied to any human institution with equal accuracy, and in the history of the world it has actually generally been better to be the stronger power than the weaker.
True, our position is not permanent and will not continue indefinately. Nothing human or natural does. America's position may last for a long time, or a short period. Understanding that means neither that we should behave however we please, nor does it mean that we should submit to the authority of others in the expectation that when the wheel turns this means that whoever follows will automatically do the same. What it does mean is that we should do the best we can to insure that the world is hospitable to ourselves and our values, and if and when the time comes we pass the torch off in a way that will continue to promote those values, just as Britain did. That is one of the reasons I came to the conclusions I did in Part III.
People rightly want us to avoid the perils of Empire for reasons other than its ephemeral nature, though. They are concerned with what an "imperial attitude" may do to us and others, how it might deform us. This becomes one of the reasons that some have for prefering to "internationalize" crisis-management. Many accept or even insist that we will lead, but in conjunction and consultation with others - either through the UN, or NATO, or some other league of allies. The underlaying assumption is that such a mechanism will preclude the possibility that we turn into a new Roman Empire.
Irony of Ironies, all is Irony. Rome began its Imperial assent when it formed and led a League in Italy - first Latin, later to include other allies. Right up through the Late Republic and into the Early Empire, Rome prefered to view itself at the center of a network of alliances - as the senior partner, to be sure. But this is little different from what is proposed that we do, where even many of the staunchest American opponents of an "Imperial America" have as their premise that in acting "multilaterally", we will have the leadership role. Non-American (and some American) "multilateralists", of course, have a different model in mind, and we have discussed that elsewhere. But my point here is that as a safeguard against an "American Empire", this is a false one. It did not prevent Rome from rising to the status of an Empire, it paved Rome's way.
Like any easy solution, the problem with this method is that we can delude ourselves into thinking that in acting as the leader of a League of allies we have immunized ourselves, when we have not. We could then easily neglect the constant political engagement and vigilant necessary to really keep ourselves honest, thinking we're safe from a pitfall that we are instead walking right into.
A True Commonwealth
None the less, this does not mean we should spurn the idea of having allies, and simply go it alone; arguing that working within an alliance does not immunize us to Empire is not the same as arguing that we should avoid "entangling alliances" and not value allies. Quite the contrary - we should seek out and value allies, real allies, and consult with and cooperate with them, because there are many benefits to working with those who share our interests and values, even if it is not a prophalactic against Empire.
I also want to try again to clarify one thing that I may not have been sufficiently clear on in previous posts. People often seem to believe that those of us who have concluded that some of the countries who have traditionally been our allies are, for whatever reason, not currently interested in working in cooperation with us and wouldn't now have much to contribute even if they were genuinely willing to help, that this means we wouldn't want their help if it was sincerely offered.
I would prefer it if we had strong allies, who shared our objectives, who could give us significant help. In such a case their would have been a strong "international consensus" among our allies in Europe and elsewhere to respond firmly to Saddam's violations of the post-Gulf War cease fire terms, not in 2002 but in '98 (lets even go back to 91), ultimately removing him from power then. What distinguishes my position from the position of some others is that I don't substitute my preferences for reality. Understanding that wantin aint gettin is very important if we're going to have a successful foreign policy. This, indeed, is one level (among many) on which most Democratic politicians fail the "seriousness" test.
We also have to have open eyes about what constitutes an ally and what does not. Allies are nations with shared interests and objectives. Countries that invoke "ally" status to get us to put their interests ahead of ours are not allies. Allies don't make passive-agressive assertions designed to get you to drop your objectives so they can maintain their (different) objectives. Allies aren't "bullied" and don't complain of it, because there is natural cooperation due to an understanding of shared interests, values, and goals. So they don't have to sit waiting to be persuaded, with their arms crossed, insisting "you need to make the case" but from a position that nothing will convince them to support your position (that was, for example, France's position in the UN this spring). Allies are neither "bullied" nor preached to passive-agressively ("unsophisticated") or dragged along unwillingly, because they cooperate out of shared interests. Britain, Australia, and a host of other countries (such as Norway) are examples of allies; they worked with us without having to be cajoled because they shared the same view of the situation (or at least close enough to make cooperation on it possible).
Such countries are more accurately described as "neutrals". One can work with neutrals on other things, trade with them, maintain good relations with them, but without unreasonable expectations on either side. It is at times important to cajole and persuade neutrals to cooperate and help, and try to convince them to move from the "neutral" to "allied" category. In my opinion, we should pursue India in that way, and also (as Armed Liberal argues), Russia.
Many "progressives" are once again proving themselves reactionaries by being stuck in the past. Because some countries were allied to us in a conflict that ended over a decade ago, they still perceive them as allies even though circumstances have changed and so have their views (and ours). Countries have diverged - which is not unusual. Anyone with a solid grounding of history would understand that alliances rarely outlast the conflict that drew them together. (See here and here and here and here for some past posts on this theme).
Another thing we need to be clear-eyed about is the degree to which other countries can and cannot help, currently. The fact is that most of our allies, do to domestic political and budget constraints, still have '70s-era forces designed to fight a short, fierce war (against the SovWorld) close to home, in their own front yards. People often handwring about the combat-to-noncombat troop ratios in America's armed forces. It is a concern, because it means we have relatively few infantrymen on the ground to do what needs to be done in Iraq. However, all those noncombat support personnel are also what makes projecting force to Iraq possible in the first place. Most Continental European countries have difficulty operating in their own backyards on any scale without American support, much less on a large scale further from home. See this post for the example of Macedonia, a relatively small operation in Europe's own backyard.
