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"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Friday, March 28, 2003
Stratfor On The War
Stratfor posted this for free, and it contains some things worth remembering:
Let's begin by benchmarking wars. Desert Storm, which is as close to the “perfect” campaign as you can come, lasted six weeks. It included a massive air campaign that culminated in a lightning ground war. The lightning ground war was made possible by the fact that Iraqi forces left in Kuwait were generally among the weakest formations in the Iraqi army and had been brutalized by six weeks of incessant bombardment. But the perfect campaign still took six weeks.
Kosovo, which was far from a perfect campaign by any measure, took two months to complete. It did not end in the military defeat of the Yugoslav armed forces but in a complex diplomatic maneuver, in which the Russians convinced the Serb leadership that capitulation on the Kosovo question was better than resistance. It nevertheless took the United States and its coalition two months of intense bombardment to reach this point.
It is true that Haiti was defeated in a matter of days. But Iraq is not Haiti. Under the best of circumstances, you couldn't drive from Kuwait to Turkey in 48 hours in peacetime. The idea that a large military force could enter and occupy Iraq in a matter of days was preposterous on its face, even if the Iraqi army had served as guides. The time measure for this war ought to be Desert Storm and Kosovo, save that the territory being fought over is substantially larger than either Kuwait or Kosovo, and the defenders appear somewhat more motivated. This is a war of weeks or months, not of days.
It goes on:
Since the night of March 20, the United States executed the easier part of the campaign. It advanced to the major line of Iraqi resistance and halted its advance as it should have done, which opened the door for the next part of the campaign -- intensive air attacks on the Republican Guards.
As things go wrong or unexpected things happen, it's important to keep this in mind:
In this particular case, it seems to us that the plan thus far has actually been followed. But if one simply thinks of the Normandy Invasion, we can see a case in which many things went wrong for the Allies, except for one: They succeeded in invading France.
While successfully invading France would be a bonus, I don't think we should raise expectations for Operation Iraqi Freedom to include such a goal. But we do have to remember this:
The greatest danger the United States faces in this war is if its politicians and generals come to feel that they are working against some deadline -- if they sense that they must not only win, but win fast. That is where unnecessary risks are taken and where wars can be lost. How many really remember how long Desert Storm or Kosovo took? What is remembered is the outcome. There is no prize for doing it fast. However, the core Iraqi assumption is that the United States will not be given enough time by the American public to defeat Iraq. That is the essence of the Iraqi war plan. Over the past few days, it did not seem a foolish assumption.
First, be wary of those, especially the French, who say that because there are some civilian casualties in this war, that means that the U.S. and Britain are losing whatever goodwill we might have otherwise had in Iraq and everyone will turn against us.
The Normandy campaign alone caused 14,000 or so casualties among the French civilian population. Perhaps that explains French hostility to the Anglo-Americans today, but I tend to doubt it. Generally, the French point to WWII as a reason they have to like us, not a reason they have to despise us ("We would have helped you in the Security Council, but you killed so many of us during the liberation of France that we think of you as an enemy" doesn't seem to be a commonly invoked rationale).
We killed far more German civilians, far more indiscriminately, but the Germans - on the whole (ok, there's always a few characters) - don't wave the bloody shirt of WWII and say they'll always hate America and Britain because of the war. In Japan, several cities were firebombed and/or nuked outright and yes, there are Japanese who hold it against us. But not the majority of the population, and Japan as a whole seems to have gotten over it to the point that they're supporting us in this effort.
If the Iraqis end up disliking us (something I doubt), the most carefully conducted military campaign in human history won't be the reason for it.
Now, the second point in this post. During WWII, after the initial battles, once it became clear what the NAZI invasion meant, Russian soldiers fought with dogged determination to defeat them. But that's not my point. There were some troops that Stalin sent to the front that consisted of people who weren't, for whatever reason, loyal and trustworthy. These were organized into battalions backed up by loyalists (NKVD, IIRC) with machine guns, who would force the troops in question to fight, at gunpoint. They were used as assault troops.
What we're seeing in Iraq is one aspect on the "perfection" of despotism - the extension of this concept to an entire country. Fedayeen, Ba'ath party cadres, and troops detached from Republican Guard units scattered throughout the armed forces and the country as a whole, forcing people to fight. Shooting those who try to escape - even civilians who might just be trying to refugee out of a combat zone or find food. This is going to make the fight a lot more brutal.
Now, to the extent that something like this has a "bright" side, the fact that the hard-core supporters of the regime are fighting so fiercely means that there will be a "deBa'athization" of Iraq, as a consequence of so many of them being killed. Also, since they're not defecting to save their hides and secure for themselves a place in post-war Iraq, even the survivors are likely to be excluded from "power sharing" arrangements that they might otherwise have wormed themselves into. The brutal reality is that if there had been a successful "decapitation" of the top leadership followed by a swift collapse, along with the surrender of most of the Ba'athist officialdom (who would then claim to have "been with us and against Saddam the whole time"), a lot of these guys would have retained their positions and their perks (just as in many Eastern European countries where their was no deCommunization and many of the nomenclatura retained their places in the governmental structure, simply renaming their parties without changing their spots. This was a consequence of the near-bloodless collapse of the SovWorld, in contrast to the Gotterdammerung of Fascism).
The French government is indignant about reports that they have refused to say who they'd like to see win the war in Iraq:
But the government said Friday that does not mean Paris hopes Iraq wins the war, and said that its position on who it wants to win was "totally devoid of ambiguity."
That's true. They want TotalFinaElf to win. They've been completely clear about that.
