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"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Saturday, April 12, 2003
Getting Way Out of Hand III
Fox News apparently now has a reporter "embeded" with the looters.
One of their guys just did a report on a family of "Ali Babas" and when the camera panned to him, he was on a "ride-along" with them in the back of their flatbed truck.
Islamic tradition permits three days of relatively orderly looting after the fall of a city (the usual assumption is that the invaders, not the inhabitants, will be the ones taking their share of the booty, but why quibble over details. I guess this is one of the things that shows that we're liberators, not invaders or conquerers). I think it might even be an injunction in the Koran, but I don't remember for sure.
I haven't really been happy with the looting (I understand it, I've even chuckled at aspects of it, and there is that aspect of justice to seeing Uday's palace put to the sack, for example). I recommended in a previous post that one of the things we can learn from this is that if we ever are faced with a similar situation, we should have more MP units in the area to maintain civil order. It's far too easy for all this to get out of hand, as it has.
The plundering of government buildings for removable valuables may seem apropos, but then they were burned down. Who knows what documents those buildings contained, which would be helpful in trying war criminals, finding hidden weapons caches, or even simply for the administration of Iraq (property records, for example - and if you don't think those are of significant importance then you haven't read enough Hernando De Soto)? What started as the pillaging of government buildings then turned in many cases into ransacking shopkeepers - not all of whom are likely to be "Ba'athist" and thus "ok" to steal from (hey, I don't like the Ba'athists anymore than anyone else, as those who've been reading this blog know, but I just don't think this is the route to justice). Even killing some, or getting some killed, or getting shot down by some. This is not something to blow off (and here I think Rumsfeld is wrong in the "boys will be boys" attitude. Yah, a certain amount of this was bound to happen. But more of it than needs to happen has happened because of a relatively relaxed attitude towards it. Yes, after sporting events some folks have a tendency to get out of hand, too - but if handled properly, it doesn't get as bad as it does if it's mishandled. Same principle applies here, too, and one would think a conservative Administration would understand that).
We should now do the best we can to invoke the "three day rule", and put an end to all this. Better yet, get local Imams and Mullahs to invoke the "three day rule" and then be their agents in enforcing an end to it. (And yes, I recognize that there are military reasons for having kept our troops clear of it and focused on fighting the enemy in areas where they still exist. But I do think we can do more to reduce this than we have).
Dardeli says that it is the "international community" that is pressing for quick elections in Iraq, and the "international community" is saying that only such an election can legitimize the new government of Iraq.
That's not true.
That's what Blair and Bush and the "coalition of the willing" (which is one wing of the "international community" I suppose) are saying. But it's not what the French, Germans, Russians, and Belgians etc are saying. The wing of the "international community" that they represent are saying that it is the UN, not elections in Iraq, that is the only means of legitimizing a new government in Iraq.
This is because they want to use the UN to select a government in Iraq which will preserve their commercial interests (something an elected Iraqi government manifestly will not make its priority). Actually, the last thing the "international community" of Iraq's neighbors and the Axis of Weasels want is a democratic republic in Iraq. They actually oppose such a thing.
This is meaningful, because it puts Dardeli's article in context.
In a post praising the candor of a madman, Glenn Reynolds writes:
On the radio (I think it was CBS radio news) I heard a correspondent from Mosul say that an Iraqi there asked him if America was there for freedom, or for the oil. What do you think? he asked. "If you stay," responded the Iraqi, "you're here for freedom. If you leave, it's just for the oil."
Which is the opposite of what we usually think they want. The conventional wisdom has been that they'll want us to leave as quickly as possible. I've thought that this is likely true, too - not that we'll be wanted to leave completely, but our presence minimized.
Meanwhile, further proof that for the EU, reconstructing Iraq is all about winning contracts for their companies, not about contributing to Iraq's rebuilding.
However, what this quote might mean is that people are starting to notice a pattern. In the places America has stayed (Germany, Japan, South Korea), freedom has grown. In places we have quickly departed from, not so much.
Update: One main point on this, in case it's not clear. The contracts that they're talking about will be paid with money derived not from the European countries who's firms think it's their Divine Right to be given them, not from UN funds, not even from funds from the sale of Iraqi oil. They're speaking here of U.S. taxpayer money, from the recently passed suplimentary budget.
They're not offering to help rebuild Iraq. They just want to enrich themselves from it, while others pay fr it.
Nelson Ascher points me to this article by Robert Kagan that he finds worrisome. Frankly, I do too, so lets Fisk it. Kagan writes:
Can the Bush administration follow its brilliant military campaign in Iraq with a smart political and diplomatic campaign after the war? It can if it avoids some dangerous temptations.
The first temptation comes in Iraq, where some Bush officials may want to support the political fortunes of people they have known and trusted for many years, such as Ahmed Chalabi.
It's understandable, but it's a mistake. Chalabi is undoubtedly a good man. While in exile, he labored long and hard against Saddam Hussein. If he can now muster genuine support in Iraq, through his own exertions, then the world should wish him well. But the United States must not give him a leg up over other potential leaders, and especially those who may now begin emerging from within Iraq. As Paul Wolfowitz put it last Sunday, "You can't talk about democracy and then turn around and say we're going to pick the leaders of this democratic country." Exactly right, so the United States shouldn't help Chalabi or anyone else position himself as Iraq's Charles de Gaulle in the waning days of the war. If it ever starts to look as if the United States fought a war in Iraq in order to put Chalabi in power, President Bush's great success will be measurably discredited.
That's all good. I don't disagree with it. However, I'm worried by this because there's an obvious move by the State Department to do what they can to sideline Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (and this article quotes State Department officials phrasing things exactly as Kagan does in his article), but not because they're really interested in having democracy in Iraq or having the Iraqi people choose their leaders. After all, this is how the real debate:
To his friends in the Pentagon — among them, Defense Secretary Robert H. Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Defense Policy Review Board member Richard Perle — Mr. Chalabi is a courageous and charismatic proponent of democracy whose vision for Iraq is in tune with the Bush administration and could also help transform autocratic, tradition-bound Arab culture.
But many officials at the State Department and the C.I.A. consider him erratic and egomaniacal. Many regard his ambitious desire to transform Arab political culture as "flaky" and potentially destabilizing not only to Iraq, but also to autocratic leaders of Middle Eastern nations that are longtime American allies.
Mr. Chalabi has long since grown accustomed to the political cross-fire.
"This is really not about me," Mr. Chalabi said in an interview in February in the Kurdish-controlled area of northern Iraq. "This is about whether people think that Arabs are wogs who really don't deserve, and can't handle democracy."
The telling thing there is that the State Department (which in this case doesn't mean "Powell", but likely consists of the permanent staff) sees trying to create a democratic Iraq as flaky and a threat to our allies.