Indeed, this is one of the reasons why in Afghanistan, where there is an international security force, they are reluctant to expand it outside of Kabul, despite the fact that the Karzai government would like them to and we would welcome it. The limited capacities of many countries is one reason why the Bush Administration is only half-heartedly trying to convince them to help. As was mentioned in that Press Conference with respect to sending additional American soldiers, doing so would require additional logistical support as well. The fact is that non-American forces would depend upon American logistical support, so the main reason to seek such help at all is mainly to relieve troop rotation pressures rather than increase the size of the force deployed to Iraq.
We also need to be clear-eyed about international institutions, such as the UN. In a column containing some points which are debatable, Victor Davis Hanson was on the money at least in writing this:
Little needs be said about the U.N. After its decade-long impotence where it came to disarming Saddam, and the circus last winter concerning the American invasion of Iraq, its officials will now have no interest in seeing the United States create a just society when they themselves could not. Indeed, many U.N. members probably preferred the old regime anyway. That allegation is not bombast or a slur — given the prominence of Syria in U.N. deliberations, and the elevation of Iran and Libya on key committees.
The U.N. has simply ceased to be the liberal, Western-inspired utopian body that arose from the ashes of World War II with the promise that reasonable, civilized nations could adjudicate differences rather than killing each other over perceived grievances. Instead, it is a mobocracy, where majority votes reflect a passive-aggressive stance toward the United States — guiltily desiring our money and support, while still eager for a televised forum in high-profile New York to pose and showcase its cheap, easy defiance of America.
Given the prominence of Syria and other dictatorships and dubious countries in the UN, and the fact that in the UN countries like Libya are seen as fit to pass judgements on Human Rights while Israel is not, it is clear that the UN is no longer the embodiment of liberal, democratic values. It has become an institution aimed at making the world safe for Dictatorships, not Democracy. In order to have a successful foreign policy, we need to be clear eyed on the limitations of the UN.
There may be an alternative. "Welding together some other kind of Commonwealth of Democracies in which other countries play a more meaningful role", to paraphrase what Armed Liberal wrote in the comments section of his post. I prefer the concept of a "Commonwealth" to Armed Liberal's original formulation, which was that of a "International Collective". What needs to be done is we need to have a serious "sit down" with our allies (and friendly neutrals) and discuss things with them in a grave manner. Countries that are willing step up to the plate and commit the resources - financial, materiel, political - to upgrading their military capabilities (to at least Britain's level, or Australia's for smaller nations) so that they would be able to make a more substantive contribution beyond a willingness to accept "having a say" and a "share of authority" can be given a seat at the table. Those who are willing and able to make such investments demonstrate a serious commitment to true cooperation. Those who don't, who aren't willing to make sacrifices (fiscal and otherwise) as we and the British do that demonstrate a willingness to be able to provide help commensurate with the consultation-voice they want are not serious partners and do not deserve a place at the table. Indeed, the fact that they have little to offer beyond their bitching and moaning and a willingness to accept authority without responsibility is one of the reasons why there is little interest in convincing them to help at the moment.
Now, whatever is decided at such a "sit down", countries can be added later as they develop (such as India) and do decide to engage in the investment of resources and effort to be able to substantively contribute in significant ways beyond wanting the deciding vote in how we use our resources to pursue policies can join later. Also, dictatorships, even "our" dictatorships (like Pakistan) Need Not Apply. They can be friendly, but they cannot have a "seat at the table" of the Commonwealth until they make democratic reforms. This would give an incentive for "friendly" authoritarian regimes to pursue such reforms, and also indicate that we're serious in making a distinction between democracies and dictatorships, even in cases where the latter are allies. The principle should be: No one gets a vote in international institutions unless their people get a (real) vote at home, which works hand in glove with a principle that: No one gets a vote unless they accept the duty of really sharing the burdens and responsibilities - not just a vote on how others (the U.S.) can and cannot act with our own resources, but a serious commitment of their own. Britain, Australia, and a few others (sit down, Canada - Canada does not) pass the test. This would also create the incentive for those countries to make such a commitment - their political leaders could go to their people and say "look, there is a reason we need to spend more on defense. We want capabilities to match our ambitions when it comes to the role we see ourselves playing internationally."
Not only would this be good for us now, but it would put us on the path that I believe would be the right path to be on for that future time when we are not as dominant as we are now. We would have created a true internatnional partnership that would carry on from there, one that hopefully would not be as hypocritical and corrupt as the UN has become, one founded on principles that are both lofty but also grounded in seriousness.
Likely to be lightish posting this morning. On the other hand, I should have Part V of the "America's 21st Century Foreign Policy" series posted either tonight or tomorrow for those who are interested.
In the meantime, in betweentime, apropos of the "Whither Europe" debate, a piece on The Islamization of France worth reading.
Also, serious attack on Shia shrine which killed up to 20 people, including Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Instead, it is a mobocracy, where majority votes reflect a passive-aggressive stance toward the United States — guiltily desiring our money and support, while still eager for a televised forum in high-profile New York to pose and showcase its cheap, easy defiance of America.
