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"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Tuesday, December 26, 2006
Do We Have a Glass Jaw?
So I saw "Rocky Balboa today and it was fairly good (more on that in another post, perhaps). One particular bit made me think. Now, I'll say up front that this is me taking from the movie something, by which I mean it isn't necessarily the point the movie intends to make. But that's what we do - we make connections, mental and otherwise, of our own.
At one point in the movie, Rocky is speaking to his son and says:
Let me tell you something you already know. The world ain't all sunshine and rainbows. It is a very mean and nasty place and it will beat you to your knees and keep you there permanently if you let it. You, me, or nobody is gonna hit as hard as life. But it ain't how hard you hit; it's about how hard you can get hit, and keep moving forward. How much you can take, and keep moving forward. That's how winning is done. Now, if you know what you're worth, then go out and get what you're worth. But you gotta be willing to take the hit, and not pointing fingers saying you ain't where you are because of him, or her, or anybody. Cowards do that and that ain't you. You're better than that!
It seems to me that is a question for all of us at the moment, as a nation.
But really I titled this badly. Because as a nation we can take "the big punch" quite well. We proved that (again) on 9/11. In Boxing, "headhunting", going for the big-punch-to-the-head knockout, isn't always wise. It certainly isn't against the U.S.
When hit like that, we react like Rocky, sure enough. That's why our wiser enemies aren't looking to do that kind of thing again.
No, the better boxers go for body shots over time: Weaken an opponents legs by continual, less dramatic blows. That's when you find out if you have the stuff: Do you weaken, and drop? Or do you have the strength to go the distance?
This is what's happening to us now. We're taking an accumulation of smaller blows. So are our opponents. We feel the hits that affect us, but only occasionally (when a memo is intercepted, for example), get a glimpse into how badly our opponents are taking it.
We can throw the biggest punch in the world. But, as the quote says, that's not the test of success. What can we take? When the war in Iraq seemed easy, a lot of people were for it, and the Democrats complained of the "politicization" of it, when Republicans tried to contrast their support with supposedly less-than-full support on the part of the Democrats. Now?
Now the war seems hard, and we're taking an accumulation of hits while not knocking the enemy out. So support has fallen and Democrats are happy to disclaim any responsibility for a war they view not as America's, but as "Bush's problem". All the "wise men" (and women) are saying that the "Realist" thing to do now is to throw in the towel.
Everywhere around the world, the question that is being asked - and answered - is whether we have the legs to go the distance. We know we don't have a glass jaw, but do we have feet of clay?
"Thou, O king, sawest, and behold a great image ... his feet part of iron and part of clay. ... And as the toes of the feet were part of iron, and part of clay, so the kingdom shall be partly strong, and partly broken."
What the ISG offers us are mere aspirations, with no serious consideration of the concrete means required to fulfill those aspirations.
I've been in agreement with those who have said that if we're going to send someone to Syria, it should be Baker himself: Let him put up or shut up. Only problem is, he would happily sell our allies in the region down the river on behalf of his Saudi employers and other "forces of regional stability", and give concessions to our enemies. So that might not be a good "call his bluff" act after all.
Realism my arse: This the ISG was an exercise in academic wishful thinking at best, and actively mischevious at worst. Sure, there are some good ideas in there, but most of the proposals that are being most widely highlighted are the worst ones, the ones most dependent on fatuous King Canute pronouncements.
My unit recently returned from Iraq, as part of the 4th Infantry Division. While there, I was a "Fobbit": I never went outside the wire. For most of the tour, though, I worked at Sather Air Base, BIAP, and thus had an opportunity to interact with a lot of soldiers stationed throughout the Baghdad Area of Operations.
What great insight does that give me? None. Do I have the answer to "the Question"? No more than anyone else. I would say that overall my experiences - and that of just about everyone there - may give them some knowledge of a little slice of the war, but overall I don't think I know more than I would have had I been "at home" the whole time. Something to keep in mind, always, whenever people disparage those who haven't gone as "chickenhawks" and imply that they have nothing to contribute to the debate (unless, of course, they are against the mission).
"It'll Be a Mess"
During my deployment there was a two-week period where me and some buddies were assigned as the "admin guys" assisting a Special Forces team in the selection of new trainees for the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOFOR) Brigade. The SF Team assisted/oversaw a team from the ISOFOR, Iraqi NCOS, who were essentially the "Drill Sergeants" in charge of the Selectees/Trainees. The Iraqi NCOs were eager, as were the majority of the Selectees, but somewhat disorganized. "Training the Trainers", the job the SF Team was there to do, was clearly an ongoing process. Yet according to one member of the team, who I'll call "Mark", theirs was the last Team that was going to be assigned to this mission, and they would be present for only one more "class" of ISOFOR trainees. I asked him what would happen after, and he smiled and said "it'll be a mess."
Now, things change, and I don't know whether another SF Team ended up being assigned to continue on with it or not. But clearly this is one of the things we need to do more of, and keep up with.
Corruption is a real problem. Throughout the two-week selection process, which is somewhat similar to reception at U.S. Basic Training but also a tool for testing and weeding out, the ISOFOR Command Sergeant Major was often present, sitting and watching. One of the interpreters said "Oh, he shouldn't be here so much, interfering with the training. He should be with the rest of the brigade, and let the trainers do their jobs." (By which he meant the Iraqi trainers). But "Mike" told me later the CSM was a great help. Why? He was running interference, keeping the Iraqi officers away from the Selection process.
That was important because many of the recruits had paid bribes to get in. Some of them because they wanted a job, others because they were infiltrators, loyal to militias or even the insurgency. Indeed, an entire company was composed of people the SF Team suspected of having gotten there through bribes, with a tough Iraqi NCO/Drill Sergeant over them. The goal: Weed them out (recruits could quit at any time, and many did). They figured they got rid of most of the infiltrators, but that probably a couple had slipped through.
The ISOFOR CSM's reward for that was, when selection was over, a letter of reprimand from the Iraqi command (the SF Team told him to tear it up and ignore it). So what will happen if/when the Americans are gone? Will such a man have "cover" to do that? Unlikely. "Mike" was candid that the NCOs were onboard with the anti-corruption efforts "because they know we [the SF guys] don't like it".
What's the lesson here? It will take time and patience to inculcate a sense of professionalism in the Iraqi NCO Corps, but there is promise. People in the States - usually ignoratii on the Left - sometimes talk about how quickly we're able to turn a recruit into a Soldier. Well, the difference is they are incorporated into a functioning, organic system, with strong traditions of professionalism, and the NCOs are the backbone of our Army. But an NCO isn't created overnight. It can take 10 years or more for someone to become a Platoon Sergeant, and that's in an Army where they are surrounded by mentors who have "gone before.".