The State Department prefers a shadowy cabal of Ba'athist (not even "ex-Ba'athist") exiles and remnants. The kind of people the State Department wants to see lead Iraq are the sorts that will please the "stability in the middle east" crowd, where "stability" = dictatorship, and democracy means Turkey's
Parliament, "unreliable" (sigh if only there had been a nice, urbane general in charge, to insure things went smoothly. Not one of those nasty ones with a bristling black mustache that wear helmets with that pointy thing on top and who likes goose stepping, mind, but a civilized one. Someone who was educated in Paris, perhaps. You know, worldly and reliable and only mildly brutal and repressive to keep the ungovernable mob in firm hand). In other words, they're opposed to and think of as naive the sort of political transformation that will make this worth doing at all. They seem to prefer "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss (but perhaps more reliable and a shade less brutal - that last would be nice, but is not, for them, essential) to any other option. I'm thinking that both Bush and Blair have a different view, and really are sincere in wanting to push "flaky" ideas like transforming Iraq's political culture from cruel despotism into a representative republic with the rule of law.
So while I take Kagan's point regarding not anointing anyone, including Chalabi, I'm also more than a little suspicious of it. Especially since the rest of Kagan's piece also reads like a brief for the State Department's "don't rock the boat" preferences:
The second temptation comes in Europe. There is a strong impulse in the administration right now to punish erstwhile allies in Europe who opposed the war. A certain righteous triumphalism in Washington is to be expected, and payback is a normal human desire. But this is the time for a little self-interested magnanimity.
The world's sole superpower doesn't need to hold grudges, and sometimes it can't afford to. No ally imperiled the American war effort more than Turkey, after all, but it would be politically and strategically insane, as the United States works on building a democratic Iraq, to punish the only well-established moderate Muslim democracy in the region.
So far no one has talked of punishing Turkey, though if they keep threatening to invade Northern Iraq over every little thing, they'll need a strong talking-to.
The Bush administration seems capable of burying the hatchet with Vladimir Putin, overlooking Russia's provision of banned weaponry to Iraq. Nor, one suspects, will China pay a price for joining France and Russia in opposition to the war.
So why not make amends in Europe? Of course Bush should reward those who took risks to support him, especially Tony Blair. And it won't be possible to do much business with France so long as the Chirac government continues to present itself as the builder of a great counterweight to the United States. But if the United States looks like it's asking Europeans to choose between being "European" and being pro-American, we'll fail. The European Union is still the dominant political institution in European society, and Blair is trying to knit back his own tattered relations with Europe. Punishing the rejectionist Europeans won't help him.
The United States should not try to divide Europe; let France do that. Most European leaders realize that a policy of opposing the United States makes European unity impossible.
Kagan, as with many of the people at the State Department, make some fundamental errors here. Firstly, an explanation of the U.S. State Department's fundamental outlook might be needed here.
For most countries, their Foreign Ministry sees their purpose primarily as achieving the country's interests. France's, for example, is particularly tenacious in that respect (they use diplomatic speak to talk about what's good for the "international community" or for "Europe", but the funny thing is that what they present as good for everyone always what they think is good for France - they might be wrong about what is good for France, but they don't defer French interests). Sure, they want to use diplomacy to get along with people, but they see their primary purpose as achieving the interests of their country.
The U.S. State Department reverses that. They follow a typically American temptation, one I feel myself, in wanting everyone to like us. They see their primary purpose as doing what is needed to make other governments like us more, and thus their outlook is "how can we accommodate them". This is one reason why America's State Department's policy proposals often seem like they see themselves as the world's representatives to America rather than America's representatives to the world. Sure, the State Department will pursue America's interests, but they see that as secondary. Perhaps even tertiary (they also are very status quo oriented, abjuring "flaky" things that might destabilize existing relationships). I'm also not saying that America doesn't pursue it's own interests, including through diplomacy. However, the State Department usually has to be pushed (as under Reagan, during the Cold War), by other American institutions - the Administration itself, Congress, other Departments, into forcefully advocating America's interests. Their natural tendency (default position) is to go along to get along, don't rock the boat, don't upset others. The natural tendency of the diplomatic arms of countries that don't worry so much about whether people like them at all is to push others to go along to get along with them.
Note one thing here in this extensive explanation: there's a very good reason why article after article, statement after statement, directed at American audiences, are intended to convey the message to us that others don't like us because of this or that policy of ours or because we've elected a Republican cowboy instead of a decent Democratic Tranzi, and if we changed these things then they'd like us better. There aren't such articles directed at other countries. Why? Is it because they never screw up or tick people off? No. It's because they don't care as much if they do, and don't have as great a "felt need" to be liked by everyone, including their enemies, as so many Americans do. This is why one never encountered articles (except satirical ones) during the Cold War directed at the Soviet Union telling them how this or that policy of theres was making Americans dislike them and they needed to change it, nor do we see articles now telling the Syrians, North Koreans, or French that their policies are angering the "American Street" and they need to alter their policies if they want polls of the American public to show more warm, fuzzy feelings towards them and less dislike. Such arguments are only employed with respect to America, because they work (at least with some Americans, who then parrot back the "this is making others upset" meme as a strong - in their mind - counter-argument to policies. Discussing the policies on the merit of them is often secondary, or even ignored, compared to whether it makes others smile or frown; it's more important to many Americans to be liked than to do the right thing).
Back to Kagan and his mistakes (I bet you thought I forgot all about what they were and was just meandering): one of the consequences of the "get everyone to like us" approach is a failure to make distinctions. Kagan mixes up categories here. Sure, we're not going to punish China, for two reasons. Unlike France and Germany, China isn't an American ally. We don't expect more cooperation from them than we received. Also, China didn't threaten to veto everything out of hand (they likely would have simply abstained. They wouldn't have cooperated with the effort, but they weren't obstructing it, either), as our "friends" in France and Germany did.
Similarly with Russia, too. Sure, relations were (and IMO still are) becoming better with Russia. But they were more in a position in between ally and neutral. They aren't a treaty ally of America, like France and Germany. Likewise, they didn't threaten to veto any Resolution. They were opposed, but if it wasn't for Chirac's government, they, too, likely would have abstained (and worked out some sort of deal with America in the background to protect their interests in Iraq).
The second mistake Kagan (along with most in the State Department) makes is related to my explanation of their attitudes, too: don't punish people for misbehavior, because it will just make them upset at us. The big problem with this is it creates a moral hazzard. If there's never any cost to trying to thwart us, never any penalty, then there's no reason to not do it. One may as well work to keep a tyrant in power in order to protect your commercial ties to him, because even if it doesn't work out, there's no downside, and the potential upside (even if it's a remote chance) - having the dictator be thankful for your efforts if you succeed, and reward you for it - is a gain. You can't loose.