Feel free to enter "passive-agressive" and "passive agressive" into my search engine and have fun reading what pops up. {*_+}
The arguments of the Norwegian Blogger seem pretty reasonable and realistic. I would be the last person to state dogmatically what Europe will look like in 10 or 20 years. Actually, I've been just trying to come to grips with what Europe is and is not right now. Consider that three years ago I was enough of a fan of Paul Krugman's to order his books through Amazon and read them. And I did actually read almost everything Eric Hobsbawm published: his books were part of my (confessedly slanted) formation and his Brazilian publisher's a friend of mine. If I had tried to foresee what the world would look like in, say, about a week on September 10, 2001, I'm sure I would have failed miserably. And the only historical law or constant I believe in the the one that points to unintended
consequences.
Nevertheless, I'd say that some of the things he points out mayb be working better in some parts of Europe than in others. What's the case of a small country like Norway might not apply specifically to France. France would have to go through some radical changes to begin working again as a real democracy. Here I think a bureaucratic elite has taken over too much power and many, probably most, democratic mechanisms became merely formal: from the parliament to the press, media, academia etc. The simple fact that those Frenchmen who depend on tourism, from restaurant and coffee-shop owner, to hoteliers, waiters, tourist guides and so on, had no independent voice and couldn't openly put pressure on the government while it was alienating its largest pool of clients, that is, the US, seems somewhat alarming to me. The lack of an independent association of the retired that should now be protesting against 13.000 deaths is a bad symptom of the weakness of civil society here. Even the lack of a true blogosphere tells a lot about the absence of individual initiative. The problem here won't be solved by the next election, or the next. New parties are needed, other, independent, newspapers, neighbourhood, trade, municipal associations that are not connected either to the government, to the bureaucracy or to the unions. I see no signs of those emerging. For the time being France seems to be the new sick man of Europe.
Besides, maybe if one takes the long view, that of decades, the Norwegian Blogger is probably right. But many unpleasant things can still happen over a period of years. And I'd add that he doesn't seem to give enough importance to the changed international context. Thus, even up to 911, the assimilation of the Muslims in Europe could be considered a local or internal problem. But when those unassimilated elements are plotting in Hamburg, Milan, Barcelona or London and attack that will result in thousands of American dead, I don't think that's the case anymore. I mean, we're not talking now about higher criminality on the streets of Rome, of homelessness in Oslo or whatever. The Muslims immigrants for the foreseeable future belong in a different category than the Senegalese or Vietnamese or Peruvians.
If I’m allowed to risk something like a prediction for Europe or, rather, a couple of predictions, I would, first say that, in the short term, the future of a closer, more monolithic union of the continent’s countries doesn’t look so bright and, if that’s something I would have regretted only two years ago, now I think
that’s a pretty good thing. I’d also say that there’s a considerable risk that
Europe won’t be anymore the example of affluence it has been since at least the 60s or 70s: the chasm between the continent and the US looks big enough for Europe to be, by now, considered not part of the first, but a new second world of sorts. Again, I don’t see the elements needed for Europe to get close, not to mention overtake, the US economy for some while. Surely one of its greatest handicaps is a culture of denial. Unfortunately, in France at least, the Muslim immigrants won’t be assimilated by the state. The best chance they’d have would be if there were something like an entrepreneurial culture in place that allowed them to get rich. I don’t have to tell you how much the country would have to change for this to be possible. Finally, not being now at the (geographical and geopolitical) center of the Cold War, the political importance of Europe will drop, though I don’t know how much. Even in the Middle East, which is basically the closest neighbourhood to their own, they’ve managed, through misguided and slanted policies, to become basically irrelevant. Soon they’ll also have to make up their collective bureaucratic mind whether they’ll use limited financial resources to help keep Assad fils in power or to buy air-conditioners for some hospitals. Whatever happens, much points to the fact that there was a long-lasting post-war Euro bubble which allowed the continent a larger share of world power and a higher level of affluence than it could reasonably have in realistic terms."
Porphy: I'll probably have some thoughts of my own on both the Norwegian Blogger posts & Nelson's response, but it probably won't be today.
Bruce Bartlett is on the money regarding this issue:
while direct wage costs may be 80 percent lower in India, total labor cost savings are much more modest — 10 percent to 15 percent for most companies. The reason is that there are important added costs to doing business in India that eat up much of the saving. Higher costs for travel, communications, equipment and managerial oversight are some of these. But the largest costs are for lower productivity, cultural differences and incompatible systems.
The Deloitte Consulting report goes on to detail several case studies where companies went into India thinking they would achieve significant savings only to find it was not worth the effort. Other companies undoubtedly will make the same discovery.
Another reason service providers may find outsourcing unprofitable is that productivity in the U.S. service sector is rising sharply, as the result of heavy investments in computers, software and telecommunications in recent years. Two new studies document this fact.
If you're interested in the subject, read the whole piece.
Update: Here's a good piece on the state of manufacturing in America today:
the National Association of Manufacturers' Web site shows that "manufacturing's share of the U.S. economy, as measured by real GDP, has been stable since the late 1940s.
. . . The overall share remains the same over the business cycle." It is impressive for any private activity to maintain a stable share of GDP, since government spending has risen from about 20 percent of GDP in the early '50s to 30 percent since the '80s. Manufacturing doesn't need protection from foreign countries; it needs protection from domestic governments.
Mr. Uchitelle claims "the essence of a great world power is its edge in producing not services but manufactured products." By that standard, the two greatest world powers are Turkmenistan (with 39.8 percent of GDP attributed to manufacturing in 2000) and Cuba (at 37.2 percent). In China, services have risen from 21.4 percent in 1980 to 33.7 percent by 2002. In Hong Kong, manufacturing declined from 22.4 percent of the economy in 1980 to 5.2 percent in 2001. . .