Well, as I linked to in this post, there's another Financial Times article, this one by Laurent Fabius. Much of it is sui generis, and we'll pass over the casual assertion that the war in Iraq is a violation of international law (no more than the action in Kossovo was, buh-ddy, actually it's more legal - "international law" isn't "whatever the French say"; this action is supported by UN Resolutions authorizing it, which the Kossovo action - an action I supported, btw - was not. It's not intellectually credible to assert that this is a violation of international law. I'm sorry, but while everyone's entitled to their own opinion, they're not entitled to their own facts). But I'll try not to get hung up on that. We'll go right to the core of the article:
This war demonstrates the urgent need for Europe to advance political union, to become a federal Europe, both more democratic and integrated. Such a goal probably cannot be achieved throughout all the European member states at the same time - particularly not with 25 members. So there is a need for an advance party of countries that wants, and is able, to move forward more quickly. Creating a militarily unified Europe for this advance guard is essential.
Those who might be tempted to think I was speculating wildly and was off the mark in my post on Collectivist Internationalism should note that "advance guard" and "vanguard" are identical terms. Who constitutes that vanguard?
The construction of a European defence force requires France and Germany in particular to pool their military resources speedily.
Read the article, and re-read my posts on Collectivist Internationalism.
Iraqi forces (probably the Fedayeen Saddam and Republican Guard forces) are hanging people who welcome coalition forces. (Via the Agonist, who vouches for the report). Also via the Agonist is this site giving an overview of the war, and this post by Tacitus on the need for reinforcements.
Note that much of those forces would have been there if the Turks had approved the movement of troops into the north. But that still begs the question of why we waited so long to swing the transport ships south through the Suez canal. The reason for that probably has to do with port capacity in Kuwait and the fact that there simply wasn't room for the additional ships at the time, with everything that was (still) being put in place then for the forces currently operating in the south. But that is just speculation on my part - I don't know if that was the reason or not, I just suspect it was.
You know all those Iraqi claims about the number of casualties they've inflicted on coalition forces, which we all dismiss as lies? They may not be lying.
No, I don't mean that what they're saying is true - that the bodies of American soldiers litter the fields of Iraq &tc. I am saying that they may very well be accurately relating the reports they are getting from Iraqi forces in the field. In any regime, but in particular one like this, there is a lot of pressure to make optimistic reports. Look, in Iraq, it's actually dangerous to report failure.
So field commanders send back distorted reports "Yes, we took x losses, but. . .um, we inflicted casualties, too! Lots!". As these reports make their way up the Iraqi chain of command, they get increasingly. . .optimistic. By the time they're submitted to Iraq's central government, they bear little or no relationship to reality.
Thus Saddam's spokesmen in Baghdad making such outlandish claims, and thus the reported optimism of Iraqi officials observed by Western reporters there. This also explains the otherwise inexplicable counter-attacks, such as the one out of Basra involving T-55 tanks. Now, the T-55 was a solid tank, in it's day. But it's day was the '50s. At this point it's good only for crushing peasant revolts, and is hopelessly outclassed by coalition tanks. Out in open country, it has no chance. People are wondering why the Iraqis would order a counter-attack under conditions that are described by coalition commanders in the field as "suicidal". Well, this would explain it: Iraq's high command has a completely inaccurate picture of what is occurring on the battlefield, because their field officers don't dare report the truth. This should be kept in mind in particular by those people who think that reports of the situation by coalition forces have been over-optimistic. On the Iraq side, it's exponentially worse, as happens in a situation where people who fail are executed. Indeed, the fact that coalition forces may be adjusting their plan in the face of Iraqi operations means, far from being a "failure" of earlier operational conceptions, that coalition commanders are receiving reasonably accurate information from the battlefield and adjusting accordingly, while Iraqi forces often seem to be behaving inexplicably from the point of view of anyone familiar with what is happening in the field (openly attacking coalition forces that they have no chance to defeat by such means, for example).
Frankenreich Expressions of Alliance
I've been saying in various posts (including ones from yesterday) that the French (in particular) are using claims off being allies as a means to lull Americans into a false sense of friendship while they're really looking for means to oppose us. I still think that's the case in many respects. However, in their claims of friendship and continued alliance with America, what if the target audience isn't so much us, as their domestic population?
Look, it's true that the majority of the people of France or Germany may be against this or that American policy (not just on Iraq, though that's a big current example). But it's also true that the majority of the people of both countries want to maintain good relations with America, want the alliance to continue. They're not up for open talk of opposing America in general. Thus one gets something we're all familiar with from politicians in our own countries: two-faced double-talk. On the one hand general and vague references to maintaining trans-Atlantic relations, strengthening the alliance, vague (never specific) talk about "all the things we have in common, all the areas on which we agree and cooperate" and the like, and on the other hand talk of the need to constrain U.S. power, oppose this or that U.S. policy, and very specific proposals (as opposed to vague generalities) on building institutions that are designed not to foster cooperation, but to foster opposition. (Another day, another Financial Times article).
Steven Den Beste has some insightful observations about why protest antics often seem counter-productive from the standpoint of persuading anyone (rather than turning them off).
I expect the reaction of many on the anti-war side will be that this is absurd, that it's hardly the case that members of the WWP are sitting around conspiring, thinking "we need an initiation ceremony to bond people to our cause". That's not the right way to look at these things. In most cases initiation rites are not designed consciously in that way. They come about "spontaneously". However, from personal experience I do know that there is peer pressure to do things that show your "dedication", and the people who did were then considered, and considered themselves to be, the real "in group" - the people most committed to the cause, etc. They were also, again from personal experience, the least reasonable (this includes people who, prior to the act of "initiation", were otherwise fairly reasonable people, but then all the sudden were less tolerant of questioning this or that aspect of the cause or the group's methods - especially from someone who hadn't "been there" - you "just don't get it").