This, in no small part, was part of the French (mis)calculation. Just as we (mis)calculated that the French would oppose rhetorically and then at the last second jump on board and join in, like they did the last time. The French calculation here has been the main pillar of French foreign policy since the days of de Gaulle: there was no penalty for doing whatever they could to undermine and thwart America, so there was no reason to not do it and several reasons (warmer ties to Stalinists, for example) to do it. What we've seen here is really that outlook spreading (which is one of the consequences of allowing this to go on).
However, on this I'm going to give Kagan a pass, after pointing this out. Because if you read his article, when he talks about not punishing anyone, there's one country he leaves off the list of countries to be immune from the consequences of their behavior. That country is France. He doesn't say we shouldn't punish France. I'm not sure I agree (I think we should seriously consider moving our troops from Germany into a more welcoming country). But his position is partly tactical - if we let France tie the rope around their own neck, they will do so, while if we act like an enemy of, say, Germany, this will simply confirm in the minds of the German population the belief that they need a strong EU led by the Franco-Germans to oppose us. If we do nothing, however, Schroeder's government will probably fall of it's own dead weight and a more friendly CDU government will replace it.
Speaking of Germany, though, Kagan makes one other, though smaller, mistake. Sure, Germany didn't deny us overflight or limit the use of our bases like Turkey did. But that was in no small part because the legal status of the American presence in Germany was different - it was far from clear that Germany could deny us permission. Not that German government ministers didn't look into trying that.
The Bush administration, for its part, should embrace Europe. Last week Colin Powell did good work in Brussels, and Vice President Cheney met with the EU's foreign minister, Javier Solana. It's time to take the next step. If pursuing important national interests means letting bygones be bygones in Moscow, Beijing and Ankara, why not in, say, Berlin? Unlike Turkey, Germany did not deny overflight rights to U.S. aircraft during the war or limit the use of American bases on German soil. Germany sent Patriot missile batteries to Israel. Many leading Germans would like to mend ties with the United States. If those reasons aren't enough, perhaps Bush officials will appreciate this one: The more the United States "punishes" the German government, the more we drive an anxious, isolated Germany into the welcoming arms of France. If Bush can call Putin on the phone, he can call Gerhard Schroeder, too -- not because he likes him but because it's the smart thing to do.
"The Bush Administration should embrace Europe". If by that Kagan means (as I doubt) the countries of Europe, that's one thing. If he means the EU, though, I don't think that's wise. That has been American policy for at least the last two decades: to encourage (rather than discourage) European Union (and ECC, and EEC) integration in the vain belief that if we do so then things will work out for us, but if we oppose it then the EU will form anyhow and into an anti-American institution. We went so far in this embracing of the EU that we worked at cross purposes with Thatcher and other friends in Britain who were reluctant to go along with some EU designs (very Statist ones), giving our friends no comfort. In the meantime, throughout that period, the people involved building the EU's institutions consciously and deliberately have worked to create a strong EU that will oppose ("counterbalance") America. Our demonstrations of goodwill and best wishes notwithstanding - they wanted to turn EUrope against America even while we were cheering them on, "embracing" their project. For more on this, one can read through the archives of this blog (and a number of others).
Better than continuing the policy of embracing the EU would be to follow James Bennett's wise advice:
Many of these hopes had always been problematic. Other items on the Europeanist wish-list had started to unravel before Sept. 11, 2001, if you took a close look. But it has taken the events of the period between Sept. 11 and today to pull the curtain away from the European Union, where instead of the Great and Wondrous Wizard of Brussels, there was only Romano Prodi furiously working the wheels and levers.
More than anything else, it was the centrality of the Anglo-American partnership to world events that has given the lie to Europeanism. Even with the Euro-enthusiast Tony Blair at the helm, Europe could not achieve sufficient consensus on the Iraq war to create, much less act upon a common European foreign policy. What Blair discovered was that the common language of internationalism he thought he had shared with the Continentals was in fact divided into two very distinct dialects.
That which he spoke came from the Anglosphere tradition of Wilsonian/Gladstonian politics, of robust democracy reaching beyond national borders to ultimately knit together a globe-spanning civil society. That which the Continentals spoke came from a much different tradition, harking back to Napoleon, the Caesars, and ultimately to Plato's vision of utopian dictatorship, of the state remaking man in its perfect image.
Ultimately, the Continental vision is of philosopher-kings remaking the man and the world, with democracy visible only in the occasional plebiscite designed to allow the masses to validate the vision of their guardians. (If they fail to deliver the right vote, they are merely made to vote over again until they get it right, like schoolchildren who have scribbled on their exam papers.)
As happened most recently in Ireland, with respect to joining the Euro.
So now the question for Americans, British, and Continental European alike is, where to go next with Europe. There seem to be three possibilities.
One is to ignore everything that happened and pick up where things left off.
The "don't punish them" (that is, don't react to their actions) position.
This course would turn Iraq over to the United Nations, sabotage the critical de-Baathization of that country and continue creating a centralized European superstate that would prevent Britain from ever again siding effectively with the United States without Franco-German permission.
This would see Britain ceding its Security Council seat to Brussels, placing its foreign policy and military forces under joint European control and exposing its economy to a full-blown case of the European disease. This is obviously entirely contrary to the interests of the American and British people alike, and against the long-term interest even of the Europeans themselves.
The second course is to admit that the European Union is badly flawed, and in great need of reform, but to react by encouraging Britain to immerse itself even more strongly into European unification, in the vain hopes of it leading a coalition of "New Europe" against the "Old." This is undoubtedly the course that Blair is urging on Bush every time they meet. But it is illusory and, if implemented, disastrous. The European Union is inherently flawed. Its structures create a titled playing field upon which Britain, and all those who would ally with her in hopes of reform, will always, in the end, lose.
The third course is to admit that the European Union is flawed and badly in need of not just reform but wholesale replacement. The ideal of free trade and cooperation among European nations, and between them and the world, is true and desirable. But the European Union, as it stands, is not the means of achieving it. And the best remedy for its ills is competition.
The United States, its friends in Britain and Ireland, and those on the Continent who share their critique of the Europeanist disease must adopt a vigorous and aggressive policy of offering a viable alternative to the take-it-or-leave it policies Brussels hold out to old and new members alike. The United States must take the lead in offering free trade to every democratic European nation, whether it is in the EU or not.