Increases in productivity from improved machinery and skills are the reason manufacturing employment falls most of the time, as it does in farming, even when output is growing briskly. From 1990 to 2000, manufacturing employment fell by 0.4 percent a year in the U.S., by 1.8 percent a year in Japan, and by 2.5 percent a year in Germany.
This man came to mind as I thought about the debate over whether we have enough troops in Iraq. The truth is, we don't even have enough people to direct traffic. This troops issue, though, is more complicated than it seems — because it's not just about numbers. No, what we need in Iraq today is something more complex: we need the right mentality
Now, I don't think we need American soldiers directing traffic. That's where I think guys like Friedman have the wrong mentality themselves. There should be Iraqis capable of the minimal task of traffic direction, just as many New Yorkers took it upon themselves on the spur of the moment during the blackout. As George Will puts it today:
All this is pertinent to the boiling debate in Washington -- Wolfowitz insists that it is much more a debate here than in Baghdad -- about whether the United States needs more troops in Iraq. He says the real need is for more Iraqi-staffed instruments of social control -- troops and police. Hence plans to send 28,000 Iraqis to Hungary for police training. . .
If, in the run-up to war, the CIA and State Department had been less opposed to the war, and less hostile to what they called "externals," meaning Iraqi exiles. This hostility expressed a perverse premise: Those who remained in Iraq under Hussein were somehow morally superior to those who went into exile to work for liberation. Absent hostility toward "externals," more Iraqis competent to work on public safety and civil administration would have arrived immediately behind coalition troops.
If the CIA had more accurately anticipated the continued opposition of Baathist remnants and had been less optimistic about the postwar performance of the Iraqi police, the problems faced now might have been substantially reduced.
We are not "rebuilding" Iraq. We are "building" a new Iraq — from scratch. Not only has Saddam Hussein's army, party and bureaucracy collapsed, but so, too, has the internal balance between Iraqi Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, which was held together by Saddam's iron fist. Also, the reporting on Iraq under Saddam rarely conveyed how poor and rundown Saddam had made it. Iraq today is the Arab Liberia. In short, Iraq is not a vase that we broke to remove the rancid water inside, and now we just need to glue it back together. We have to build a whole new vase. We have to dig the clay, mix it, shape it, harden it and paint it. . .
Yes, we need more boots on the ground, but we also need the right mix: military police, experts in civilian affairs and officers who know how to innovate. Sure, there is still a guerrilla war to be won, but the main task today for U.S. soldiers in Iraq is political: helping towns get organized, opening schools and managing the simmering tensions between, and within, different ethnic groups. If Bulgarian or Polish troops can help do that, bring 'em on. If not, stay home.
As the fall of 2003 approaches, Iraq is two battlefields and one birthplace. On one battlefield, the venomous regime of Saddam Hussein dies a slow, painful and dangerous death. Big vipers die killing because killing is their be-all and -- to the last -- their end-all. With cash stashed in Iraq and corrupt banks throughout the world, with weapons littering Iraq's landscape, the snake still has ready poison. It's why Americans who understand the enemy continue to apply deadly, insistent military and political pressure.
The second battlefield is a large "strategic" ambush, and the enemy entering the kill zone still hasn't quite figured it out. From an American perspective that presents an opportunity, an opportunity with risks, but one with huge potential payoffs.
In Iraq, America is ambushing Al Qaeda and tag-along jihadis powered by the fantasy ideology of Islamo-fascism.
The ambush was never completely secret. In a column from Jan. 29 of this year, I wrote: "The massive American build-up around Iraq serves as a baited trap that Al Qaeda cannot ignore. Failure to react to the pending American attack would demonstrate Al Qaeda's impotence. For the sake of their own reputation (as well as any notion of divine sanction), Al Qaeda's cadres must show CNN and Al Jazeera they are still capable of dramatic endeavor. This ain't theory. Al Qaeda's leaders and fighters know it, and the rats are coming out of their alleys."
Astute observers have dubbed America's ambush the "flypaper strategy."
On 9/11, Al Qaeda chose the battlefields: New York and Washington. American leaders have decided it's better to fight terrorists "over there" than "over here." So our soldiers slug it out in the Sunni Triangle instead of Seattle. U.S. and British soldiers, and increasingly Iraqi police, are engaged in this fight. It's tough. In eight to 10 months, we'll know if it worked. Spies "walk back the cat." Jihadis entering Iraq connect back to terror cliques in rogue states. America intends to make excellent political and military use of the jihadis' "intelligence trail."
For real freedom fighters, Iraq's two battlefields are one common struggle. Occasionally reporters glimpse Al Qaeda's and Saddam's direct links, the Ansar al-Islam gang in Kurdistan being the most obvious. However, the division between secular and religious anti-American terrorists is -- as scholar Faoud Ajami said this week in The Wall Street Journal -- a "distinction without substance." Saddam's Baath loyalists and bin Laden-inspired Islamo-fascists always understood politically free people were their common foe.
Which brings us to the birthplace. Iraq is the birthplace of something every committed human rights advocate should praise -- a free land escaping murderous tyranny. Baathists and Islamo-fascists are both old-time autocrats, the control freaks of the past trying to kill the future in its crib.
It's an exhausting and bloody birth, and understandably, given the legacy of murder and theft. Yet Iraq is on a time-line for an elected government. Even The New York Times, the daily voice of American quagmire and catastrophe, admitted Iraqis support the U.S. effort in extraordinary numbers: "Four months into the occupation, the rebellion against American forces, though fierce, is still largely limited to the Arab Sunni Muslim population and its foreign supporters and confined to a relatively limited geographic area."