The further lesson is that it will take a lot longer, and quite a bit of work, effort, to bring even that level of professionalism to much of the Iraqi Officer Corps. Remember: The ISOFOR is one of the better units. But the Iraqi Officer Corps seems to be at least partly made up of political appointees. It will take time to separate the wheat from the chaff.
"This is My Death Sentence"
One day, before we wrapped it all up, one of the Iraqi interpreters who worked with us was talking to me, during down time. He held out his ID card and said "know what this is"? I said an ID card. He said "this is my death sentence". Every day he puts it in his shoe. His fear? If he's found with it, at one of the "checkpoints" between the base and his home off post, he might be shot. By insurgents? No, by sectarian militias.
That's what awaits guys who work with us, after we leave.
Plan of Action
So, what's to be done? My tour was fairly safe. I was stationed at a large FOB, and didn't really feel I was in much greater danger there than I would have been at home (if one exchanges dangerous highways at home for the occasional mortar or RPG fired off by people with such bad aim that they would aim at the airport and literally miss it by a kilometer or more). I'm not going to apologize to anyone for the comparative safety of my deployment compared to many others who were out there, in more harrowing FOBs, and those outside the wire. I went where I was told. So did thousands of others at Liberty/Victory, Balad, &tc.
But Victor Davis Hanson is closer to the truth, and those counseling us to reposition our troops so that they are in bases, ready to be "rapid reaction forces" as-needed but otherwise draw back from the fighting and "let the Iraqis take the lead" are wrong. Too many people are concerned with cosseting the troops: They're all about body armor, safety, putting as many as possible behind the wire, protected by concrete barriers, and not about what needs to be done. We need to get more of out troops outside the big basecamps, and working directly with Iraqi forces as mentors. We also need to expand greatly the embedment of other departments of our government, and allied nations, with Iraqi counterparts, to build civil-society infrastructure.
We need to reduce the megabases, the situation where Fort Hood is essentially being re-created opposite the terminal of Baghdad International, and get more of us out working with the Iraqi soldiers. We need to "embed" more troops among the Iraqis, mentor them more.
But this is really not about "them", or at least not only about "them" and "their deficiencies" and whether we can help them rectify those deficiencies or not. It's also about us: A country where "Fighting Dems" mean not Democrats like Lieberman who want to make sure we're doing our utmost to fight our enemies abroad, but partisans ferociously fighting their domestic political opponents at home, a country where few people say "well, I was opposed to the war, but Congress had a vote, and we're in it as a country, and we need to figure out how best to win it." Instead half the country's attitude is that "it's Bush's war and we're not going to help let him off the hook, we're going to stick him with it, and use it to discredit people we don't agree with at home."
But I don't want to hit the "partisan politics" head too hard, because that is not the biggest of our problems. Those who are for the war, myself not excluded, have done a very poor job communicating. We have not convinced the American people that the sacrifices are necessary. We have not explained that conflicts like this generally take a decade, and that are losses are historical not in there extreme nature, but in how low they are. But beyond that, we have not maintained support: You can hardly convince someone that even low losses are worth it if they don't believe the mission should continue in the first place.
Admittedly, given the nature of things, those who favor going forward and striving the best we can to be successful, have an uphill battle in the public communications department, given the slant of the media. But this is hardly an excuse: We did not face a favorable MSN when advocating the war to topple Saddam, but we succeeded then, so it's hardly complain now of being unable to reach people because of media bias. The fact that we have a media that regurgitates insurgent propaganda unskeptically and unquestioningly but claims our own information efforts are propaganda to be dismissed out of hand is certainly one of the problems we face, but it is not insurmountable.
As for the idea of discussions with Iran and Syria over Iraq's future, well, if we're not able to convince the American people of why that would be a bad idea and why any concession to them on Iraq's development would be counter to our interest and Iraq's, well we should pack it in. Instead, we should do more to put the pressure back on those countries - to fight fire with fire. The cost they pay for destabilizing Iraq and Lebanon should be destabilization and our financing of opposition groups, and even insurgents against them. If after that they decide to play nice, and cease the mischief, then we should be willing to meet them halfway. But unilateral concessions on our part as a means to put a happy face on turning Iraq and Lebanon over to their not-so-tender-mercies would be a disgrace that, while "realists" at home would believe in, everyone else in the world would know for what it was: Capitulation.
What needs to be done is to adopt a plan capable of success, which I believe increased embedment of American and allied personnel would be, then we need to explain what is being done to our fellow citizens, and why, and the patience that it will involve. But also that it can work: Similar efforts are bearing fruit in the Balkans and elsewhere. We need to not be satisfied with explaining it one time, however, but keep up with the public persuasion efforts, because those on the other side (both at home and abroad) don't stop repeating their negative talking points of doom and withdrawal ("redeployment" by any other name). Their repetition needs to be continually countered.
Also, we need to increase the size of America's ground forces. Those of us who favored this effort, and others, should be ashamed that we did not insist upon an increase in the force structure of the Army and Marines years ago. Many of us were for it, but were not stronger in our advocacy. Troops to maintain our efforts while also deterring meddlesome powers like Syria, Iran, and North Korea simply don't exist because we did not push harder. It is a sign of near unseriousness that we tolerated budgets that prioritized continuation of expensive programs to fight aerial dogfights 20 years from now against a non-existent "near-peer" enemy air force instead of paying for additional boots on the grounds (the "legacy-costs" of that being unbearable, in a way that apparently the "legacy-costs" of the F-22 are not).
We should have pushed for an increase in the budget. We should have called the bluff of those at home who keep calling for "shared sacrifice in a time of war" by offering to cut frivolous non-defense spending programs, on the promise that for each dollar of cut we get this year (not "cut in rate of growth" cut, either), we'll pass a dollar's worth of tax increases next year. But doing that would have required a Congress serious enough about the war to put their "earmark spending" on hold. But we can still push for additional troops, and the Democrats might pass a budget that increases the authorized troop strength, because they want to burnish their bona fides on the issue. It can be easily done without a draft; we had considerably more people in our Armed Forces when our population was 50 million people fewer than today.
Because, if this is to be a "long war", we need the soldiers, and the patience, to fight it seriously.