Check out the whole article. Indeed, there is nothing in this that punishes any country - it offers them an alternative that would be better than the fate that awaits France, of France's own making (having nothing to do with whether we "punish" them or not):
Economically speaking, France is decaying, full speed. Unemployment is officially around ten per cent. If you add the people who have never worked and so are not counted for the statistics, and also add the students who study nothing useful, the right number would be way above fifteen per cent. Growth rate is now officially around one per cent, and it includes government activities: if the government component was not included, it would be easy to see that France is in depression. Her population is growing old, and no money is available to take care of the large number of senior citizens in the years to come. The greater part of young people are Muslim, not integrated with French society, and almost illiterate.
In fact, the only things that are growing in France right now are crime and Islamism. Some readers have been amazed by the fact that teenaged girls and young women in many city districts have to wear the Islamic veil if they do not want to be harassed, but it gets worse. A few weeks ago, a young Arab burnt a teenaged girl alive in the suburbs of Paris. He was convicted of murder, but he became a hero and an example for other young Arabs living in the same kind of areas. Two month ago, ten Arab men who raped another teenaged girl in another district were convicted and condemned to spend five years in jail. Yes, just five years. Their families left the court of justice shouting to the journalists it was unfair and they would look out for revenge. Eight days later, the court was burnt down during the night. The teenaged girl and her family have had to leave Paris, and hide in another part of the country.
I have written columns in the French press concerning what’s happening. The response has been death threats, with color pictures of slit throats, anti-Semitic insults. There were Muslims in France thirty years ago, but they were not like the Muslims of today. They were moderate, they did not feel they could wield decisive political power in France, they did not think they were at war against western civilization. Now it’s clear that they think they are at war. Very few people are in jail in France (France does not have enough jails), but more than sixty per cent of the convicts are Muslims, and Islamist imams visit them on a weekly basis. My wife was born in a Muslim family. She’s not a Muslim anymore, and because she left Islam, she risks being killed if she says it openly. My wife’s mother is still Muslim, but she is a moderate, and she’s afraid to be considered a traitor by the much more radical Muslims that are spreading throughout France. . .
The French government takes care of the present: it knows it cannot take care of the future because there is no future. The French government acts like a traitor to its old allies for many reasons: because it has no principles, because it needs money, but especially because it is afraid of bloody riots. . .
Now, given the tone of this blog, some might think that when I read an article like Guy Milliere's on France I get some wicked satisfaction out of it. But that's not the case. In fact, it makes me sad. But this is the consequence of the policies of a succession of elected French governments. This isn't a punishment we visited on them, it's something the are visiting on themselves.
The EU on the other hand, given those who are it's guiding hand (and we'll see just how naturally opposed their ideology is to America's principles when the EU Constitution they're drafting comes out in June), that is something I would like to see replaced. Not that I'm optimistic.
Update: Erik at Wax Tadpole has some thoughts on both the Bennett and Kagan pieces. In a mail to me he writes:
I agree that the EU and UN are fundamentally flawed but I think a blatant, take-no-prisoners assault on either institution would backfire badly, as Europeans
(and even some Americans) would rally around them. Just ignoring the UN would be perceived as arrogant and would also prompt a backlash.
I'm not sure we disagree that much, for I wrote this:
But his position is partly tactical - if we let France tie the rope around their own neck, they will do so, while if we act like an enemy of, say, Germany, this will simply confirm in the minds of the German population the belief that they need a strong EU led by the Franco-Germans to oppose us. If we do nothing, however, Schroeder's government will probably fall of it's own dead weight and a more friendly CDU government will replace it.
On the EU, though, I don't think either Bennett or I am talking about having the American government adopt a "a blatant, take-no-prisoners assault on either institution" (that's what Blogs are for; I can adopt a blatant, take-no-prisoners assault on the corrupt nature of the EU and UN in a way that our government can't). But that doesn't mean following Kagan's advice and (continuing to) embrace the EU - encourage it's growth, continue to push countries into it ("helping" them join something that will be taking them down a bad path, not just for us but for them). Bennett is talking about offering alternatives - not even exclusive alternatives ("take TAFTA and NATO or the EU, you can't have both" isn't what he proposes. It is what the faction in the vanguard of pushing the EU is pushing, though - take-it-or-leave it choices, pushing countries into surrendering their ability to make decisions for themselves, in the name of "EUNITY IS STRENGTH", and the like - one of the ironies of the EU set has always been their propaganda to Europeans that in order to avoid being lackeys of the U.S. they'll have to unquestioningly follow the policies set in Brussels. . .among other related "FREEDOM IS SLAVERY" ironies). Erik goes on:
So I'm looking for a tactical middle ground. Don't let the EU or UN near anything important, but keep them talking. Stay calm, focused and reasonable and let the weasel bloc be the belligerents.
Pay attention to appearances - not because we want to be liked but to keep the weasel-bloc off balance. If they have less to push against, they'll have to push hard enough that a tap will topple them.
There's little I quibble with there.
I think we should adopt a policy of cool aloofness from further EU integration, stop cheering it on, stop pushing & encouraging countries into joining, and offer them alternative's, and every time one of the scions of the EU process makes some remark (as they have over at least the last decade or so fairly commonly) about one of the EU's purposes being to oppose, counterbalance, and constrain the U.S., we shouldn't ignore it - we should make sure that Americans know about it, and that our friends in Europe (which are many) recognize the significance of them, and what they imply about throwing themselves in with an EU led by such a vanguard (rather than downplaying such things and encouraging our friends to overlook them, as has been our policy up to now). That's not the same as a blatant "take no prisoners" assault.
The Financial Times has actually published a more temperate article on future international relations, with a far less condescendingly snarky attitude towards the U.S. than what is usually offered up in the pages of the Financial Times. I'm not saying I endorse all of it, but it's worth reading and thinking about.
Then there's this article, also in the Financial Times, suggesting that a democratic Iraq shouldn't be rushed, By Aleksander Dardeli. It's well written and well argued and makes important points:
The US is under international pressure to move as quickly as possibly to a democratically-elected government in Iraq. But it should instead adopt a long-term approach to one of the goals set out by Washington at the outset of war: a democratic and prosperous Iraq that can be a salutary example for the Middle East's authoritarian regimes. Preventing international criticism has its merits, but doing the job right matters more. The US has already weathered the worst international criticism set off by initiating the war, and rapid elections will only increase the long-term political costs.
If Iraq is to become a viable democracy, it is essential to act in the proper sequence. The first priority should be to set up functioning institutions of law and order, create an effective and transparent civil service, and establish fair mechanisms for administering the country's economic resources. The approach of focusing first on building the rule of law and establishing institutions was applied in post-war Germany and Japan. The victorious second world war allies pursued a two-tier approach to post-war administration. They conducted massive humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction campaigns, while gradually re-building effective and transparent rule-based systems of governance. Elections followed afterwards, and the results speak for themselves.