Iraq's success has frightened autocrats throughout the Middle East. Autocrats in Taliban caves, in Iran, in Syria, fear Iraqi democracy. Coalition success in Iraq is forcing the House of Saud to choose between democratic evolution and fatal revolution. . .
August has been a hot and horrid month in Baghdad. Fascist and Islamo-fascist thugs are testing the collective will of America, the Iraqi people, Britain, and their coalition allies.
Update: Add this piece by David Ignatius to the discussion:
Colby's critique of "overmilitarization" in Vietnam is worth reviewing now, at a time when many analysts are urging President Bush to send more troops to Iraq. . .
Sending more troops always sounds like the right answer when the going gets tough on the battlefield. But as Vietnam showed, deploying a bigger, heavier force isn't necessarily a wise choice. The large U.S. garrison, with all its attendant logistical needs, might simply reinforce the impression that it's America's war -- making the enemy more aggressive, our local allies more passive and U.S. troops more vulnerable. . .
The Iraq debate should be about strategy, not a numbers game. America's job is to give Iraqis the tools to create a modern, secure country -- and then get out. The right force is the one that will accomplish this mission.
Vegard Valberg has returned from a hiatus, in particular with two long and thoughtful pieces on the future of Europe, Part I and Part II countering some of the arguments common in parts of the blogosphere (including ones sometimes made here). Here's a key point in Part I:
One of the biggest mistakes is the indefinite projection of current trends, let me assure you that current trends will not, and cannot be projected indefinitely. There comes a point past which current trends can no longer be supported, there are many reasons for this, but the main reason is Democracy, the second reason is pain, and in some cases the third reason is wealth.
That's worth remembering. Of course, some of the people he's arguing against also point to the fact that current trends in Europe are unsustainable, but they (we) tend to presume they will reach hypertrophy followed by collapse and/or crisis (fascist takeover or Union of European Social Democratic Republics ruled by a Soviet politburo) rather than be reformed through democratic processes, which is not necessarily the case. The posts are well worth checking out because they are a well thought out counter-argument to some of these fears. I don't know if I'm convinced. I may have some thoughts on the posts but it'll have to wait for another day when I've had more time to ponder.
Additional: From Nelson Ascher via e-mail a link to an article deploring the fact that debates in the U.S. on "Europe" tend to fixate too much on France:
The administration needs to correct the exaggerated concern with France that is skewing its priorities. For one thing, a neurotic obsession with Gaullism - the chief foreign policy heritage of the former French president, Charles de Gaulle, to steer a course independent from that of Washington - is detracting from America's understanding of Europe and the European process.
This is instilling a myopic fear across Washington that Europe, under the "French spell," is evolving into a competitor that will challenge the United States in the future. In response, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his colleagues have formulated a divide-and-rule approach for Europe.
It is absurd that the U.S. policymaking apparatus should so gravely misjudge the role of an increasingly marginalized political mantra. Such behavior is reminiscent of America's tendency to overestimate the power and potential of the Soviet Union during the cold war. In addition, Washington's determination to punish and isolate France on the basis of a false premise is putting intolerable pressure on the European process and Europe as such, and further divorcing Washington from Europe's mainstream.
In the interests of moving the crippled trans-Atlantic relationship back on track, let's set the record straight: Gaullism does not carry a Europe-wide appeal. It is nothing more than an effort to project narrowly defined French interests globally through the manipulation of the EU experiment. This political conviction is not exactly popular across Europe. Anti-Americanism on the Continent is a no-confidence vote to the U.S. approach in international security management, not a "yes" vote to Gaullism.
I'm not sure I'm convinced but it is another thoughtful counter-argument. Read the whole thing.
In related news, ever since these posts on their editorial content, which included a letter written to them, the Financial Times has coincidentally moved their "comment and analysis" pieces almost completely to "subscriber only". . .
U.S. intelligence suspects Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have finally been located.
Unfortunately, getting to them will be nearly impossible for the United States and its allies, because the containers with the strategic materials are not in Iraq.
Instead they are located in Lebanon's heavily-fortified Bekaa Valley, swarming with Iranian and Syrian forces, and Hizbullah and ex-Iraqi agents, Geostrategy-Direct.com will report in Wednesday's new weekly edition.
U.S. intelligence first identified a stream of tractor-trailer trucks moving from Iraq to Syria to Lebaon in January 2003. The significance of this sighting did not register on the CIA at the time.
U.S. intelligence sources believe the area contains extended-range Scud-based missiles and parts for chemical and biological warheads.
Mutually-lucrative Iraqi-Syrian arms transactions are nothing new. Firas Tlas, son of Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas, has been the key to Syria's rogue alliance with Iraq. He and Assad made hundreds of millions of dollars selling weapons, oil and drugs to and from Iraq, according to the May 13, 2003 edition of Geostrategy-Direct.com.
The CIA now believes a multi-million dollar deal between Iraq and Syria provided for the hiding and safekeeping of Saddam's strategic weapons.
Not surprisingly, U.S. inquiries in Beirut and Syria are being met with little substantive response, U.S. officials said.