We need to be tough-minded with Iraqi politicians, too, not just with our own. When they tell us not to go after those who have captured our soldiers, or to take the pressure off of Sadr City (and Sadr), we need to be prepared to tell them that they are in charge of the country, but there are consequences for their choices. Not just consequences from our enemies (which give elements like Sadr a one-sided advantage), but steps we'll take, too. We can start with offering to withdraw not just from the pursuit, not just from Sadr City, but withdraw our protection teams from the politicians who tell us to back off.
There's more, of course. That is just the end of the begining of what we need to do.
Update: Biggest differences between what I see as needed and what the ISG recommends is that I wouldn't be withdrawing troops. If anything, I think the "surge" idea of 20-30,000 additional troops is closer to the right tack, if done within the context of increasing the size of our ground forces, but the increase should be kept there as needed for security. Also, unlike the ISG, I don't favor a policy of issuing ultimatums to our friends on the one hand and giving concessions to our enemies on the other. That would just place America further down the road of becoming "a harmless enemy and a treacherous friend", as Bernard Lewis has been quoted saying.
Now early word has it that The Fabulous Baker Boys (straight from the political boneyard and known formally as the Iraq Study Group) will recommend withdrawing U.S. combat troops from Iraq by 2008, while leaving behind our embedded trainers and vulnerable support units.
This is the sort of nonsense that sounds great to civilians with no military experience. To veterans, it's nuts.
The ISG was proud of "compromise", each giving a bit to get a bit in the final recommendation. But a good plan isn't necessarily one created by groupthink and compromise, and ideas aren't necessarily better just because they're generated through consensus. Our first priority shouldn't be an "exit strategy" arrived at via compromise, it should be victory.
(See also here on engagement with Syria and Iran).
A couple people, perhaps reminded of this blog's existence because of recent Papal remarks, mailed me with a howdy and wanting to know how things were going and saying they missed the site.
I'm doing fine, and though we're not supposed to talk about when we come and go, people can figure out when 4th ID will be leaving from here.
Alas, I didn't blog at all out here, really. I'd like to get back to it but usually by the time a post "sparks" the moment has passed - including this latest tempest-in-a-teapot over what the Pope said.
Most of what I would say has, by the time a post forms in my head, been said and better by someone else. I would say that my general outlook on all this stuff (the theatrical hypocrisies of various "Islamic community spokesmen" over everything from Danish Cartoons to Papal speeches) is that we need to stop worrying about "offending Islamic sensibilities" and get them to worry about offending ours.
The Pope shouldn't have apologized. I read one article quoting an Imam criticizing the Pope for bringing it up because "Catholics had started the Crusades and invaded Constantinople too". Sure, the Catholic Church has a lot to answer for, but the Imam's statement was an example of those theatrical hypocrisies: The Crusades weren't, contrary to what many people are miseducated to believe, an example of unprovoked Western Imperial-Colonialist aggression, but a response to Islamic invasion, and I don't see Moslems prepared to apologize for their own conquests of Eastern Roman territory, or capture of Constantinople.
But back to my lack of blogging: My position over here hasn't given me much special insight into how well or badly things may be going, so I haven't done any "The View from Baghdad" posts. The downside of having a safe job here is that I don't really have any greater "feel" for things than I had back in the 'States.
So I left the Milblogging-from-Iraq to those who are better able to give people an informed view, rather than trying to pretend whatever hearsay and grapevine stuff I learned formed some sort of special, boots-on-ground insight.
Then also was working some very long hours for a good part of the time, and simply didn't have the energy to post anyway when I had access to a computer that didn't block my site. :P
Eventually I do hope to get back to blogging regularly...but it will almost certainly be once I'm back Stateside.
Update: Don't say we're violent and intollerant, or we'll burn down your churches> and you'll be on the receiving end of more terrorist attacks!
Im with 10th MTN, also based on Liberty and have been blogging here since my arrival in August. General Vines of the XVIII corps has a policy letter for the forces here in Baghdad that I can send you if you havent seen it. It which pretty much says blogging is ok, minus OPSEC and the obvious. And since I am MI, you know my daily stuff can't go up. My CO and 1SG were curious where I even found it because they didn't know it existed. The only thing she added was to not have photos of vehicles.
So that seems to be a more reasonable policy. I'm hoping when 4th ID takes over this sector, they'll leave that policy in place.
I do have one complaint with how the military, or at least our Division,
has handled stuff, and it's a complaint that might be of interest to
Bloggers. That is this:
When we were prepping for deployment, all the
leadership were given various briefings on security matters. One was on
blogs, and the danger they pose. Now, I get security issues - obviously
you don't want people posting sensitive information, that might affect a
mission. But our leadership at least came back from the briefing with the
sense that virtually nothing should be said in a Blog - "let people read
about it in the news. If you want to talk about stuff, tell your family
you're fine and all but don't talk about anything, they can watch the news
or read it in the papers."
That is, they seem to have been given a highly
negative sense of the blogosphere, and were discouraging soldiers from
posting anything that might affect anything. Which to me is sass-akwards.
Milbloggers, in my non-humble opinion, have done more for the war effort
and more to correct misleading reports than the entire Army Public Affairs
Branch has (note: this is not a slam on them, but praise for the MilBlog
community). The Army should be encouraging troops to give *more*
information on their first-hand impressions and how things are going, not
less. "Winning the War" begins at home - we're not going to be defeated
here, but may have to pull out because of people's impressions at home,
which in my opinion seem to be shaped by misleading reports of what the
overall picture here is. (Note again - I'm writing less from my own direct
experiences than from the impression I get second-hand, both talking to
people who have direct experiences and reading what I consider to be
reliable sources).
This attitude towards soldier-bloggers, which might be
limited to just the 4th Division, seems to be another example of the Army
shooting itself in the foot - making it's mission harder.
(Just to
emphasize, again - I know there is good reason for not posting sensitive
information that could affect ongoing missions. But they negative attitude
our leadership came back with from the briefings they got on blogs went
beyond that, to encompass just about everything someone might post that
wasn't utterly banal).
I haven't posted in a long time, I know. But here's an update, for those
who may be interested.
My detachment got into Kuwait in mid-October, and
processed through a dusty, sandy Camp out in the middle of nowhere - we
spent Thanksgiving there; it wasn't bad at all. Just somewhat of a wait
before we crossed every "T" and dotted every "I" before going Up
North.
We went up a few days after Thanksgiving, into Baghdad where
we're based. It's almost like working at home (but not quite, obviously).