Without the cornerstone of the rule of law, any elected government institutions will tend to fall prey to paralysis, anarchy, or criminal activity. There are likely to be some concerns about the legitimacy of the post-war transitional authority if elections are delayed. But these can be addressed by integrating into such an authority well-respected Iraqis who are capable of contributing.
I think his points are well taken, but I'm not sure I'm convinced. Not because of how the international community will react, but because I think it's important to demonstrate as early as feasible that we really do mean that the Iraqis will be governed by people of their choosing. Also, the institutions he talks about (the rule of law, the form of government institutions, the people who are appointed to lead and build the civil service), while outsiders can offer advice and suggestions on those matters and certainly should help in devising them, the decisions should be made by Iraqis, chosen by the people of Iraq through some widely-acceptable process. That might mean elections.
I would hope that these things can be done in tandem - not so much one first, then the other. It would be possible to elect a representative body that would work on building these institutions without having it immediately take on the burdens of administering all of Iraq. The transition need not be immediate (rushed), but there needs to be a reasonably early demonstration that no, this isn't a colonialist enterprise and no, we're not going to select their leaders for them or build the rule of law and civil service without reference to the people of Iraq. This may not mean elections tomorrow, but I would say there should be some sort of election - if not for a full government, then for a "Constitutional Congress" to debate what form Iraq's full government should take - within a year.
Update: Jeff at Caerdoria comments, and I respond in the comments section to his post. I don't think he and I really disagree that much.
I think we need to do something about putting a close to this looting. I'm now waiting for one of the looters to complain to U.S. servicemen that while he was out looting, someone broke into his house and stole all his junk.
Frequent FT contributor Charles Kupchan, who submits essentially the same article each time and has it published with minor variation each time, has another. Unlike Kupchan, I'll try to raise some points I haven't before (or at least not recently) in my analysis of his article. Its essential point is that Europe should part ways with America and build a strong European power to oppose it (nothing original so far):
Now that the war in Iraq appears to be close to its end, Americans and Europeans will inevitably begin asking how to repair the transatlantic bond. They need not bother. The diplomatic divide that has opened between the US and continental Europe is bringing the Atlantic alliance to a definitive end.
Even before the outbreak of war, the anguished stand-off at the United Nations Security Council made it amply evident that European and American security are no longer indivisible. By steadfastly opposing the US, France, Germany and Russia revealed that they are ready for a Europe without its American pacifier. Having already made clear that shifting priorities necessitate a diminished US presence in Europe, Washington is sure to oblige, casting aside the western alliance in spirit, if not also in fact.
Notice how things are shifted - the Franco-Germans "reveal they are ready for a Europe without" America, but it is Washington that is "casting aside the western alliance" in Kupchan's portrayal.
This is due to the fact that, for Kupchan and those who share his perspective, whenever there is a disagreement or a divergence of views, the U.S. (and its supporters, which included most of the countries of Europe) on one side and anyone else (in this case the Franco-German axis) on the other, it is axiomatic that the U.S. is in the wrong - no argumentation or supporting evidence required to prove assertions about how wrong the U.S. is (and Kupchan provides none). For those who might be tempted to claim I do the same thing, the archives of this blog are a refutation (providing arguments and evidence that support my conclusions. Kupchan consistently simply provides conclusions - resentment in Europe and estrangement in the alliance are exclusively the fault of the American government):
For its part, George W. Bush's administration will have to realise that the guiding principles of its foreign policy have put Washington on a collision course with Europe. Those principles must now change if there is to be any hope of post-war rapprochement across the Atlantic. In particular, the administration must redress three miscalculations about the use of US power. . .
These strategic misconceptions are continuing to tear down what little remains of the Atlantic community. Before it is too late, Washington must rediscover the principles of restraint, multilateralism and alliance. Otherwise, estranged allies will become outright adversaries, and Europe will have no reason even to contemplate working on its end of a new bargain.
Kupchan want's a strong Europe that will then bend America to it's will:
For its part, Europe must redouble efforts to build a union capable of acting collectively on the international stage. The European Union is currently in a no-man's-land. It is too strong to be Washington's lackey, but too weak and divided to be either an effective partner or a formidable counterweight.
Two things to note here. Firstly, one has to connect Kupchan's first assertion (that Washington must mend its ways and change it's policies to better reflect the desires of the Franco-Germans) to make sense of this paragraph. When Kupchan speaks of the possibility of the EU as an "effective partner" of America, he means America following the Franco-German lead. If America doesn't, then the strong EU Kupchan desires must be a "formidable counterweight", to oppose and thwart U.S. policy.
The second thing to note is that Kupchan is of the sort that, if the EU becomes seen in America as an enemy, will be talking about how "Americans have a psychological need for an enemy and invent one if there isn't one, even to the point of turning friends into enemies." Now, there will be some truth to that. After all, Kupchan is a scholar (*snort*) studying in America. But it is he and like-minded people who are inventing an enemy to oppose America - not those they will accuse of doing that. Kupchan goes on:
Although debate over Iraq has unquestionably weakened European unity.
Preserving the Atlantic link has been one of the key motivations inducing Britain, Spain and most central European countries to side with the Bush administration. But now that the Atlantic alliance is expiring, an Atlanticist Europe is no longer an option.
France and Germany have realised as much - one of the main reasons they are discussing with Belgium deeper defence co-operation. The Poles have yet to give up hope of a strong Nato, but they can ignore reality for only so long; Warsaw and other like-minded capitals will soon realise that they have no choice but to settle for a strong EU.
The exact mentality I discussed on display again.
The Atlantic alliance now lies in the rubble of Baghdad. Perhaps that sad truth will awaken US leaders to their strategic mis-steps, and at the same time impress on Europe's leaders the urgent need for a deeper union.
Cutting through the doublespeak, Kupchan means that the U.S. will have to think about how wrong it was to not accept the Franco-German position on Iraq, and the rest of Europe will likewise have to discover the need to follow the Franco-German lead unquestioningly, so that there can be EUropean unity and a strong Europe to oppose the U.S. and force it to comply with EUropean policy preferences and Franco-German interests in the future, rather than recklessly pursuing America's own misguided, mistaken principles.
I mean, what's more important? America's principles of a free Iraq disarmed of weapons of mass destruction and the enforcing of the Gulf War's cease fire provisions? Or long lasting French, German, and Russian bonds to Saddam Hussein? The answer is so obvious to Kupchan (and the EUropean elites) that it's beyond the need for argumentation.