In a post yesterday I mentioned some of the problems with the Stryker armored vehicle. This prompted James Pate to write an e-mail that I'm going to post as a "guest blog"
Stryker Flaws By James Pate
Glad you have noticed some of the problems with Stryker. It is actually much worse than Mr Scarborough described. The original hype and reason for existence was that we could get a brigade of these armored cars to a crisis point in 96 hours. Those were the published parameters. The same parameters indicated it would take about 230 C-17 loads move this one brigade. Now I would remind you that we have projected about 180 C-17s for the total buy. Basically, it would take the entire air force transport system to get a brigade anywhere, using planes that really exist. Another problem arises, we need to move the food, fuel, ammo, communications, and personnel there also. Problem, we are already using our entire air force to move the armored cars. Also specified as part of this Stryker plan was that the brigade would not have any artillery. The air force would be the artillery. Problem, if you are moving the armored cars and logistics train by air, how the hell do you also move a couple of air expeditionary wings at the same time with the same transport and refueling assets? Transport in a C-130? Absolutely not. The Army lies in your face. Sure you can move some of the models, without applique armor and ammo and fuel. Other models have to have their weapons dismounted from the vehicle. Once in, you can't move around in the plane except by crawling over the vehicle. The models they are sending to iraq will have the applique armor. That slows the vehicle down to a crawl and makes it completely road bound. It also tremendously increases fuel consumption.
But, in actual truth, the idea of moving any brigade with its equipment, by air is absurd, unless it is in humvees and light trucks. For all this you get a military vehicle suitable for breaking up bar fights. There is a lot more information available on this vehicle which makes it look even worse. The reeeeaaaallll problem is that it diverts 12 billion from really useful programs and systems for this non starter. This fiasco is the brain dead child of Gen Shinseke as a sop to politically connected industrial concerns. The bush administration fully knows all the problems with this thing, but does not have the political will to terminate it, which is especially sad since the M113 armored vehicle we already possess is far superior to the Stryker and could be fielded for 2 billion rather that 12 billion AND it DOES fit into a C-130.
Porphy additional: In some respects this is even worse than it may seem. Dispensing with integral artillery is a very bad idea. As effective and accurate as air support has become, even when it's deployed in an area it cannot completely replace ground artillery. A plane can only carry so much. Sure, so can dirt artillery - but their load capacity is significantly greater. Any piece of artillery can fire far more rounds in a given time than an equivalent air asset can drop in bombs.
Traditionally, Airborne and Airmobile forces have recognized that no matter how good air support is, they need artillery. Thus they have had towed artillery that can be airdropped. The idea that this light unit will not have artillery scares me more than the incapacities of the Stryker. Artillery is often decisive and the side that doesn't have enough of it is at a very grave disadvantage.
Apropos of recent post, Nelson Ascher shares a theory (sent via e-mail). I'm going to post it as a "guest blog". For now I'm not going to comment on where I agree and where I'm not sure. I will say that it's fairly clear that there is a constituency in Europe for having American resources tied down long-term: witness the arguments in the UN this spring over the Nth Resolution on Iraq, where the French, German, and Russian position was that Saddam should be contained by the indefinite deployment not of their troops but of ours, but also that he should be left in power so they could keep conducting deals with him to their benefit, and keep the "stability" of the Middle East intact - again to their benefit. As with any general theory, where he writes "Europe" obviously this isn't every European in every country, or even every European in France and Germany - he's describing the consensus of the political class. With that said, here it is.
Europe vs. America: a New Cold War By Nelson Ascher
Arguably, the Cold War was the best, or one of the best periods ever for Western Europe.
They got rich, their continent was peaceful, their defence was assured by the US and they mattered because they were positioned between the two contenders who, though sometimes put pressure on them, most of the time found it more expedient to buy them off. It was a period of economic growth and also the time when a certain project cherished both by France (Napoleon) and Germany (Adolf) was actually implemented, namely, the unification of the continent. Let me state clearly that perhaps the majority of the French weren't wholly opposed to the unification as it was put into practice between 39 and 43/44. Nowadays, when Germany and France are as close to each other as they can possibly be, it wouldn't be entirely unbelievable that many in both countries see those years as a prelude for what came later, as a viable project that was interrupted by Anglo-American interference and by unreasonable Russian resistance.
Anyway, perhaps the end of the Cold War could be seen, from the Western European standpoint, as not altogether positive. The role of Europe in the world was reduced. Those noisy, misbehaving Eastern Europeans were set free and started thinking they had rights. Worse, Western Europe had now to think about her own defence and also to compete commercially and industrially with the US in unfavourable conditions. That's because while the Americans were busy watching the Russians, the Europeans could develop their own brand of neo-imperialism in Africa or Latin America and elsewhere, selling overpriced goods to corrupt dictators they helped to keep in power and so on. In other words, the Cold War created in many places a vacuum where the less competitive Euro economies could prosper.
If there had been perfect peace, that would have been bad for them, not necessarily, in political terms, at home, but abroad, because they'd lose their chance of practicing imperialism on the cheap. Then, this would have actual repercussions at home: they'd lack money to pay for their own inefficient agriculture, their expensive and, as we've just seen, worthless socialized medical systems etc.
What , then, after the Cold War, would have been the ideal solution for Western Europe? A second Cold War.
Thus, if they haven't actually instigated the Arab Muslim world against America (but maybe they have, mainly helping to give the Israeli-Palestinian issue an importance it never had and not allowing it to be solved), they surely welcomed the possibility of seeing 1/5 of mankind in bad terms with the US. A kind of low intensity warfare, with sporadic not too big terrorist attacks and Clinton's kind of reaction (the same, by the way, as that of the first Bush, Reagan and Carter), that is, a not decisive one, all this was just fine from the Euro point of view, because it kept the Americans busy and the Europeans both relevant and free to do their own kind of business in several places.