Look, my personal experience (no need to go into details) was generally as a tag-along. I'd go into it because a friend thought it was a good idea or proposed it, and there was peer pressure to do it (I was broadly sympathetic but also not-unquestioning). I never did the "hard core" stuff (like die-ins for a nuclear freeze) - so I'm speaking as someone who was on the fringe, at best, of such things - but not a complete outsider and I know for a fact that this dynamic was at work and that participation in certain antics separated the less dedicated from the true believers.
I mean, look, even back in the '80s, there were things like going down to the local mall and staging a "die-in" (among other forms of protest theater) to force shoppers to walk over or around bodies of protestors, and get media attention ("get the message out"), that I always thought were lame at best (there was no chance that such a thing was going to convince anyone who wasn't already favorably disposed, and all such things ever accomplished was to allow people to believe that the people engaging in such antics were fringe nut cases, not to be taken seriously. But the people who were really into it never questioned doing such things and always dismissed any question of them. Performing such acts served a existential purpose - and definitely bonded the participants relative to non-participants.
Always an interesting intellectual force, I have to say he was somewhat of a disappointment as a Senator. His vast promise never seemed to gel into commensurate legislative achievements. But that aside, I never had anything but respect for him and the Senate was poorer for his retirement, and I mourn his passing.
The WTO's preliminary ruling is that they were totally bogus, dude. Which is about right, as is this:
By making steel more expensive, one US industry group claimed, up to 200,000 jobs may have been lost in industries using steel in their products.
While that might be exaggerated a bit, such tariffs almost invariably end up costing more jobs than they "save". Imposing tariffs as we were trying to get out of recession was one aspect of Bush's economic policy that was more harmful than helpful, but of course most Democrats weren't in any position to criticize it (beyond the "he's-trying-to-get-votes" aspect of things) because so many Democratic politicians favor this sort of thing.
SPIEGEL: And also because the German government committed itself too early and too unequivocally to be included in the American decision-making process?
Fischer: The decisive question is whether countries that now stand firmly on the side of the US can have or ever did have any influence at all.
What they had was the same thing Germany had for itself - influence on their own policy (they decided to join in the effort, the Germans decided not to. No one in America prevented either choice from being made). However, what we see here is a different sort of thing - Fischer having an expectation of being able to determine what U.S. policy will be.
Now, ask Tony Blair if he had any influence on the course of things. He's had quite a bit, in fact (most obviously with respect to attempting to get a 2nd - er, 18th - Resolution in the UN. That effort of Blair's was blocked, by the by, not by the U.S., but by France and Germany. Blair is also influential in the discussions regarding post-war Iraq, and most certainly has influenced things - I doubt there'd be as much talk about involving the UN in post-war reconstruction as there has been, to mention just one aspect of things. But he's been influential on other levels, too. Note that in the future, within the context of "Europe", how much influence a Tony Blair will have on determining what policy will be, in the face of the determination of the Frankenreich).
But the point here is that no one in the U.S. is compelling Germany to adopt a policy that Germany is not in favor of (similarly, ask yourself if Fischer would want the U.S. to have the sort of influence on determining German policy that he presumes is the divine right of Germany and France to have with respect to the determination of American policies). They are currently perfectly free to have the policy on Iraq that they do. HOWEVER the same will not be the case if EU integration proceeds as Fischer and others desire to see it proceed: then there will be one "European viewpoint", and some (will it be Germany? Or will it be Britain?) will be compelled to adopt a position they otherwise wouldn't have.
So you see here at play the looking-glass logic of the Collectivist Internationalists at work: ostensibly to avoid having to surrender their own ability to determine policy positions, the countries of Europe must surrender their own ability to determine policy positions. But what they're really looking for is something else, under that guise: telling various countries that they need to surrender their own ability to determine policy positions so that a large, united Europe can dictate what American policy should be, too (and this exposes along the way all of Fischer's prattle about protecting small and medium sized countries, by the by - he's looking to beat them into a big club to be used as a tool to influence American policy, which leaves little room for the small countries of Europe to express a position at variance with the "European" viewpoint as determined by the Frankenreich).
Fischer goes on, tellingly:
For democracy also means being able to have a different opinion - about fundamental existential questions, certainly also vis-ā-vis friendly governments. This is a very, very important experience which is valid beyond today. And it tells us: When others in Europe have a viewpoint different from ours, it is neither a cause for alarm or for rejection. Rather it is a sign of democratic maturity.
Except for those who are "not well brought up" and who shouldn't "miss an opportunity to keep silent." But the key sentence in that statement is For democracy also means being able to have a different opinion - about fundamental existential questions. Notice that in the EU as its advocates envision it will precisely oppose the expression of such differences of opinion. Such things are defined, in such a context, as the crime of "divisiveness" standing in the way of a "single European foreign and security policy."
So we see that on the terms with which Fischer himself defines democracy, the future EU will stifle that, not allow, much less enlarge, it. Meanwhile, again, there is nothing now - certainly not the U.S. - which is preventing countries from reaching a different opinion on anything (including the Iraq crisis). Germany has its policy, as does France, and the U.S. and Britain (among others) have theirs as well.
We'll pass over Fischer's insights (such as they are) on North Korea (where Fischer says that things were fine until the current American administration discontinued giving North Korea benefits, omitting the fact that North Korea was violating the agreement) and the "end of the Cold War" (Fischer's position on the Cold War, during the Cold War, is something to keep in mind, as is the fact that he puts it in passive voice as if it just sort of happened - no Thatcher, no Reagan, no pressure on Gorbachev to attempt reforms, no Pershing II, none of those things - which, of course, Fischer, at the time, had the same position on as the Soviet Union did. It is illustrative that when it came to the Cold War, Fischer was opposed to the policy of the U.S. and its allies, just as he opposes the policies of the U.S. and its allies now), or even on the particulars of the Iraq crisis and the question of whether UN Resolutions mean what they say (the U.S. and British position) or something else (the Franco-German position), and keep our focus on the larger questions:
Fischer: We had other priorities, which I continue to believe were the right ones. Moreover, we didn't circumvent anything, we only said that for good reasons we were not going to participate in any military actions.