If you ever think of taking a trip to Iraq (once things calm down, I
know), this time of year is the time to do it. The weather has been great
so far - balmy, not hot. The nights are somewhat chilly, but not cold. The
soil here is very fine, though - silty because, well, it's silt (river run
off, natch). So I can see that when it rains, it'll turn into mud that
will stick to everything, and when the wind picks up - yah, I can see
where the "sand storms" come from (though this part of Iraq isn't sandy).
The people here that I've run into, both military & civilian, are very up-beat. This is a very comfortable posting - the very definition of a REMF base camp. We've got just about everything here, and my biggest concerns are getting internet hooked up in my trailer and how I'll handle the summer heat (I'm a pale Caucasian from a cold-weather state, and sweat profusely in the heat; melting). When those are your biggest concerns, you know you have it good.
This is not to say that all of Iraq is secure, just that the little bit of it I'm in is highly secure. This also means, though, that I'm not the best source of "first-hand observations of how things are going on the ground". My mission, which is serving the personnel of 4th ID and it's attached units, doesn't have me leaving the post. My job is to take care of those who are helping build the country up (right now, both soldiers and civilian contractors.
Yes, I've also seen some Iraqi troops, though they aren't a big presence on Baghdad. But I don't have any good (or bad) idea how well (or badly) they're performing, just from having seen them. Everyone I've seen has been positive, relaxed, and confident. But, again I emphasize that I haven't seen everyone.
The one regret I'll possibly have from this situation, as a historian, is being in a country with so much history without being able to get out and about and see some of the things that I've always been interested in - the ruins of Babylon, of Ninevah, and the like, or even much of Baghdad. That's not the job we're here to do, natch, but even on R&R or Pass, site-seeing isn't on the agenda. Oh well, there's always the future - and now I know when would be a good time to come.
We were here during the time of the elections - I didn't post on them because, like much else, I didn't have any direct experience that would enable me to say something someone else wasn't able to say, better. But I will say that things passed in relative calm here. On Sunday night the week before the polls opened, the air was filled with tracer rounds all around camp, and the sound of gunfire - it was Iraqis, firing their weapons. But not in an attack, in celebration.
As things sort themselves out I hope to be making more posts again, and have some impressions. I might - no promises again - also start posting again on wider issues, but lately my heart hasn't been in it. It all seems like cud-chewing, the same old stuff being re-aired and having to be re-re-re-rebutted for the Nth time. Facts don't seem to matter or make any impact, especially when it comes to the self-described "Reality-Based Community". But I suppose one should listen to the words of Winston Churchill and never give up the good fight anyhow. I haven't, but I've taken a bit of a sabbatical, at least from the Blog Wars. I will say that, having heard about the insurgents who helped guard polling places, that we live in an odd, Bearded-Spock Universe when the loyalists of a dictatorship are active in protecting the elections, while the Western Progressives who claimed to be interested only in popular democracy and who got all offended if you suggested they were in favor of the Saddam regime, claiming to only be interested in the people of Iraq, were nowhere to be found when those same Iraqis went to the polls. They were motivated to protect the institutions of dictatorship, but not to help the Iraqi people secure the institutions of democracy.
That doesn't make me smug, or "I told you so". It makes me sad.
Writing in response to this post, David Carleson says:
My caution to you on wobble is that ALL GIs in ALL wars are too close to
properly see the big picture. I have valued your insights for some
time but birthing a state out of the sewer in Iraq was never going to be
pretty. As it was not in Japan, Germany, Korea, etc.
I thank God that we have not had 100s or 1000s of our citizens killed in
repeated Beirut style bombings. I thank God we have not had scores of
our brave paraded on TV as captives of scum like Zarkawi. These would
be the things that would signal to the homefront that Kennedy is right.
That would be our Vietnam/Iran failures rolled up in one.
Our soldiers have done a great job and (as I see it) we are nearing a
tipping point in the middle east that could not happen with the shithole
of Iraq still under Baathist control.
Imagine how the ill-equiped soldiers at Valley Forge could not see our
democracy bloom from looking at the blood in snow. I am so very glad
they didn't go wobbly.
It's so difficult for me to get a good assessement of what's going on. I will say that the voting went off much better than expected. You can tell because the media got quiet about things in Iraq again - for now. It's obviously not as bad as they like to portray. We'll see how things go, and keep working on it.
We have yet to find a serviceable framework for the application of our military power in the war on terrorism; in view of potential catastrophes of which we have a great deal of forewarning, we have yet to provide adequately for what used to be called civil defense; and we have no policy in regard to China's steady cultivation of power that soon will vie with our own. Though any one of these things is capable of dominating the coming century, not one has been properly addressed.
Emphasis added to the first sentance. I don't agree with Halprin's full criticism in the article, I think the goals are worthy and do constitute a mission. But I find the situation in Iraq increasingly worrisome to me, as there does not seem to be the kind of progress there should be. By that I mean the curbing of violent attacks. A couple weeks ago I read a report in The Economist by their enbed in Iraq that was troubling in the extreme (I read it in the print edition, I don't have an online subscription, myself).
It was not unsympathetic, but it was stark. It recognized the conundrums our soldiers faced. But the methods we're using now don't seem designed to produce the outcome we desire. Indeed, on the ground they seemed to have given up on the idea it was achievable at all - at least the ones the enbed reported on. That was the one that caused me to "start to go wobbly" on the war. Again, I was for it and remain supportive and am not one of those people who will say "I was had", I went in with clear eyes, and still hope we can make a difference there. It's not hopeless yet, but it is not looking good.
Will the elections change anything? The transfer of sovereignity was supposed to change things, but didn't. The elections won't move the people who are fighting us there. They will need to be defeated, preferably by Iraqis. The question will be: Will the elections, and improving training and confidence, motivate the Iraqis to fight for their own freedom against the Ba'athists and radical theocratic terrorists?
So it's been a long time since I've posted on Iraq, which might be a surprise to people who remember when I posted frequently on it. During the run-up to the war and its aftermath, it was the central subject. This has always been a "war blog", with politics & international affairs thrown in. Of late it's more of the latter.
Why is that? It's not because I've lost interest in what's going on in Iraq, or am distancing this blog from it. Far from that. I watch the news and try to learn as much as I can. But it's hard to tell.
It remains at best a mixed picture. Yes, there are good things going on. But violence remains endemic. I figured the aftermath would be more difficult than the invasion itself, and said so time and again, but I didn't think it would be as difficult as its proven. I've said that before, but it bears repeating.
