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"The stream of Time, irresistible, ever moving, carries off and bears away all things that come to birth and plunges them into utter darkness, both deeds of no account and deeds which are mighty and worthy of commemoration. . .Nevertheless, the science of History is a great bulwark against the stream of Time; in a way it checks this irresistible flood, it holds in a tight grasp whatever it can seize floating on the surface and will not allow it to slip away into the depths of Oblivion. "
- Anna Comnena (1083-1153), The Alexiad
"I have taken all knowledge to be my province."
- Francis Bacon, 1592
Monday, December 27, 2004
Tsunami Tragedy
If I wasn't sure what to say about the death of Reggie White, still more I'm not sure what to say about the catastrophic death toll in the Indian Ocean. One can get news here and a better round-up than I could provide here.
Many, many more people have died in this than did on 9/11. Comparisons are almost inevitable. It is possible that 8-10 times as many people died as a result of this natural catastrophe as died on Sept 11th.
For the people who lost loved ones on either date, people they cared about, there is little distinction. Every life is precious, and we mourn them all. To look at the sorrow and loss of people as a result of this tragedy is to see something no different than the sorrow and loss of people whose loved ones died on 9/11. In that, there is no distinction, no real difference.
Likewise, when it comes to rallying to send aid and comfort to those affected, our response should be no different. If you were moved to give blood then, you should be so moved now. If you were moved to send what you could to help, contribute to the relief efforts then, you should do so now. It is needed all the more because there are so many more people who have been affected, and in nations that are not as able to bear the cost themselves as we are. In that, there is no difference.
I have thought long and hard, but I must add, if only because others will want to obscure, that there is a distinction on one level. Many of us rankled when 9/11 was called a "tragedy", and described as one would describe a force of nature. This event is such an occasion - no human hand could have prevented the earthquake that launched this Tsunami, that killed so many people.
But human actions launched 9/11. Humans conducted the attack, and those people are responsible for the deaths that resulted. That is a distinction with a difference, in the same way that actions that deliberately target civilian non-combatants are different from actions that try to avoid, to the extent humanly possible and at great expense, harming the innocent (the cost of developing guided munitions, for example - not to mention the expense in the lives of our own soldiers because of rules-of-engagement that call on us to take such care to some risk of our own people).
So if people pointedly ask why the reaction - emotional, moral, and otherwise - to the Tsunami is different from how we reacted in the wake of 9/11, well there is a reason. 9/11 was not a natural event.
For those who died, and those who loved them, the loss is no less real, however. We must all remember that, and mourning should be no different. It is impossible to see the images from Asia and not feel for the people there. Those who died had a future ahead of them, a promising future, and they are no longer able to live it.
Some positive steps in China. First, China's President lays it into the administrators of Hong Kong:
The cabinet stood stony-faced as Hu said the Hong Kong government "must be more concerned with the people of Hong Kong" and analyse problems which have unsettled the territory since its return to Chinese rule in 1997.
"Officials must also improve their capabilities and abilities to govern. The officials must turn back and look over the past seven years and find out what has gone wrong," Hu said.
Which is a good, if limited, step forward. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating, as always: What happens next, and whether they really listen to the people of Hong Kong and their desire for more accountable, democratic governance, or if this is just cosmetic rhetoric to be followed by more of the same. After all, it is the central government of China that has often led the way in demanding that the officialdom of Hong Kong listen less to the people and more to, well, the central government's wishes. Then there's this:
China will start holding jury trials next year as part of court reforms that also will increase the number of judges, state media reported Monday.
The measures were announced by China's highest court after a meeting last week on how to best prepare the courts to handle cases stemming from the country's sweeping economic changes, the official Xinhua News Agency said.
Jurors are to be elected to five-year terms and must have at least two years of university education, the Xinhua report and other state media said. Under the current system, judges are the sole arbiters in court cases.
The idea of jurors being elected to five-year terms is foreign to our experience, that's for sure. But still, this is a step forward towards putting matters of law into the hands of people, decentralizing it. It's not the "three-judge-panel" concept that one might have expected China to adopt. Again, we'll have to see how it works in practice, but it's a positive step.
Neither of these things are the end of the road, or even the end of the beginning of the road, towards a real Rule of Law and limited government (which go hand in glove). But they are good signs, signs of some movement in the right direction.
Will 2005 be marked as the year democracy took root in the Arab world? It's certainly possible.
We'll have to see how elections go among the Palestinians. Note that "democracy" does not mean "moderates win, extremists lose". Nor does it mean, as the EU sometimes seems to think when it comes to candidates they don't like winning in countries like Austria "candidates that suit our tastes win". The Palestinians might elect Abbas, who we can work with might win - to the extent to which Fatah has the system somewhat "sewed up".
It's even less likely that a completely open vote in Saudi Arabia would produce an outcome we would find acceptable. But democracy, and a truly democratic attitude among the populace, will likely only take root if it is given a chance. No democracy springs up fully-formed to resemble what we have now. It took us not a few stages along the way to get to universal enfranchisement.
Now, the idea of limited constitutional government deriving its powers from the consent of the governed (as opposed to paternalistic government granting some freedoms to the governed) is an Anglo-American phenomenon. We might hope that Arab democrats will adopt a similar outlook, but they are far more likely to build something that resembles that of Continental European or East Asian Democracy.
That's livable. As long as they don't try to impose that outlook on us, we shouldn't try to force our version on them, either. Attempts to persuade and convince, on the other hand, are fair game. As for the rejoinder that we're forcing democracy itself on Iraq, and arm-twisting the Palestinians into it, that's along the lines of how we forced it on Japan and Germany. But we didn't compel them to adopt our version, with checks-and-balances and the like. The ideologically-driven war against the West & America in particular launched by the fascist dictatorships compelled only three outcomes: their victory, their utter destruction, or their transformation. It's similar in the case of the war launched by Arabic-Islamic fascism. But I digress. . .