Note indeed that Germany, far from being "bullied" by anyone (in particular the U.S.) into adopting a different policy that Fischer "believe(s) are the right ones" for Germany. But if Chirac, Schroeder, Fischer et al get their way, then that won't be possible in the future, within Europe (again, will it be Germany that will have to go along with policies they don't think are wise, in order to maintain European unity? Or will it be Britain? Or will the policy positions of Europe be some horrible middle-ground: a policy that no one would have chosen if left to their own devices, but was the result of grudging enforced consensus?)
Setting that aside for just a moment, let me make note of one other observation Fischer makes:
In the US there is nothing comparable to Auschwitz or Stalingrad or any of the other terrible symbolic places in our history.
Right. Now, everyone tempted to nod their head at the profundity of Fischer's observation should consider the real meaning of such a contrast.
But Fischer goes on, oblivious to the essence of the point he just made:
That we must strengthen and jointly expand our capabilities and that we need a strong European foreign minister who would combine the functions of Javier Solana as EU High Representative and Chris Patten as Commissioner - in one person with one telephone number.
In other words, "strengthened and expanded capabilities" means insuring that a single policy is adopted by all EU members (which, to use the example of the current crisis, would mean coercion of some into following a policy they would not have favored. In this case, it would mean, if Fischer got his way, dragging the majority of European countries along and compelling them to adopt the French veto policy, and policy of keeping Saddam in power regardless of his observation - or lack thereof - of UN Resolutions, because it's good for French and German businessmen who have vital "experience" in conducting business with the Ba'athists).
People wonder sometimes why Euroskeptics consider the EU an Orwellian exercise. . .
(As for the implication Fischer makes in the interview that only the U.S. is pursuing its interests while others - Germany, France, whomever - are acting out of high-minded principle rather than their own interests, the only appropriate response to that is: PUH-LEESE. I may have been born at night, but it wasn't last night. Who's he trying to fool? Other than himself, I mean).
(As for Fischer's comments on how those who support America are undergoing "democratic destabilization", we'll have to start placing bets on which government will last longer - Tony Blair's in Britain or Schroeder's in Germany.)
Germans have long been strangely conflicted about the United States, with strong pulls in either direction.
Fischer was the last politician in Schroeder's government to make any attempt to patch things up though, so I take this interview as a sign that the
Schröder government is now in full, conscious opposition to the United States. They might have blundered into this crisis unaware, but they're making
up for lost time.
Which seems to be about right. I think it's part of the strategy to play on "alliance" sentiment while actually working against America. It may have been an accidental strategy for some (the current government of Germany - though both Schröder's and Fischer's personal backgrounds make it a natural strategy for them even if it is an accidental one), but it's been an active strategy, in my opinion, from the French for quite some time.
Always beware of someone patting you on the back in presumed friendship while they mutter darkly about "constraining" you. They're usually just patting you on the back because they're trying to locate the best point in which to stick the shiv (which was the case in de Villepin's dealings with Colin Powell in the run up to this year's UNSC meetings on Iraq, after their promises of last year). As I wrote:
that's usually the priority of a rival or enemy, not an ally; the Soviets, for example, worked hard to constrain U.S. power during the Cold War, and we theirs. That wasn't the behavior of allies, and if Frenchmen like Parmentier think it is, then of course they won't mind if we show our love for France by working as hard as we can to constrain French power.
Another day, another FT article. This time one by Guillame Parmentier on mending the trans-Atlantic divide.
the falling out has exposed the ineffectiveness of all traditional forums of transatlantic co-operation. It is not too early to think about how they might be rebuilt.
That, at least, is true.
That Nato was unable to meet the challenges of the age came as no great surprise to close observers of the organisation. In the Kosovo war, its military structure was shown to be too American-dominated to satisfy European needs.
Of course, the reason for that isn't mentioned. The reason is the European side of the equation doesn't want to devote sufficient resources to military matters to "satisfy European needs" (see here for the underlaying attitude behind that).
Nato is finished, at least in its present form. Its refusal to reform itself after the cold war has proved its undoing.
It took the Financial Times long enough to notice what was noticed by the blogosphere six months (if not a year) ago. But let me go back half a paragraph, because something interesting is at play here (and we'll see it unfold as the article goes on):
After September 11 2001, the Americans made no pretence of being interested in Nato support for their operations against al-Qaeda.
Not quite true. America would have been happy with NATO support, but that wasn't really what was offered. What was offered was, to quote from the article its political side [would] be used by the Europeans to constrain US power, which is not the same as offering help in the fight. Thus early enthusiasm and deeply felt thanks for the initial invoking of Article V quickly soured when it became clear that the NATO alliance wasn't being invoked by at least some of the European NATO members to mean what it should have meant (one for all and all for one), but as a means to kvetch and try to hold us back, rather than an offer of help. Some European (and Canadian) forces were eventually dispatched to Afghanistan to support the mission there - but only after widespread initial complaints about the very idea of the mission (which thus, as a result, had to be initiated by American forces acting outside the NATO structure. Oh, this is also in no small part due to the initial observation I quoted from the article "its military structure was shown to be too American-dominated to satisfy European needs" - the European NATO members had little to offer in a military campaign against al-Queda bases in central Asia because they lacked the means for "force projection").