Relocation of the Seoul garrison would be an easy first step because the move has little military significance and is supported by South Korean people who resent the intrusive US presence. But South Korean public opinion has shifted sharply back in favour of the US military presence since it became clear Seoul's 50-year alliance with Washington was at risk.
"Wait, wait! Our resentment of you isn't supposed to cost us anything!"
Quite a number of people and countries are acting as if it's a prize to be involved in the reconstruction of Iraq. This is especially true of certain countries. Certain countries want to be involved - insist on being involved - for the following reasons:
To secure their commercial interests, contracts, and insure that the Saddam era debt is repaid to them.
To insure that the next government of Iraq will be friendly to them.
To acquire presumably lucrative reconstruction contracts for companies headquartered in their country.
Roughly in that order. They're far less interested in contributing anything to the reconstruction. Sure, several American companies are scheduled to get reconstruction contracts - but we've also, in the War Budget submitted to Congress by the Administration, scheduled billions of dollars (American dollars) to begin the rebuilding of Iraq. In the list of reasons certain countries (the ones that strove the hardest to try and thwart the toppling of the Ba'ath National Socialist regime in Iraq and several of which show up at the top of this graph) you won't notice any interest in the welfare of the Iraqi people or a government that serves the people of Iraq (as opposed to French political commercial interests).
These countries demonstrate their unseriousness in treating the rebuilding and reconstruction of Iraq as a plum, rather than a burden to be undertaken. And not just a financial burden (sure, Iraqi oil will pay for some, but not all, of the reconstruction), or a burden in having thousands of your people overseas to secure the peace in Iraq, and not even just an administrative burden (restoring civil order and helping build civil society there). But a moral burden as well - lots of people, I would say most Iraqis, have extremely high expectations, even unrealistic expectations (just as expectations were high in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism and a considerable proportion of the population became disillusioned when everything didn't improve dramatically all at once, especially in their economic situation. Building free, prosperous, open societies was harder than they thought it would be). The burden is on those who participate in helping to live up to these expectations. Not that it's an unwanted or unrewarding burden, but so many are looking at it the wrong way, as a means of enrichment for themselves rather than something to be undertaken with sobriety. Frankly, it will be hard enough without having those who have, so far, continued to show absolutely no interest in what the people of Iraq might want, and have been fixated on securing their own interests in Iraq (see earlier posts for more on this).
One of the ways they could show they were friends of the people of Iraq and were sincerely interested in seeing that country get a fresh start on a good foundation would be to do this, or at least evidence a willingness to at least reduce the debt. They could also say they're willing to re-negotiate contracts with the next, new government of Iraq. Frankly, if they want to have good trading relations with Iraq that will benefit them in the future, being helpful is the best way to go about it. Indeed, that is what really is at root of their fear that, as a result of this war, American and British companies will have an advantage in winning contracts from the next government of Iraq - that government will naturally be more friendly to those who helped them.
But by being obstinate boors about the situation, and showing that the only thing they're really interested is their own welfare, countries like France and Russia are only hurting themselves. It's paradoxical but poetic justice that if they were to have demonstrated any flexibility, understanding, willingness to pay a price to help Iraq get back on its feet, their presence would likely be more welcomed in Iraq and their business with the new Iraq would flourish as much as anyone's, but by being selfish they are likely to lose exactly what they're trying so hard to retain.
(Another aside: Frankly I think it would be best if it were Iraqi companies, perhaps in partnership with foreign firms, that did most of this, but such private firms capable of doing the job may not exist and it may take awhile before they do. Still, I would hope that everyone involved would see the good in having as much Iraqi involvement in building their future as possible, as I mentioned in a different context here).
John Cole finds the LA Times engaging in the behavior I prognosticated. Stephen M. St. Onge recommends checking out March 30ths Kausfiles and Sergio Breton brings this Dowd screed to my attention (both the Kaus worry and the Dowd article written before my prognostication, by the way. I hadn't read the Kaus article and I try to avoid reading Dowd's articles, because they kill brain cells and I have few enough as it is.
Joel Mackey points to his comments in the post "Really Smart Bombs" on 3/22/03 over at The Politburo (apparently they don't have permalinks for their posts).
Ned Wynn says that of course the Left will do what I predicted - anything to avoid having to admit they were wrong about something, while Terrey Cobb writes that this might be a good thing if the idea gets out there among other dictators, they might decide to keep their heads down and not engage in behavior that might provoke us.
Tangential Aside: This UPI article reminds me of something I've been meaning to mention: I've found it extremely ironic that the French paper named "Liberation" has spent it's time cautioning against liberation and criticizing it.
The next thing some people will start complaining about - including many of the ones who predicted horrible civilian casualties and talked about how we were thinking of napalming urban neighborhoods while cackling like that guy in Apocalypse Now while we deliberately strafe civilians - is that we've made war too "humane" and thus will want to engage in it now.
That is, the next complaint - from some (not from the willfully ignorant who will intransigently insist that we turned Baghdad into Dresden) - will be that by having high-tech weapons that "minimize" civilian casualties (they'll always put "minimize" in quotes and sneer at "collateral damage", just like they'll always put "humane" in quotes), we'll have the urge to conduct more wars now. Their new "worry" that will wrack them with "deep concern" will be that we'll now think we can have "war on the cheap, with few casualties" and thus resort to it at every opportunity, and that we'll be filled with hubris in thinking we can solve all problems with military force at a "low" cost in innocent lives (they'll put "low" in quotes, too). Because of this there will be more U.S. agression against the peace-loving despotisms of the world.
(Some of this crowd will actually mix the two complaints - they'll speak of the "media-created illusion that we've made war 'humane'" creating the danger of having a quicker trigger finger in the future, when "really" we slaughtered everyone in sight).
Steven Den Beste has a short item (!) on what France is demonstrating insofar as its willingness to participate in the rebuilding of Iraq.
Seems like those of us who've been saying that France is demanding a big role want it for their own interests, not the interests of the people of Iraq, are proven right (again).
Yesterday Reuters reported that the CIA had coerced Iraqi opposition forces into abandoning a town in Iraq they had captured. I'm not sure how accurate the report is, it may overstate things a bit. But one thing's fairly clear anyhow - we haven't allowed the Iraqi opposition forces to cooperate with us as much as they wanted to in the liberation of their own country. I'm not sure that's a good idea.
On the other hand, Iraqi opposition intellectual leader Kanyan Makiya says that:
He says that he favours a 10-year ban on army officers and party members taking part in politics, so that Iraq can eliminate "all vestiges of totalitarianism" and build a "new kind of state" in the Middle East.
Mr Makiya says that, because of the threat of future coups, he would favour a complete dismantling of the army, as well as the Republican Guards and the security services.