I'm not conspiratorially minded, but the mushrooming of anti-US NGOs in the 90s was a bit too convenient to be wholly coincidental. If it was or not, that mushrooming helped erode American power through other means. In the meanwhile, the Eastern Europeans were kept quiet through blackmail: they weren't immediately allowed into the club, because they had to satisfy a couple of million of rules, but the possibility of joining it was enough to make them dependent on Western Europe's goodwill: and this was cheap too, almost for fee.
Then came 911 and America took the decision of fighting and eventually winning that new Cold War turned into a hot one. It forced on the Bush administration the same kind of behaviour Europe hated so much in Reagan. Thus, the Old European effort ever since then has basically been one of cooling the war down without extinguishing it, proving to America that either it could not be won or wasn't worth fighting or whatever. A decades-long conflict between the US and the Arab-Muslim world would be just fine for Europe. It would divert Muslim animosity from them to America; it would keep the Americans busy and in a climate of perpetual crisis; it would make of them, the Europeans, ideal mediators; it would leave a large chunk of the world US-free for them to play their diplomatic and business games.
If at least part of what I’ve said makes sense, then it would help explain the intensity of the European animosity against the US. It wasn’t new. On the contrary. But it was covert, hidden. The Europeans were already waging their own cold war against the US ever since the end of the Cold War or even before, but 911 forced their feelings out into the open and made them show at least some of their cards. All this would also explain Kyoto, the ICC etc. (even Oslo as parts of a wider strategy. On the other hand, if all this has a grain of truth, it wasn’t only in keeping track of radical islamicists and their true intentions that the American intelligence services have failed.
Former fighters of Saddam's Republican Guard or Fedayeen troops, and prominent members of his ruling Baath party, may be organising and financing the guerrilla attacks, but do not appear to be carrying them out, the commanders said.
"They are going out and getting hired hands who do not have much experience. Normally you get two- or three- or four-men groups trying to conduct attacks, usually a couple of young guys with one middle-aged guy," [Col.] Hickey said.
"I have yet to see any degree of military competence. They are not experienced fighters. They fire a mortar, then pick up and run. I think we have taken away their capacity to wage any organized resistance, although I concede they have enough structure to put guys in each main town to shoot at us."
The guerrillas have been adapting some tactics, like not hiding ammunition in houses due to the constant searches.
Their numbers appear small, the commanders said.
"Whenever we kill four of the enemy, things just drop off in that area," Hickey said. "We are winning, we have the initiative."
An attack last week on a U.S. patrol in Tikrit's busy market-place infuriated the local American officers. "The enemy is a coward," Russell said. "He continues to hide behind women, children and his own population. He refuses to wear uniform, therefore we categorise him as a terrorist."
Rowan Scarborough reports that the Stryker aint livin up to the hype so far. They plan enhancements that will make the "light, rapidly deployable" vehicle heavier and harder to deploy quickly, given that it will not be C-130 transportable and our C-17 assets are finite.
They never knew the Cold War. They don't fear "the bomb ." They've always had MTV.
The college freshmen of 2003 -- about 10,000 of whom start classes at Triangle campuses this week -- seem to be more optimistic, more selfless and more tolerant than the generations that preceded them. That's the word from the professors who teach them, from the parents who raised them and from the students themselves. Although it's difficult to generalize about any group of young people, many say this group may be something special.
Heller, the son of two lawyers, doesn't know what he'll study yet, but he wants a job that is "practical," a blend of decent salary and honorable profession.
Members of this year's class, people say, exhibit some common traits:
* They're optimistic.
That's compared with their parents, many of whom went to school in the 1970s amid the Vietnam War, the continuing civil rights struggle and the energy crisis.
"We were unfocused and cynical. I don't think this generation is as cynical," said Dan Heller, Greg's dad, a 1975 graduate of Yale University, as he waited by the family SUV. "They're less likely to be disappointed when promises made to them aren't kept."
* They're selfless.
Today's students are more community-minded than the Generation Xers a few years ago -- kids who came of age during the Reagan years and craved big-time salaries.
"I think we are swinging back on the pendulum," said James Dixon, director of the Lower College at St. Augustine's College in Raleigh. "They're not just getting an education for themselves, but to serve others."
* They're smart.
At UNC-Chapel Hill, the incoming class's average SAT score is 1,282, up 16 points over last year. At N.C. State University, the SAT scores are about the same as last year's, but still high with an average of 1,192, said Tommy Griffin, the admissions director.
Even smaller schools are seeing better students. The average SAT score is 890, the highest ever, for the 600 or so freshmen entering St. Aug's.
* They seem to bounce back quickly .
The current crop of freshmen lived through 9/11 and the war with Iraq. But instead of living in fear, many say they take pride in how the country rallied behind a common cause.
"You realize what's important more," said Mike DiMarco, a Duke freshman from Wyckoff, N.J. "People banded together after it happened."
Could almost be a description of the Millenials right out of Strauss & Howe's book.
the Republicans, once considered your father's Grand Old (and hopelessly out-of-touch) Party, are addressing middle America in their own language, which is to say, their popular culture. George Bush drives a pickup truck, hams it up with Ozzy Osbourne and speaks about world affairs in simple, homely terms so "the boys back home in Lubbock" can understand. . .
If conservatives aren't made to feel especially welcome in Hollywood, there is little doubt that they have borrowed much of their energy from pop culture. They enthuse about NASCAR and wrestling and football. They campaign with country musicians. Even the senior George Bush, a classic patrician leader, famously declared his love of pork rinds.