In any case, with the exception of fairly minor quibbles, Parmentier's article has been fine so far. But here he starts to get to his real purpose:
The other important organisation in the transatlantic relationship, the European Union, has not come out of this crisis unscathed.
The European Union as a "important organization in the transatlantic relationship" is an odd assertion to make at this point, given that EU institutions, as they've grown (evolved out of the old EEC), were consciously designed to exclude the "trans-Atlantic" aspect of relationships and concentrate on purely European interrelationships (and, indeed, often condemn or look with suspicion at those maintaining Atlantic relationships or seeing them as at least as important as their inter-European ties). It's not part of a trans-Atlantic partnership - at least in regards to the "French-led ambition to become a powerful force in foreign policy, security and defence". With respect to this, it was intended to be used in opposition to "hegemonism" (a phrase used to describe the U.S., rather than, say, French activities in Africa) - to go around (circumvent) trans-Atlantic institutions like NATO.
Disagreement over the degree of solidarity with the US aside, Europe had shown, to varying degrees.
What we see, then, is an inter-European disagreement. One that calls into question the stated premise of Parmentier's article. A disagreement over whether there should be any "bridge across the Atlantic", fresh or otherwise. But now we're getting into the heart of the matter:
Nato is also too heavily dominated by the US, both practically and psychologically, and it is organized along national lines and therefore does not allow for the expression of a European viewpoint.
Now, Parmentier just got done saying that "the Europeans" disagree among themselves but now he is saying they are to have a single "European viewpoint". It is clear here that what he is driving at is a forum should be created where a "European viewpoint" will be expressed and that countries in Europe will not take a position at variance from that viewpoint (his attitude towards expressions disagreement is pretty obvious). Which of the two broad options (the "British" position, or the "French" one) does Parmentier see as being the "European viewpoint"? He won't explicitly say, but the underlaying tone (and critique of "American dominance") makes it clear, regardless.
What is needed is a Euro-American framework to make broad dialogue possible and fruitful, especially on new threats. The emphasis, perhaps paradoxically, should be on the convention on Europe's constitutional future.
So, for folks like Parmentier, when he speaks of a "transatlantic bridge", what is really meant is something quite different: a tool to subdue the views of those who have a Atlanticist perspective, and enforce conformity with a "European" viewpoint. Parmentier then slides into completely false and propagandistic polemic:
The prevailing feeling in Washington may be one of contempt for the military abilities of the Europeans, the British included, if Donald Rumsfeld is to be believed.
Nothing of the sort was said by Rumsfeld or anyone else, which might be why Parmentier offers nothing to support this assertion except an aura of passive-aggressive condecension.
The present development of EU institutions makes it difficult for this to be achieved, if only because member states cannot develop their capabilities at the same rate. For the sake of continued transatlantic comity, the convention needs to move boldly towards strengthening co-operation among willing countries in the European security and defence policy.
Which is clearly why, in their upcomming discussions the "willing countries" that will lead the way (as a European vanguard) were the round up of the usual suspects (France, Belgium, and Germany. So when Parmentier wrote:
the Americans need allies - and will need them more as time goes on. They need these allies to be serious about international threats and also serious about the means needed to contain or combat them.
He was both accurate and simultaneously dissembling. America has and welcomes allies, who are helping. America wants and needs allies - but those who make claims of "alliance" as a cover for opposing and "constraining" you aren't allies (that's usually the priority of a rival or enemy, not an ally; the Soviets, for example, worked hard to constrain U.S. power during the Cold War, and we theirs. That wasn't the behavior of allies, and if Frenchmen like Parmentier think it is, then of course they won't mind if we show our love for France by working as hard as we can to constrain French power). At this point my assertion about Parmentier and his ilk being passive-aggressive should be examined; he's describing a mechanism of counterbalance, not of alliance. What will happen will be what we've already seen: "you can't do this without us, your allies, but we don't think it should be done," but is looking for a more effective means to impose this (NATO and the EU as it is now, with it's "Disagreement over the degree of solidarity with the US" was not able to use current institutions as tools "by the Europeans to constrain US power", so something must be done to "allow for the expression of a European viewpoint", and cut off the expression of viewpoints "organised along national lines" - that is, at variance with the "European" position.
What will that "European" position be? By excluding the possibility of creating an institution that will include the United States, it's pretty clear: this is the wet dream of the Restored Carolingian Empire. Corral all the countries of Europe and make sure that none can dissent from the position of "Europe" (by, for example, signing letters of support for the Americans). That's why when he says "What is needed is a Euro-American framework to make broad dialogue possible" his answer is an institution that excludes the Americans. In the context of that I cannot emphasize enough that his idea of "a broad dialogue" is a constrained one - a (single) European viewpoint rather than "divisive" expressions of intra-European disagreement.
So, for further insight into this vision of the future, I refer you back to my post on Collectivist Internationalism.
In fact, the reaction to the televised war has revealed more about the transatlantic chattering classes than about American or British soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines or the plans of their generals. The campaign thus far has been bold, to be sure, but well within the proven capabilities of both militaries. After less than a week of combat, the coalition is now positioned for the two decisive moments: the confrontation with the Republican Guard's armoured forces and then the final business of regime change in Baghdad.
Indeed.
I have only one quibble with the article:
To any student of the military art, this will be a remarkable victory, regardless of the reviews.
Things are looking good, but it's too soon to say that.
AP reports that France expects big role in post-war Iraq and is already drawing up their plans for involvement (meaning, in their case, enrichment by) in the project they have done nothing but oppose and hinder:
Worried it could be shut out of business deals in postwar Iraq, France is drawing up plans to win French companies access to lucrative oil and reconstruction contracts, officials said Tuesday.
The government is determined that French companies will be part of rebuilding Iraq, despite President Jacques Chirac's vigorous opposition to the war, a Finance Ministry official said.