Which sounds very wise to me. The article infers that he wants a disarmed Iraq - which goes a bit beyond what he is paraphrased as saying, really. Disarming the Republican Guard and the current army does not mean disarming all of Iraq. A new military could be forged with opposition forces as its base. But I have heard Kanan Makiyta on TV, talking of a demilitarized Iraq.
I don't think that's a wise idea. Iraq is surrounded by fairly dangerous states, including ones that are happy to let paramilitary bands (like Ansar al-Islam) filter across the border. The new armed forces for a new Iraq need not be nearly as large as under Saddam (but can none the less be better) - possibly 160,000 strong, with perhaps a 10,000 man brown and green water navy (to defend Iraq against Lukoil's gunboats and other threats), 30,000 man air force, and 120,000 man army. But an Iraq that has to rely on coalition forces to defend it would, in my opinion, not be good for the morale of the country - something that I know Kanan Makiya is very keen on rekindling. They should have a professional, volunteer army (rather than poorly fed, led, coerced and mistreated conscripts). There should also, of course, be a reserve component.
A military can be a positive unifying force in society, not just a negative one, and having armed forces does not mean militarism. Separating the military from politics and reducing its role in society while building one that serves the interests of the country rather than feeding off it (as the Ba'athist military did) would be an achievement to be proud of, not something to avoid. Indeed, that's one reason I'm less than happy that we haven't allowed the Iraqi opposition forces (except for the Kurdish component in the north) to contribute as much as they wanted to the liberation of their own country - something that would help infuse the sense of accomplishment, pride, and service to the people into the foundation of the new Iraqi armed forces.
Asside: One other thing. I haven't joined the know-nothings in mindless criticism of the military plan. But I think that we can and should learn things from every experience, even one as successful as this one. Part of a "don't get cocky" attitude includes striving for continual improvement, even when things go about as well as one could hope. One is alluded to above. Another is that, if we ever have to do something like this again, it might be wise to have more units of Military Police on hand to help keep civil order in the wake of rapid advances.
Well, not quite. Not completely, at least. But this is the day that will be remembered, as the Ba'ath Regime collapses and U.S. marines sweep through eastern Baghdad.
Heck, for a brief moment (roughly 6:45 AM to 7:30 AM my time), the BBC radio reporters (at least a couple of them) forgot themselves and even they were calling it the liberation of Baghdad. Then they recovered their usual attitude, and by 7:30 AM were projecting the typical demeanor of gloom that they exude whenever Americans achieve something.
Update: this is how the Ba'ath National Socialist Regime "recruited" suicide bombers.
Glenn Reynolds has a omnigatherum post on the crumbling of the BBC. Hey, this is the best thing that could happen - the BBC's reporting has been like this for several years now, but now it's become unignorable.
In the post immediately below this one I mentioned a failure to make mental connections. One of the things that vexes me most are people who are incapable of making elementary analytical connections. A current example is that many people in the Arab world, and perhaps elsewhere, reportedly believe both of the following:
American forces aren't actually in Baghdad - it's just a Hollywood trick.
An American Tank in Baghdad deliberately targeted journalists in the Palestine Hotel
Now, if the former is true, then the latter can't be (if American forces aren't in Baghdad, it's a Hollywood trick, then an American tank couldn't have targeted journalists, deliberately or otherwise), and vice versa (if an American tank in Baghdad struck journalists, deliberately or not, then obviously American forces are in Baghdad). But the people who believe both never notice the logical contradiction.
I don't mean to pick on Arabs, either. This lack of analytical ability and refusal to make mental connections is very common - even among the supposedly intelligent (among reporters, NYT, FT, and other columnists, political office holders in the U.S. and Europe, and in other fields). We have to listen to these political figures or read articles by such columnists, and always wonder if they're really as foolish as they seem, or just trying to score ideological points, however inane.
Which brings me back to the people on the "Arab street" who, when asked, claim to believe the things they say they do. One has to wonder if they really hold such mutually exclusive beliefs about what is happening in the world or if they're just saying they do - playing the reporters they're talking to, who in most cases - as with the BBC's Judy Swallow(s) (I bet she does!) - are willing, even happy, participants in being played - because they believe we (the "audience" for this junk) are incapable of noticing the contradictions in their assertions.
Are they really that dumb? Or is it just that they think we are?
Russia's Lukoil company is planning legal action if the post-Saddam government of Iraq does not implement a oil contract that the Ba'athists already voided:
Lukoil, the Russian oil giant, has threatened to take legal action if its interests in Iraq are not honoured by a postwar administration.
Which is all the more interesting, of course, because when Iraq did this:
The status of West Qurna, which has proven reserves of 7.8m barrels, is complicated further by the announcement last December by Iraqi authorities that they were breaking off the Lukoil contract on the grounds of non-fulfillment.
Lukoil did not initiate legal action against the then government of Iraq. So when they say this:
"We consider the contract still active. We are talking hypothetically. If anything arises that breaks that contract we will go to court," a Lukoil spokesman said on Tuesday.
That seems to apply only to the government of a free Iraq. As for this:
A precedent for Lukoil's case might be found in successful claims brought by US companies against the Iranian government after their expulsion in the 1979 revolution.
It's an interesting precedent to invoke, because it defines "successful" as meaning that the US companies did not return to Iran and were not compensated for their losses by Iran's government. So if "nothing" is what Lukoil is looking for, I'm sure they can get that. Here's another laugher:
"Russia is concerned about oil contracts signed with Baghdad, in particular the investment worth billions by Lukoil." Mr Klebanov said. "Having established control over Iraq, the US may easily declare contracts signed between Russia and Iraq invalid."
Despite the continual hysteria of a certain set, the U.S. will do nothing of the sort (as the FT article itself mentions, without making a mental connection, "US diplomats say they recognize Russia's claim to a stake in Iraqi oil." The next government of Iraq, however, might very well take the position that no such contract exists - it was voided not by them, but by the previous Iraqi government, and Lukoil didn't challenge that in court at the time. But the next Iraqi government won't have to take any action on this contract.
Lukoil could also use the court to seize oil exports from Iraq in compensation for any loss of its $20bn investment, Mr Fedun said.
I wasn't aware of Lukoil's naval prowess. They'll definitely need a squadron of gunboats to seize Iraq's oil. Perhaps they'll enlist the use of the Russian fleet. It does make me wonder, though, since the precedent of Iran's seizure of the assets of U.S. companies was invoked, what the reaction in Russia (or the rest of the world, for that matter) would be if the U.S. Navy started seizing Iranian oil and distributing it to U.S. companies. I think Russia would be quick to denounce U.S. "piracy".