I'm not sure what to make of what's going on, but I will make two observations. First is that however much progress in some areas there may be, it does not offset the violence. Not anymore, because the progress isn't affecting the insurgency. Isn't persuading them to stop fighting. The simple fact is that no amount of "good news" outweighs the "bad" when the bad includes a continuing low-intensity conflict.
Things must at least reach the state that they have in, say, Bosnia, when it comes to violence. That is, it may include a continued stabilizing presence, and it may be precarious. But it must exist. Note that for those of us who supported the war, this is a [i][b]huge[/b][/i] lowering of hopes, if that's all the success that we can get (by we I mean the coalition and Iraqis). I'm hoping there will be more, but it's going to be an uphill fight.
Also, we've been saying things such as "well, the violence will escalate in the run-up to the election". Before it was the run-up to the transfer of power. This has, of course, proven to be true. But the implication left by this - that it would ramp-down after that as the insurgents burned-out their extra-efforts - is not true. ("Insurgent" and "insurgency" are imperfect descriptors, I admit. But there is no perfect term). The enemy will continue to ramp-up the violence, using any excuse they can. We'll know we're getting the upper hand when the violence comes down, that is when the enemy can't succeed in keeping it up. We're not there yet. Clearly.
There's no point in me posting every tidbit of good news here, nor in logging every attack. Other blogs do a much better job of keeping track of that (as always, I think Winds of Change is the best at this). I can't really tell from here whether we're getting the upper hand yet or not. I'm not saying we're failing. I'm just saying that I don't know, and that when I don't know something, it's best to not try and make up a position and post as if I think it's happening, if you know what I mean. It's always tempting to make predictions based more on hope than reality, but I'm going to refrain from that.
I can't even tell at this point what I think we should be doing to make success more likely. I still think we should have increased the size of the army, as I said before the war, when we had the chance, so we would be able to commit more troops. But we didn't. I'm not even sure more American troops would be helpful, anyhow. What we really need is an Iraqi Army that will do the fighting. The Americanization of the Vietnam war is one of the things that caused an already-unreliable ARVN to go to the sidelines and become even less effective, sitting out their own war. We can't have that here. It doesn't work.
There needs to be a decent-sized Iraqi army, which we're working on building up. But more importantly, it needs to be an effective army, willing to fight the enemy, to go after them. That is harder to do, because we largely can't control whether the Iraqis will fight as tenaciously for their own liberty as the enemy is willing to fight to destroy it. We might be able to influence that by doing things right rather than wrong, but it's not something completely within our control.
Many opponents of the war, and critics of American policies in general, often seem to base their positions on the assumption that everything is within our ability to control. In that, they assume we have more power than we do. That is, they base their criticisms on the unspoken premise that if only we did things a certain way, there would be no problems - that we could have gotten the support of France or Russia in the UN, and their troops on the ground in Iraq, if only our diplomacy would have been better. Not that their interests (keeping Saddam, and lucrative ties with him, in place) were different and they make decisions as well. That if only we had done things "thus and such", then we wouldn't have a problem with an insurgency today.
Well, I'm not saying things have been perfectly done. But the assumption that they could have been, and that if only we made all the right choices then there would be no problems now, is a faulty one. Life doesn't work like that. The decisions and actions of others have an effect, too. They aren't just a bundle of stimuli responding to what we do, but make their own choices as well. The critics want to let others off the hook for their decisions as a means of America accountable for everything. But I won't do that here.
Which doesn't mean that I don't criticize things we've done here. I will continue to do so when I think it's appropriate. I just don't think that even if everything was done the way I think it should have been, that would mean the problem would be solved. One thing about such "Alternative Realities" is that while it's easy to draw a pretty picture based on them ("U.S. sends more soldiers in the wake of the war, along with our good buddies the French and the Russians who've been brought on board with more accurate & honest diplomacy convincing them to join after giving the inspectors more of a chance. Increased security lowers looting, catches the bad guys off guard, the insurgency fizzles right away, and rose petals rain down on everyone as the French & Russians & nearby Arab dictatorships, in all their noble sincerity help us build democracy in Iraq without any self-serving stuff on their part"), but reality has a way of throwing wrenches into such things, and one can make cases that outcomes would have been worse rather than better, just as plausibly.
We live in the real world, not a fantasy make-believe world. I still think it remains worth it taking the chance to build a democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East, for all the reasons discussed before the war.
My cousin sent me the link to this story about a West Point Grad from her class, Capt. Kellie McCoy, and the fighting in Fallujah this past September. Check it out.
Just goes to show that some of the girls can lead in battle as well as the guys. Something to think about for those of us, like myself, who don't believe in having women in combat.
Before the offensive against Fallujah started, the commentary was that letting the enemy control the city showed the limits of U.S. policy & power, implying that our strategy in Iraq was failing. Now many of the same people are saying that by going into Fallujah we are showing the limits of U.S. policy & power, because the irregulars have slipped away to fight another day, hiding in other places where they are harder to get at.
This Catch-22 formula where whatever we do it is a display of failure and powerlessness against an invincible foe is usually followed with useless advice such as perhaps it would have been better to continue to negotiate with the intransigent, or the shrugged-shoulder implication that anything we do is bound to lose.
The Catch-22 critics are wrong, however - sometimes knowingly, having axes of their own to grind. It was obviously a mistake to back off from Fallujah in the first place, giving them a victory on two levels: one, a base from which to operate from, and two the morale-boosting symbol that such a safe haven provided. Sweeping them out of the city does the same thing that removing the Taliban and al-Qaeda from control of Afghanistan - it reverses those two benefits. They no longer have a sanctuary from which to plot and launch their operations from, and have suffered a morale-lowering setback. This in addition to the hundreds plus (perhaps over a thousand) of the enemy who have been eliminated in the operation, and others who have, like cockroaches scurrying away, exposed themselves in less hospitable locales elsewhere, where they have also been eliminated.
It is true that the offensive will not destroy 100% of the irregulars/terrorists who had made Fallujah their base of operation. Many, including most of the leadership, will have escaped to fight another day. But 100% elimination of the enemy in one offensive is not the usual standard in war. This defeat will make it more difficult for them to conduct future operations, recruit and train replacements, and find sanctuaries from which to base themselves. It is a necessary step towards success in Iraq for us, and the commentariat who would transmogrify it, Tet-like, into defeat are not living in the "Reality-Based Community", as much as they might try to tell themselves they are.
They do tend to be the same people who look for the dark lining in every silver cloud when it comes to the war, not just in Iraq but in Afghanistan where similar Catch-22 critiques are made, and on the war in general, which after awhile makes one wonder whether they want us to win or not. Perhaps they're just natural pessimists, but it is an. . .interesting pattern.