Gilles Munier, an executive board member of the French-Iraq Association for Economic Cooperation, said business leaders and government representatives were studying how to gain a foothold in postwar Iraq.
He said a meeting between France's most powerful business federation, government leaders and the French-Iraq Association for Economic Cooperation was scheduled for April 3.
The Finance Ministry official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, confirmed discussions were underway with business leaders about Iraq.
That is what the call gall (Gaul?).
Some French are concerned that a U.S.-led administration in Iraq will favor companies from the United States and other pro-war countries while penalizing companies from France and other war opponents.
Yah think?
And after all France has done to be helpful in this, to think they might get shut out of "helping" by accepting financial reward for their opposition.
Officials in Paris say French firms' experience in working in Iraq would be an advantage.
Here's a clue for the French: the Ba'athist Butchers you all sucked up to, they'll be out of power and/or dead. So your contacts are drying up as we speak. I'm not sure you have much of an "in" with the opposition groups that'll be running Iraq when it's all said and done, so your experience (such as it was) with the ins and outs of greasing palms of Ba'athist officials won't be all that important.
French companies - many with ties to Baghdad stretching back decades - have established themselves as the largest suppliers of goods to Iraq since a U.N. trade embargo was partially lifted in 1996.
And, being French, they expect this cozy relationship will continue as if nothing was wrong with helping sustain a bloody dictatorship and no one, least of all the successor government, will hold it against them. Hey, it works in Africa for the French, why not Iraq, nes pas?
French oil giant TotalFinaElf probably has the biggest stake. It spent six years in the 1990s doing preparatory work on two giant oil fields and has signed two tentative agreements with Saddam to develop them.
For the French, it's all about oil.
Chirac has warned that France would vote against any U.N. Security Council resolution that would give "the American and British belligerents the right to administer Iraq."
The UN as an instrument of French business interests. Funny, that doesn't seem to have featured much in Tom Friedman's columns (or those of anyone else who rambled on about the moral authority of the UN).
You know, it's obvious it still hasn't hit Paris that by the time this is over, their chum, Saddam, won't be at the helm in Iraq anymore. People think I'm being hyperbolic when I say that these people are living in a fantasy realm of their own creation and are detached from reality.
Note absolutely no indication of what France might contribute by way of reconstruction, just indications of interest in plums (contracts benificial to French companies). But they are the anointed moral paragons of the world these days. . .
This post at Sgt. Stryker on how we're fighting, how things are going, and some of what we're up against (hint: The War on Bad Philosophy is something to keep in mind as you read), and a StrategyPage update on the situation (both via Instapundit).
This post by Andrew Sullivan is right about at least one thing - we're paying the price of the '91 betrayal in not receiving the sort of active support we might otherwise have.
The people have so far been welcoming - passively so. But with the exception of some already-existing forces (mostly but not entirely in the Kurdish north), they aren't rising against the regime. Once bitten, twice shy, as it were. If I were in their shoes, I wonder if I'd be inclined to risk much to rise up openly now, given what they did in '91 at our encouragement and what happened afterwords.
1718: Popular uprising reported in Basra. British troops said to be firing into the city where Iraqi soldiers were shooting at civilian protesters.
I guess I spoke too soon.
The BBC is also reporting (same page, 1630 timestamp) that the Iraqis used a hospital in Nasiriya as a arms depot.
Update: Here's a full story on the Basra situation:
British troops are firing in support of what they believe is a civilian uprising in the southern Iraqi city of Basra, it is reported. Artillery fire was being used to knock out loyalist Iraqi mortar positions which were attacking civilians, ITV news reported, quoting intelligence officers with the Scots Dragoon Guards.
Perhaps they just waited to see if we were really serious, or looked for the right opportunity, or needed to see support (the British this morning declared Basra a military objective). But here we are.
No chemical weapons, just lots of conventional weapons, per the Jerusalem Post (which reported the original story). That would explain the presence of Iraqi military personnel. The Cipro (see post below) is still interesting.
In other news, this sandstorm is really annoying. I'm surprised I haven't heard the Iraqis claiming that it shows Allah is on their side. It's hampering our efforts to engage the Republican Guard unit (al-Medina) in the region. It's not going to change the outcome, but it's annoying.
Update: Sandstorms may be our friend, not our foe. Could be. I'm impatient to see the RepGuards pounded is all. I want them crushed in the field before they skedaddle back to Baghdad. That's not a comment on what tactics we should use and what options we have or don't have (readers should note that I haven't presumed to critique the battle plan as it unfolds). It's just a desire.
Also via Glenn Reynolds, James Miller's article on the Free Rider problem the U.S. faces. If you'd like, do a search of Porphyrogenitus.net for "free rider" and you'll see where I've commented on this before myself. But Miller puts it well:
Our free rider problems aren't limited to the Iraqi conflict. American taxpayers spend more per capita on the military than any other nation. We are a relatively secure country whose people yearn for peace, so why do we have such a large military? France, Germany and Japan know that the U.S. armed forces will ultimately protect their sovereignty. Consequently, they can cut military expenditures and still feel safe by counting on America's military protection. In contrast, the American people know that their security, as well as the security of the entire Western world, is dependent upon the strength of the U.S. armed forces.
He even has solutions, some of which won't happen (we'll never get away with defunding the UN, as useless an appendage it might be, and it would possibly cause more problems than it solves; the EU-types already beat their chest over how they fund "peace" stuff more than we - even while 2/3 of the world's food aid is provided by America).
But this makes sense:
Another way to stop nations from free riding on our military is to reward countries who assist our military ventures. Many British soldiers tragically gave their lives in the struggle to liberate Iraq while Chirac arrogantly refused to put French troops at risk. We must ensure that the British get some tangible benefits from their troops' sacrifices. This gain can't just come from the fact that Saddam was removed from power, since French security is also enhanced by his removal. Perhaps we could give the British preferential access to Iraqi rebuilding contracts.