Hell, though, it might be in America's interest to let Russia set this precedent. After all, not only is there the matter of Iran's nationalization of the assets of American companies, but there's also the Saudi nationalization of Aramco (so we could just start seizing Saudi oil, too, rather than paying for it), &tc. But I personally don't think that's a good idea. For any country.
But it is very interesting, all these countries considering doing things that they would denounce as "U.S. bullying" if America were to do it. Different standards for different folks, I suppose.
What Iraq needs, even more than reconstruction, is freedom and democracy. This is precisely what the United Nations, a majority of whose members are undemocratic states, cannot offer.
The U.N.'s record of intervention in countries emerging from conflict is mixed, to say the least:
* In some cases, such as Cambodia, it has tended to endorse and strengthen the status quo, often in the form of autocratic regimes in place.
* In other cases, as in the Balkans, it has preserved a fragile balance of power that excludes meaningful democratic development.
* In various African countries, notably Sierra Leone, the United Nations is used as a cover for the perpetuation of tribal divisions and foreign neo-colonial domination.
* In East Timor, the U.N. has become synonymous with widespread corruption, shady deals and missed opportunities.
But the most glaring example of how U.N. intervention can perpetuate human misery is the program that has been in place for Palestinian refugees for more than half a century. It has turned hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, of three successive generations, into hostages of a criminal policy, backed by Arab dictators, to prevent a peaceful settlement of the conflict with Israel.
The U.N. bureaucracy, accountable to no one in any democratic sense and nurtured on a culture of opacity, would love to seize control of the billions of dollars likely to be poured into Iraq.
During the past decade, the so-called oil-for-food program has linked the United Nations, which has overall supervision, with well-organised Mafia-style groups linked to Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist machine. Something like $50 billion has been disbursed since 1993. And yet the parts of Iraq controlled by Saddam until just a few days ago teetered on the brink of disaster.
Italy has become the latest country to violate the so-called "Stabilization Pact", which at this point should either be called the "Destabilization Pact" or "Suicide Pact".
I have had considerably less sympathy for the Germans and French (co-pact violators), not just for the usual reasons but because they were the ones who pressed for the "Stabilization Pact" in the first place and they have pushed for particularly harsh penalties for other countries violating it, but leniency for themselves. Italy's another matter. But still, the Pact (and indeed the Euro) was always a bad idea. Let the finger pointing begin. Or resume. Or continue. Or however it happens in EUrope.
In related news, most EU member-countries are saying "Um, not good to the currently floated EU presidency proposals. It's all the "smaller" countries, who must notice that the fix is in and this isn't good for them.
So, besides direct commercial interests (such as TotalFinaElf's oil contracts) in Iraq, a number of nations (ahem - round up the usual suspects) are interested in insuring that a post-Saddam Iraq assumes the debts incurred by the Ba'athists and agrees to pay them back.
Most of this debt was incurred for arms purchaces, most of which came from Russia.
A bit of an asside, not pointless this time: Russian generals were apparently giving the Iraqis military advice right up to the eve of the war. I hadn't piled on, pointing fingers at the Russians, for two reasons. First, because Russia is a free country now, at least sort of, and the fact that there were two Russian generals there helping the Iraqis doesn't mean that the Russian government was involved. Secondly, the Iraqis were performing so poorly - are performing so poorly - that it became possible to believe that the Russians were really on our side, sabotaging the Iraqi war effort from within; after all, one of those generals was supposedly advising the Iraqis on air defense, and Iraq's air defenses have been noteworthy only for their ineffectiveness. But given the attack on the Russian diplomatic convoy and the fact that the Russians were quick to blame the U.S. for everything (more here, it's no longer tenable to surmise that they were working with us behind the scenes to sabotage Saddam's war effort by deliberately giving them bad advice. (The truth of the Russian diplomatic convoy is more interesting).
By the way, most countries know that keeping their diplomats in a war zone involves accepting a certain amount of risk. This is why many countries moved their diplomatic staff out of Iraq in the days before the war. It used to be that the Russians, of all people, could be expected to be men about such risks. Now they're whining. What happened? Perhaps most of the tough Russians were killed by Lenin and Stalin or died fighting the NAZIs. The remainder are just Europeans.
Where was I? Oh, yah: so the Iraqis bought all this military hardware from the usual suspects, and they got pre-war military advice from generals of their largest supplier.
After the performance of the Iraqi military machine, these countries think Iraq owes them money for having sold this stuff to them? The Iraqis should be demanding their money back. The way I see it, they all owe the people of Iraq (rather than the other way around) for perpetuating a tyranny and for insuring that Iraqi conscripts would burn to a crisp in poorly designed death traps. (Burning to death in an exploding gas-bomb otherwise known as a T-62, T-72, or BMP, is a very unpleasant - if quick - way to die).
Oh, and the French always get it wrong. In this case, the Agence France-Presse. If this war is an advertisement for Russian weapons:
"We got a great advertising gift for our weapons in Iraq," Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov was quoted as saying by the Interfax-AVN news agency on Friday.
The conflict will "generate a surge in interest in anti-aircraft defences and radio-electronic equipment," predicted Alexander Nozdrachev, head of the state-run Russian Agency for Conventional Weapons, quoted by Interfax-AVN. . .
"The war is useful for Russia. The Iraqi army is creating publicity for Russian weapons," respected business daily Vedomosti commented recently.
Oh, man. I'm at a loss for words. If this is positive advertising, I'd like to see what negative advertising would look like. How about this: anyone who wants to buy Russian weapons can buy them from Iraq. All that wreckage at a low, low price.
Or, instead, Russian weapons companies can hire Iraq's soon to be unemployed Information Minister, Mohammed Saeed Sahaf, as their sales agent. He lives in a world of his own and apparently so do they. The French seem interested in expanding their military weapons so they'll be able to confront America, and since these have worked so well against American forces (or at least the French apparently believe they have), perhaps France will be a big buyer of Russian arms in the near future.
Update: Of course, after thinking about that AFP story, I'm almost back to thinking Russia is super-secretly working with us (a secret so closely kept, even they don't know it).
After all, it can only help the U.S. to have future opponents armed with the same weapons Russia sold to Iraq. I do still think that Sahaf ("Baghdad Bob") is the man to make the sales pitch.
Moscow has been spending much diplomatic energy in recent days on the demand that existing Russian contracts be respected in a post-Saddam Iraq, but many of the companies can only wait and see.
"There's nothing [the management] can do. They're not even trying. It's not their competence, they're not on that level," says an official at Tatneft, the Tatarstan-based oil company which has two contracts to extract from the Kirkuk fields in northern Iraq. "Tatneft is not Lukoil - it's a regional, provincial company."
Lukoil, Russia's second largest oil company, has more lobbying power. But in December, after Russia backed Security Coun