Update: Check this out on where terrorists come from.
One other observation: when someone praises Arafat as a statesman, visionary, democratic leader, and the like, you no longer have to wonder who they want to win in the war on terror.
If you're one of the many Americans who want to pitch in to help the troops but aren't sure what you can do, you might want to check this out. It's a way to send a care package to wounded soldiers. Check it out.
My last major post for awhile, it was actually written for a message board, thus it is in the form of replies to points other people made in the debate. This is a link-rich post that I hope will be a useful resorce for people in making counter-arguments against common assertions against the war.
Legionair wrote:
personally i don't think we should of gone. They could not launch a missile at us and there was no evidence of a wepons of mass destruction
Except for the ones that he had used, and his continual efforts to maintain the ability to produce more, and his efforts to acquire more.
People might remember last year, when Joseph Wilson was going around saying "Bush Lied!" because Saddam never tried to acquire uranium from Nigeria. Well, as I linked to here, buried in Joe Wilson's book, and in this Washington Post story, Wilson now says that
It was Saddam Hussein's information minister, Mohammed Saeed Sahhaf, often referred to in the Western press as "Baghdad Bob," who approached an official of the African nation of Niger in 1999 to discuss trade -- an overture the official saw as a possible effort to buy uranium.
That's according to a new book Joseph C. Wilson IV, a former ambassador who was sent to Niger by the CIA in 2002 to investigate reports that Iraq had been trying to buy enriched "yellowcake" uranium. Wilson wrote that he did not learn the identity of the Iraqi official until this January, when he talked again with his Niger source.
So Wilson asserts "Bush Lied!" about Saddam's efforts to aquire uranium from Niger (even though Bush never actually mentioned Niger), but it was Saddam's head spokesman who tried to aquire uranium from Niger.
And we have found considerable evidence of Saddam's ongoing efforts to maintain WMD capability, see here.
Except that he kept shooting at American and British aircraft and announcing his intentions of striking us.
no evidence of a terrorist connection.
Except for the fact that Abu Abbas was in Baghdad when he died, having been given sanctuary there by Saddam. Except for the fact that Saddam Hussein paid large sums to Palestinian terrorist groups. Except for the fact that Ansar al-Islam, a al-Qaeda affiliate, was in Iraq before the war.
I think that mister bush went in for more personal reasons and oil.
The idea that Bush invented it all for personal reasons and for oil is also false. Regime Change became the policy of the U.S. government in '98, well before Bush took office, and unless Clinton was involved in the conspiracy to create the preconditions for Bush to engage in his personal pursuit of oil, that assertion does not hold water. The intelligence on Saddam's WMD programs and terror ties pre-dated Bush in office, going back to the Clinton Administration. The analysis of this intelligence was shared throughout the Western intelligence community (again, I refer you to this post). If it was inaccurate, the problem isn't Bush inventing things - that's a political and ideological assertion that distracts from the real problem, which is fixing Western (not just American) intelligence. Intelligence failures are significant and not just in possibly over-estimating threats, but under-estimating them (see here for just one of many posts on that subject, and here for another). We now know, for example, that Libya's WMD program was far more significant than we thought (and Khaddafi only revealed it and said he would give it up because he didn't want to share Saddam's fate - that's what he said himself when he did just that). It doesn't score partisan political points, though, so no one focuses on that.
But what we have found shows that Saddam's ambitions always remained focused on WMD, in violation of the UN Resolutions he lived under after the invasion of Kuwait.
Regarding whose interests were driven by greed for oil, one might look at the nations who used the UN's Oil-for-food program as a means of graft and corrupt deals with Saddam, as posted here - it was the countries opposed to the war, France and Russia, whose positions were driven by oil interests. This is important (and I have tons of posts on UNSCAM, and so do others. It is more accurate to say that opposition to the war was driven by oil interests than support for it was. There's certainly more actual evidence), because of what Ickus said:
Carinthe, you are right. There were many chemical weapons used in the Iran-Iraq war. The problem is the U.S. gave them to Saddam. The U.S. was so against the Ayatollah that we actually gave Saddam Hussein a lot to fight him.
That's not true either. It's a falsehood, commonly asserted but with no basis in fact. It was the aforementioned countries, France and Russia, which did the most to arm Iraq. See here and here and here; there's also a bar graph if a visual aid would be helpful. See also point #4 here (also #5. . .#6. . .&tc) and here. Indeed, it was Russia - not the U.S. - that continued to provide technical support for Saddam's efforts to acquire such weapons in the years proceeding the war. See also here for ties between Saddam and al-Qaeda.
There's also this on the whole WMD thing. I'll highlight this part:
How much ricin, after all, do you need to kill thousands of people? To listen to anti-war critics, it would seem that modest amounts of biological agent somehow don't count as WMD, or a re-started nuclear programme is no threat because it is only rudimentary.
This February, Ricin was found in the U.S. Capital building - some might say "oh, that's only payback, it wouldn't have happened if we left well enough alone". But see also this post which notes that Ricin was found in London, in the hands of terrorists connected to al-Qaeda - before the war. Then there is this story about Ricin in the hands of terrorists in Paris, and the connection to Iraq and al Qaeda.
There were numerous good reasons to topple Saddam, and any involvement we may have had in allowing him to continue to rule is one such reason to do so - certainly not a reason to not do so. I also recommend this piece by Christopher Hitchens and indeed just about everything he has written on the subject of Iraq and finishing the job. Also this piece, which includes the following:
Do you know that Saddam's envoys were trying to buy a weapons production line off the shelf from North Korea (vide the Kay report) as late as last March? Why do you think Saddam offered "succor" (Mr. Clarke's word) to the man most wanted in the 1993 bombings in New York?
Saddam was happy to harbor those involved in the first WTC bombing, and indeed Clinton Administration-era investigations linked Iraq to it. Saddam was continuing to violate the UN Resolutions, as late as March, right before the war, in trying to acquire prohibited weapons. The only reason he didn't get them then was the North Koreans decided it was too hot at the moment, with the U.S. troop buildup in the gulf. But the idea that Saddam was an innocent man framed by the U.S. is just false.
I'll also mention this story on a poison gas plot foiled in Jordan a couple weeks ago. Mentioned in the article is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the al-Qaeda in Iraq and author of a strategy memo for opposing U.S. forces there. Interestingly, he is also tied to the Ricin plot I mentioned earlier. That story also mentions:
After staying in Iran for a while, al-Zarqawi supposedly went to Iraq, where doctors amputated his leg, which was injured in Afghanistan, and replaced it with a prosthesis.