Besides rewarding the British, we could also fight our free rider problem by punishing our ungrateful allies. Some have tried punishing France by renaming French fries, but nomenclaturic assaults are unlikely to cause the French lasting harm. If we really want to provide incentives for allies not to forsake us in future conflicts, we should take more drastic actions and perhaps follow Nick Denton's suggestions to free Africa of France's influence. Congress could also assist U.S. consumers who wish to punish France by requiring her to prominently label all her exports to America.
Which is one reason why I find it so tragic that Blair in particular is pressing for giving the UN a strong post-war role in Iraq. The UN allows those, such as France, who were more than unhelpful (they were positively obstructionist) to have as much influence at the table as Britain does.
Neither I nor Miller is talking vengeance here - it's a matter of giving proper due to the helpful and not allowing the world's free riders to gain from their laxity (which only encourages similar behavior in the future; if there's no cost, no drawback to acting as France has, then that creates a moral hazard).
You see? The sides in this war are indistinguishable, if not equally culpable of equal sins, at least equally capable of them.
That is the pervasive sense of phony egalitarianism nourished by the era of instantaneous communication and the absolute democracy of the World Wide Web: All war violence is the same, equally inexcusable; all news sources are equally trustworthy or not; American and British soldiers are as every bit suspect as Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard; every opinion is equally valuable, and there must be no judgment. Every life is worth the same as every other. Every sperm is sacred.
I take a different message from the dreadful events of what American military commanders acknowledged, with monumental understatement, was a tough day.
I find it unbelievable -- both heartening and enraging -- that, as the United States sent its young men and women to war, its military was not engaging in the dread practice of "profiling", and that Sergeant Asan Akbar of the 328th Engineer Battalion was among them.
So-Called Experts Continue to Try to Whip Up Panic
Taking on just one example of this sort of thing (which is widespread), we'll use Steven Fidler's article in today's the Financial Times:
The television pictures broadcast at the weekend of US captives being abused and humiliated evoked recollections of Mogadishu a decade ago. That is probably just what they were intended to do.
With no chance to overcome American military might, Saddam Hussein or what is left of his regime have just one chance: to persuade the American public and world opinion the US is getting bogged down in another Vietnam.
In this, Saddam succeeds only with people like Steven Fidler; most Americans were filled with resolve, not trepidation, upon seeing those pictures. But we leave it to the easily panicked to write newspaper articles because we obviously don't want them doing anything important, like manning a weapon (how'd you like to have Fidler in the foxhole next to you? Gads! The guy's Barney Fife with a newspaper column!)
Still, US casualties and the reminders of Mogadishu will have given some Americans food for thought. It was in October 1993 that 18 US Rangers were killed in a firefight with local militias and television pictures beamed back to the US of some of their bodies being dragged through the streets.
Look, I don't want to minimize what happened, but here's the scoop: maintenance & supply personnel (of whom I was one when I served in the military, so I don't want anyone writing in saying I'm belittling them. I'm not) took a wrong turn in the dark (it's amazing how often this happens in training; I can recall several times we got lost in the back roads of the training grounds at Ft. McCoy in the darkness). The point of Fidler's article is this:
There is, though, little doubt that the high risk approach favoured by Donald Rumsfeld, defence secretary, could have an impact on public opinion. He has been the main advocate for leaner, more mobile US forces. Lighter forces mean higher risks. Now the downside is becoming apparent: more US combat casualties than in the first days of Desert Storm in 1991 - not to speak of Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan.
However, Fidler is talking out of ignorance.
Yes, lighter forces will not be as heavily protected as heavy units; in warfare as in much of life everything is a trade-off. Fidler is acting as if no one was aware of this when proposals for more light, rapidly deployable units were made.
But Fidler's remarks here are even more misleading. He directly implies that the casualties in Iraq now are tied to the force structure outline proposing lighter, leaner, more mobile units. But that is false.
The maintenance personnel captured and shown on video were attached to the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), which is a heavy unit. Similarly, the Apache helicopter that was shot down was from the 1st Cavalry Division - another heavy unit. The point here isn't that heavy units are more vulnerable - but that there are risks, and casualties, in any conflict, with any type of unit (and maintenance personnel aren't going to be driving around in the equivalent of a tank, regardless. Well, some will be - there are tank recovery units that use a tank chassis, for example. But most aren't, and Fidler implies that they would have been if it wasn't for that misguidedly dastardly Rumsfeld).
Attributing the casualties to a shift in defense policy is misleading to the point of falsehood - indeed, the changes Rumsfeld has championed have not begun to reach field units and it will be many years before they do. There is some question too regarding whether, by that time the protection provided by heavy tanks will still be effective or not (one might be better off with faster, more elusive, low-profile vehicles). This is not a surety, but it is a subject of debate. Fidler ignores this; he's probably ignorant of such theories. Anyone who's not even aware of the fact that the changes Rumsfeld is proposing are years away - rather than present on the battlefield in Iraq - can hardly be expected to be aware of something like this.
In any event, the real debate isn't as stark as Fidler or others seem to imply. It's not a "either/or" question, where we will have no heavy units and be entirely reliant on light forces. It's a question of what force mixture we'll find most useful in the future - increasing the proportion of rapidly deployable forces, which will mean a reduction (but not elimination) in heavy forces that were designed to fight classic tank battles across the North German plain; and which are useful in fighting Iraq's Soviet-style forces in the Mesopotamian plain - but won't be as suited for campaigns against different opponents in different terrain. Should we enter a situation where heavy units are less suitable, I have little doubt that Fidler will write an article saying "gee, America's forces are clinging so closely to the past and drawing too much on their Gulf War experiences, they need a modernized military able to operate in a wide variety of environments and conditions. The U.S. won't always have six months or a year to build up forces in an area, like they had in the two Gulf Wars. We need to be able to move troops more rapidly."