"That kind of energy and humor creates a feeling of contemporaneity," he says. "It's part of their success."
As the Democrats grow blander, Hirsen says, "conservatism begins to look refreshing. Gosh, they're happy, they smile, they tell jokes, they have fun.
"We're not mean and dumb, like Janeane Garofalo says. What was that Huey Lewis song -- 'Hip to Be Square'?"
Ok, ok: actually, this LA Times poll is pretty worthless as polls go, polling everyone and their uncle rather than likely voters. But there's this, too.
Here are some thoughts on the 2004 Democratic Vice Presidential Nominee and the fallacies of his assertions. Meanwhile, Cornell University has hired one of our most thoughtful former Congressbeings, a woman famous throughout the Bloggosphere for her interesting statements on the war (and other topics). This once again proves the state American education is in, and highlights the sort of ideas that university Administrators believe are of academic worth.
Elsewhere, further signs that they have built a more caring, compassionate society in Europe than we have here in the U.S. Yet another reason to let them lead while we follow and do what we're told.
Update: Tom Friedman on why we fight - and why others are fighting so hard against us:
In short, America's opponents know just what's at stake in the postwar struggle for Iraq, which is why they flock there: beat America's ideas in Iraq and you beat them out of the whole region; lose to America there, lose everywhere.
I would add to that his friends in Europe, who are striving so hard to wrest the steering wheel from our hands for a reason, and that reason has little or nothing to do with either our welfare or the welfare of the people of the Middle East and everything to do with the fact that success for us there is defeat for them, too, on the larger issue that is of such concern to them - America's role in the world. This too is why they are selling the idea that we Americans are bungling everything in Iraq and need to step aside and let them, with their superior expertise, take the lead.
After all, when they say "the UN", the UN is made up of members - it does not have an existence apart from them and they know that anything that goes through the UN goes through them, and they will have more control over it. This is fairly similar to why, in the late '90s the Kossovo crisis was not resolved through a UN mechanism where those (primarily Russia at the time) could monkey wrench it.
Frankly, as much of an impact as the terrorists flocking to Iraq can have on our efforts there - and I don't minimize it and do believe we should do all in our power to thwart them - I believe that the (continental) European efforts, including the efforts of those in America who are advocating the same policy path (of ceding authority to the UN and therefore to the opponents of our efforts) represent a greater threat to our goals and our ability to carry them out in Iraq. This is in no small part because they have little interest in defeating the terrorist forces. Most of them believe they cannot be defeated, the best that can be done is to "manage" the problem, and most of them have shown by now that they are more concerned with the U.S. than with terrorism anyhow.
The invocation of "neutrality" and "impartiality" by those in Europe championing a commanding role for the UN should have been a warning sign for those Americans who want us to succeed in Iraq but sincerely believe in the UN route: the indication that their "co-belligerents" in asserting the need of a greater role for the UN are impartial as between the Coalition and the Ba'athists and their terrorist allies, neutral between the fire brigade and the fire, should have been an eye-opener that the UN would not be an instrument to advance the goals they say they share with other Americans, of the success of our effort there. The fact that for all too many, it was not an eye opener, shows that they are willfully blind to the fact that others see the UN not as an instrument to make the things Friedman talks about as our goals succeed, but as an instrument of preventing their success and returning to a status quo ante. The alternative interpretation of the attitude of those who say that a UN path is the way to go is that they are not willfully blind to how the UN will be used to obstruct our goals, but insincere in asserting they want us to succeed in their goals and, covertly or overtly, sharing the aims of those in (continental) Europe who see it as a tool for blocking our, to them "dangerous" and "over ambitious" policy goals.
These are the "allies" Friedman claims we are "gratuitously" alienating - however, they were "gratuitously" alienated from the get go, in '02-03 as in '98, because they oppose the policy we are implementing, not simply out of pique or a feeling that we haven't been nice enough to them. The latter may be the rather passive-aggressive means they use to try and get us to let them have the deciding vote in what to do and how to do it, but it's not the real reason. For a guy who, among many like him, that is used to looking behind surface assertions when it comes to American officials to find the reality of the situation, Friedman and his ilk are curiously uninterested in looking beyond the superficial when it comes to the claims of the (continental) Europeans he speaks so highly of. It's too bad that in the end, despite asking interesting questions, he never really turned his analytical skills to the motivations behind the opposition of our "gratuitously alienated allies" to see what they really had in mind and the degree to which their aims are - or aren't - compatible with what we - and Friedman - want to achieve.
Sure, many of the voices in Europe who opposed the war and believe our policy is unrealistic claim they want it to succeed - but so do the Saudis, among others in the Middle East. Are we to simply accept such claims as sincere, without looking at whether their actions and other statments with respect to the policy and their belief (or lack theirof) in its practicality supports asserted hopes that we succeed? Or are they insisting on the ability to direct decision-making precisely because they do not have any confidence or desire in the ambitious project we are attempting, and want the means to re-direct it in ways that are in accord with their own views and goals?
Thus it is not really a surprise that this path is favored not just by people overseas who opposed the war in the first place, but also advocated by those at home who opposed it. Opponents at home often want to see the "Neocons" behind the policy humbled, while opponents overseas see it as a way of humbling America as a whole, so that we will be put in our place and not try anything so "destabilizing" again in the future. Thus a preference for involving Ba'athists that they are familiar with over and against promoting divisive American ideas.
(Friedman piece via Armed Liberal, who thinks Friedman "gets it right")