This done in Baghdad during the time when the government of Saddam Hussein ran the health care system. It also was during a time when people complained of shortages (we now know why - skimming of funds from the 'oil for food' program by Saddam and his accomplices at the UN and in France & Germany, to enrich themselves while Iraqis suffered). It strains credulity to believe that they aided him with scarce medical care but had no ties to him.
Also, regarding Saddam and involvement in the first WTC attack in '93, I will point out this, quoting from this article by Christopher Hitchens:
The man most wanted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, Abdul Rahman Yasin, fled straight from New Jersey to Baghdad, though there are still those in our "intelligence" services who prefer to grant Saddam the presumption of innocence in this and many other matters.
On far less actual evidence people conclude that Bush is after oil or plotting for personal reasons. It often seems like lot of people are willing to give the benefit of the doubt to our enemies but believe only the worst of America. In any case, people have a lot of misimpressions about the facts. That is why this is a link-rich post and I'm asking people to read a lot of materiel: there is so much that people know that just isn't so, it's the only way to correct it. The reason people have the misimpressions they do is because there is a lot of politics involved and partisan axes being ground in the kind of information is emphasized in reports and what is downplayed and soon falls off the radar. It's no longer true that "politics stops at the water's edge".
As for the difference between North Korea and Iraq, the problem is that, because of a deal struck in '94 that North Korea violated, continuing to pursue their nuclear program, it can't be handled the same way. That's why, in his controversial State of the Union speech on the eve of the war, Bush did not say the threat from Iraq was imminent but that we could not afford to wait until faced with an imminent threat:
Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late.
Also, it is always interesting that people accuse Bush of not using diplomacy and resorting to force on every issue and not understanding that different things need to be handled in different ways, but the fact is North Korea and Iraq do need to be handled differently. I'm not sure that Ickus is saying we should have gone to war with North Korea instead - I tend to doubt it. I would recommend checking out Steven Den Beste's website and entering "North Korea" into his search engine, for posts on the difference between how North Korea should be handled vs. that of Iraq, and why it needs to be handled differently. I'd get the URLs but I'm tired from searching and introducing the subject of North Korea is digression enough.
The humanitarian case and bringing democracy to Iraq, eliminating a ruthless dictator who was a danger to his people and to the world was always a part of the rationale; I could get links for that, too, but am too exhausted. I'll just have to ask you to search my archives, Instapundit's archives, and actually read the speeches given by Administration officials before the war (instead of simply press accounts of them. The texts of the speeches are all available). There were always a number of reasons for the war, and the only reason the WMD case got more emphasis was because people kept insisting - in many cases the same people who are critics now - that we "go to the UN" and make the case there, and that meant emphasizing Iraq's violations of prior UN Resolutions. But the full range of reasons were always present, and there were always numerous good reasons for removing Saddam from power.
In any case, it doesn't really answer the point of how Iraq should have been dealt with. The best thing to do was to finish the job that should have been finished 12 years ago.
Liberals in general seem to have been able to convince themselves that America is not at war. Bush is at war. Therefore, Hillary Clinton, Ted Kennedy, and the like feel free to make comments to the world press declaring that Iraq is a quagmire, George Bush's Vietnam, confident that they are not undermining an American war effort, but merely undermining George Bush.
I think that's part of it, but I think a lot of our "Citizens of the World" type Liberals view themselves as somewhat detached from America. That is, when they make criticisms of the country and its policies, they are naturally exempted from it, not part of it but above it.
THE events in Abu Ghraib prison shamed America and our military. The mistreatment of prisoners is utterly unacceptable. And we haven't accepted it.
As a nation, we've taken responsibility for the tragic actions of a few. Our military has been investigating the misdeeds for months. The initial report was brutally frank. There's no hint of a whitewash. The guilty parties will be called to justice.
Even given the strategic damage done by those horrid photos, the fact is that we Americans can be proud our system does not tolerate such behavior. It's an exception, far from the rule. We're genuinely shocked that even a few of our soldiers could behave so grotesquely.
Now consider our loudest critics, those governments expressing outrage over the crimes we've been investigating of our own volition.
Read the whole thing and, again, "yah, what I said."
One more "Yah, what I said" - The Washington Times shows its mooney, looney Right-wing bias by publishing an editorial by Arnold Beichman condemning the fact that the enlightened, sophisticated international community has given the dictatorial, genocidal government of Sudan has been given a seat on the UN's Commission judging Human Rights around the world.
My latest article is up at Enter Stage Right. It's on how Abu Ghraib is being used both at home and around the world but why that shouldn't alter how we look at it and how we handle it.
I'm not going to go nearly as bonkers over it as Andrew Sullivan and some others have. It's despicable, but the idea that it is reflective of the leadership in the White House is akin to saying that episodes of war crimes by Americans against Japanese soldiers in WWII was the responsibility of the Roosevelt Administration (here I'm talking Japanese soldiers, not Japanese Americans). Oh, and yes - such things did occur, not often but more commonly than we might remember, in part because of what Americans heard about how our soldiers were being treated by the Japanese.
But people are laying this at the feet of Rumsfeld and Bush not because they really believe that the Administration is directly responsible anymore than they would believe Roosevelt should have been blamed. This is just part of the war against the war, which I have written about on numerous occasions before.
Evidently you are not familiar with siege warfare.
A siege is an attempt to keep the enemy from getting new supplies while making him consume his current ones (men, material). Fallujah is not a failure but a success.
Siege warfare is patient warfare.
Evidently most pro-war people do not have the patience for siege warfare. It is just what our enemies are counting on.
This is Tet all over again where the winners convince themselves they have lost.
Maybe I'm not familiar with siege warfare and maybe I don't have the patience for it.
However, I'd like to think that I understand different situations and when a go-slow approach is appropriate and when it is not. I haven't criticized our handling of al Sadr and Najaf, which could be described in the same way. We held back and waited for a consensus to form among the Shi'ite community that left al-Sadr and his supporters isolated. That approach was, in my belief, the proper one in that context. It's paid off and assaults can now begin. Most sieges end in one of three ways: with either the enemy's capitulation; an assault on a weakened, isolated foe; or in defeat of the besiegers.
Najaf was one situation. Fallujah is another, and they are not identical. The enemy will of course portray any conflict where that they are not decisively and obviously defeated in as a victory for themselves. That's not just the Tet model, that's the Mogadishu model as well. There they took crippling casualties but were able to spin it later as a victory for themselves and defeat for us, and political decisions in Washington confirmed that portrayal.