Perhaps you think I'm too harsh on Fidler. But one thing I find really tiresome is seeing people get paid to pontificate in the pages of respected media outlets, who clearly don't know squat about what they're talking about, but put on the air of knowing more than those who have studied a field (such as military operations and force composition) for years. I, myself, am far from an expert (I'm an amateur, but one who has paid attention to these things for years), but I know more than Fidler does - or at least more than he lets on in his article. Half the time it's hard to tell if someone is really that ignorant or if they're just pretending to be because it allows them to score political points against some nemesis (in this case, to assail Rumsfeld). I think many of these pieces are "outcome-oriented" - they aren't really meant to "warn" of potential pitfalls and fall-off in support, they're really intended to create the sentiments they're supposedly "warning" of. They're aimed at whipping up hysteria and popular anxiety in a campaign that, by historical standards, is going remarkably well, not remarkably badly.
One other thing as well. The implication that we've taken high casualties in these operations, upon which Fidler's column rests, is absurd. Every casualty is tragic - but so far we have taken very light, not very heavy, losses. To rebut the tropes of Fidler and his panicking ilk, it is instructive to see what actual experts in the study of military affairs have to say:
Gloom-mongers are already complaining that the campaign in Iraq is "bogging down", apparently because of the appearance of Iraqi irregulars in the rear areas and the resumption of fighting in towns described as having fallen.
It is far too early to talk of the campaign bogging down or even faltering. Doom-mongers should remember that the allied attack started only four days ago. They have been spoilt by memories of the briefness of the Gulf war of 1991 and the rapidity of the recent Northern Alliance victory in Afghanistan.
I do have to remind Mr. Keegan here that these same people were invoking the spectre of "quagmire" in Afghanistan, too, and after a week or so were similarly complaining about how long it was taking and how many losses we were going to suffer. But it is interesting to note that yes, these same people who were all in a tizzy over the Afghanistan campaign (and 12 years ago were similarly hand-wringing about the Gulf War) now use both campaigns (that they criticized at the time operations were going on) as counter examples of how we did it right and are supposedly not performing as well now.
But it isn't true. At least it isn't true that Patton said that. Patton always had great respect for the French military (I might say inordinate respect, but we're talking Patton's opinion here). Indeed, it's more likely that he would have made that quip about British troops than about French troops. Patton was always greatly suspicious of the British and British forces. But Patton had nothing but high regard for the French forces and it was a French Armored Division, commanded by LeClerc, attached to Patton's 3rd Army, that took Paris.
Department of Defense officials said on Monday that no evidence of chemical weapons production had been found at a facility close to the southern Iraqi town of Najaf occupied by US forces on Sunday. . .
However, a Pentagon official said on Monday that the site had probably been abandoned some time ago.
Which begs the question of what an Iraqi general would be doing in an "abandoned" site, and why the officers there were found with Cipro (used to prevent anthrax infection). (Via Command Post).
In related news, the New York Times decides to mention something that eluded their previous coverage:
Components of every kind of unconventional weapon Iraq may have can be smuggled out in compact forms amid throngs of refugees crossing the thousands of miles of borders. Germ agents and seed stocks can be freeze-dried, sealed and carried in a shirt pocket. Nerve gases can be converted into talc-like powders.
Interesting that how easy it is to hide (and smuggle) this stuff wasn't a major factor in the NYT's previous editorializing, when they were going on about how inspectors could handle it all.
The Scotsman reports on Scuds (?) found at another chemical facility:
EXPERTS are examining suspected Scud missiles discovered by British soldiers searching a chemical plant outside Basra.
A number of the grey-painted rockets, about 23ft long, were found in the Dirhamiyah petro-chemical plant close to Iraq’s second city.
The discovery has raised suspicions that Saddam Hussein was planning to arm the missiles with chemical warheads. British officers say it is difficult to find an innocent explanation for storing missiles in a chemical plant.
The find comes a day after soldiers with the Black Watch discovered a cache of weapons, including two Russian al-Harith anti-ship cruise missiles, at the Az Zubayr civilian heliport south of Basra.
(Be slightly wary of the use of the term "Scuds" in the story; many media outlets have sloppily and lazily taken to calling almost any Iraqi missile a "Scud", so it's not clear if these are actual Scuds or some other sort of missile). (The Scotsman link also via The Command Post).
When I heard this pablum on the Oscars last night (one of the few bits I actually saw), I knew there'd be something twisted behind it:
"The necessity for peace in this world is not a dream but a reality. And we are not alone. If Frida was alive, she would be on our side - against war."
Well, there is, of course. Frida Kahlo was a devout Stalinist of a particularly virulent sort (so of course, her apologists, such as Garcia Bernal, are correct. She would be against any war to remove Saddam Hussein, a Stalinist dictator in his own right. She would quite likely be an unapologetic supporter of Saddam's regime).
Eugene Volokh has the complete scoop, including a particularly appropriate self-portrait by Frida posing beneath a portrait of Big Brother Stalin (a portrait reminiscent of the ones of Saddam that festoon Iraq).
Says a lot about Frida. . .and about Garcia Bernal, and about all those Friviledged1 pseudoproles who found his observation moving.
Eugene, who's family comes from the Ukraine and thus knows a bit more about Stalin than Mr. Bernal, asks:
So remind me: Why exactly should we care which side Frida would be on (unless we want to be on the opposite side, an admittedly imperfect heuristic)?