I agree with Max Boot when it comes to our handling of Fallujah (but not Najaf). Patience in a siege can work both ways and those conducting the siege are not always successful - the besieged can win as well. That is more common than people sometimes think, as the most memorable sieges end with the victory of the attacker. Those conducting a siege also need to use judgement and know when an assault is necessary. Relatively few successful sieges end without one.
The problem is that the "supervisory class" in Iraq has been, for centuries, largely Sunni. Recruiting and training police and security troops was done in haste to get these guys on the job, and on the payroll, as quickly as possible. There were not enough non-Sunni with any police or management experience. You have plenty of entrepreneurs in Iraq, but a real shortage of modern, reliable managers. The corruption is pervasive and leads to a rather different style of management, one that pays more attention to the managers welfare than that of the society as a whole. Most of the guys who know modern management techniques are Sunnis, and often former (or even current) Baath Party members. Since Saddam took over, guess who was favored when it came to college admissions, or study overseas? If you let too many Sunnis back into the management positions, guess who is going to have a great deal of control over the country, way out of proportion to their numbers? The Shia and Kurds notice this, they constantly look for then, and get very upset if they see the Sunnis sneaking back into power.
Nearly all the violence in Iraq is coming from the twenty percent of the population that are Sunni Arabs. Thousands of violent Sunnis have been arrested and interrogated and it’s pretty clear from those interrogations that the violence in Iraq comes from several sources. There are the members of Saddam’s security and intelligence organizations carrying out a pre-war plan for creating violence and disorder if Iraq is occupied. There are also many Sunni Arabs acting on their own to oppose those foreigners who would allow the majority Shia and Kurds to rule the nation. And then there were the foreign fighters, who saw Saddam as a great Arab hero and the Sunni Arab cause worthy of support.
And then there are some less violent habits and customs in Iraq which make rebuilding the country and establishing a government very difficult. The biggest problem is corruption in public and private affairs and the large number of Iraqis who will not take responsibility for their actions. These self-destructive customs has been around for a long time and result in a general lack of personal responsibility for corrupt acts.
Which is all too true. The problem of "Iraqis who will not take responsibility for their actions" is a serious obstacle to the transition of sovereignty. In this, they are similar to EU elites who want power without responsibility and accountability - they want to be in charge but have others (especially the U.S.) pick up the tab and serve as a scapegoat for anything that goes wrong.
But a culture of accountability means, for example, we take responsibility for what happened in Abu Ghraib and punish those involved. We don't point fingers and say the devil made us do it, that this wouldn't have happened if only someone else somewhere else had done what they should do. In large parts of the world, a culture of rationalization has taken hold - for example, the Palestinians aren't responsible for the violence they commit, the Zionists and America push them into it and are really to blame. Corruption and vice here? It's the legacy of humiliation at the hands of America that causes it.
Too many in the Western world, in Europe but also America, are willing enablers of attitudes that create obstacles to self-rule. Ironically but unsurprisingly it is those who claim the most compassion for the plight of developing countries and present such views as understanding that do the most harm. By setting up excuses they encourage people to follow self-destructive paths. Blame-shifting that would not be tolerated when it comes to our government should not be tolerated elsewhere, either. It does no one any favors and is really a form of racist condescension masquerading as progressive multicultural understanding.
Sure, the world's full of crap and there are reasons why people do the things they do. A letter to Andrew Sullivan highlights the conditions that the U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghuraib lived under. Those should be corrected as well, to the extent humanly possible. But none of that is an excuse for mistreatment of prisoners, nor is the fact that similar things happen in the civilian prisons of some of America's greatest European critics. Tu Quoque is not an excuse. The whole world could use a lesson in democratic accountability, internal review, and the limits of rationalizing bad behavior. Then there might be more understanding about why the America they have so much contempt for manages to be so successful and powerful none the less.
Our mistakes are open for all to see and point at. It is not as if there are no efforts at cover-ups here, but they are rarely successful and ultimately problems and crimes get exposed, with the attempted cover-up likewise revealed for critics to point to. But this process allows for such things to be corrected. In much of the world, including much of the developed world, misbehavior is more successfully downplayed and the consequences for those involved are slight. That allows people to get away with things that shuoldn't be condoned and reduces the chance that corrective action will be taken.
A good letter to Glenn Reynolds and a good response from him. I agree with all the letter writer said and all of what Glenn wrote as well, including this part:
That's true, and I agree with it all. There are dark moments, however, when I wonder if the world doesn't hate us because we hold the moral high ground, and if many wouldn't breathe a secret sigh of relief if we started living down to their standards.
But what the rest of the world thinks is really irrelevant. Our integrity depends upon our own behavior. The fact that others are full of ill-will does not alter our integrity, only what we do affects it.
These soldiers wore the uniform of our country. The vast majority of our soldiers have behaved impeccably and are above reproach. That gets scant attention. But the fact that this is getting much more attention than all the decent soldiers in Iraq do does not alter the fact. Sure, our soldiers and America's efforts on behalf of Iraq deserve far more attention than will ever be given in a hostile world. But that does not mean that this vile episode deserves less attention than it is getting.
Much of the attention it is receiving is propagandistic and meant to smear all of America. That says far more about those pointing fingers than it does about this country. But how we handle this, investigate it, get to the bottom of it, and punish those responsible of whatever rank they may be, that will reveal the truth about the nature of this country.
Yes, on the scale of torture this might classify as "mild" compared to other vicious and sadistic things that are done to people. But that is no excuse either, and rationalizations that it "really wasn't so bad" should not be given any weight. It was bad enough.
In any military, as in any society, there are criminals and crimes. We should be proud that there are as few among our servicemen and women as there are, without in the least condoning or rationalizing that which does occur. Criminals should be treated as they deserve. That also said, I will note that many of the same people who loudly proclaim "innocent until proven guilty" when it comes to other crimes, no matter how ironclad the evidence of guilt might be, are not singing that tune now.
But again, the hypocrisy of others is not a reason for those of us who strive to be principled to become hypocrites ourselves. The difference between America and many of these other countries is we punish rather than reward this sort of behavior, and the European nations that often believe we take too hard a line on the abuses in other countries are only too happy to condemn us, their “allies”, more stridently than they would the worst regimes on the planet. That’s just the way it is in the Looking Glass Universe. Get used to it, get over it, and retain our principles in the face of it.