If the Arabic world begins to change, if we someday look back and see 2005 as the year democratic institutions took root in the Middle East, then we will have won, but the Arab world will have won, just as Japan emerged a winner in the wake of its democratic transformation. It will have happened with far less of a cost in human life than many other scenarios I can imagine.
Now, lets just hope it also takes place in the Persian World, that is, in Iran as well.
The New York Son asks why our "Best Ex-President", the heroic James Earl Carter, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, "Mr. Democracy", is not among those supporting democracy in Ukraine. Of course, they welcome his absence from the scene, but it does raise the question of why he's not involved.
The uncharitable might conclude it's because there is no obvious way for him to condemn or disparage the U.S. in doing so, or disparage our foreign policy, so it holds no interest for him. But there must be some reason why he's been delayed. I'm sure he'll weigh in soon, right?
A follow up to this post on Iran's nuclear weapons program and the purpose of negotiations with the Mullahs, in this article:
A top Iranian official has claimed a "great victory" over the US after the UN said it would not punish Iran's nuclear activities with sanctions.
Hassan Rohani said Iran would never give up its right to nuclear power. . .
We have proved that, in an international institution, we are capable of isolating the US. And that is a great victory," Mr Rohani said.
He added that the US representative at the IAEA meeting in Vienna "was enraged and in tears, and everybody said that the Americans had failed and we had won".
It was Iran's first direct comment on the nuclear controversy since the IAEA resolution on Monday.
'Not too long negotiations'
According to Mr Rohani, Iran's offer to suspend uranium enrichment would only apply for the duration of talks with the EU.
"We are talking months, not years," the cleric and head of Iran's top security body said.
But of course. The piece concludes with this observation:
Tehran stepped back from a similar offer to freeze uranium enrichment six months ago, sparking the current round of negotiations over its atomic ambitions.
The Iranian Mullahs decided that maybe they pushed for too much, and have backed down from demanding overt exemption for some of their nuclear weapons research programs. So the deal is back on. But how many people believe that this solves the problem, and that they will not pursue nuclear weapons now?
It's like deja vu all over again. This deal is almost identical to the one brokered by Our European Allies with Iran the last time, proclaiming "Peace In Our Time" and a triumph of European-style diplomacy over - well, not so much Iranian's nuclear goals as Cowboy-American threats of punishment. That deal, too, was seen by the Mullahs as temporary, and they quietly continued to pursue their nuclear ambitions after the pressure was off, while the International Community patted themselves on the back - again, not so much for thwarting Iran's nuclear program as sidelining the confrontational Americans.
So here we are again. Only the invincibly (willfully?) stupid, who intransigently refuse to learn from even recent history, believe that this agreement means that the Mullahs will not try and acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Everyone else - including those lauding the agreement - knows that this is just a way for them to buy time and resume their ambitions, while the Good People (European elites and America's "Reality-Based Community) politely avert their eyes, and turn off international pressure (read Cowboy-American attempts to confront Iran over it).
Just start a conversation with any one of them, and one will quickly see that they aren't that concerned over it - they will soon turn the discussion towards not Iran's nuclear weapons program, but America's, asking how we can tell them to stop while we have our own weapons, and our own program. Proliferation isn't the problem for them, and it isn't really for me, either. The problem is they fail to see a distinction between their own democratic republic on the one hand and a Religious Oligarchy that has vowed to use possession of such weapons against us and our friends if - when - they get them.
That's a distinction with a difference, while they're arguments rest on what used to be called, during the conflict between the SovWorld and the West, "moral equivalency". Such an argument empathizes not with us, but with our enemies. But it's the height of rudeness to point that out, as rude as pointing out that the Emperor wears no cloths. But that etiquette is just a means of keeping people from challenging the premises of their assertions - and challenging the mindset of "Peace In Our Time" deals such as this one, deals that ultimately make the situation worse rather than better.
Unfortunately I haven't blogged about events in Ukraine (more here). I'm far from the first to observe that it reminds me of the "Velvet Revolution" that spread throughout Eastern Europe in '89, bringing an end to totalitarian despotism there. One might begin to wonder if the effectiveness of such a method of internal regime change is entirely a province of that region; remember, a similar movement to overcome one-party rule in China fizzled in Tiananmen Square.
Or perhaps what it really illustrates is that it takes a certain kind of circumstances, not a certain kind of people or place. Mass internal protest combined with an unwillingness of the regime to disrupt it by force. For the later, concern for outside opinion is really vital - the sense that they wouldn't be able to get away with it if they crushed the revolt by force.
I look at what is going on in Ukraine with admiration, and I'm emotionally moved. I dearly hope they succeed. But also with a little bit of envy, driven by a wish that the same thing could work as well in Iran - or that the Sunni people of Iraq would mass-mobilize against the (minority?) of violent revanchists in the Sunni triangle. But even if the latter were inclined to take the streets and demonstrate that this is unacceptable to them, regard for international opinion would not stop the “insurrectionists” from making them pay in blood.
In Iran, the people can demonstrate all they want and proclaim their desire for a real democracy and the end of the mullahcracy, but the Ayatollahs have learned that when push comes to shove, the world community, embodied by European “dealmakers”, will blink before imposing any consequences on misbehavior. It’s a lesson learned in negotiations over their nuclear program, which is farce following farce: A repetition of the previously broken agreement, proving once again that some people refuse to learn from history because they want to repeat it. It was entirely predictable that Iran would cheat on the earlier agreement (a prediction I made here several times), and entirely predictable that they would do the same here, but that Our Friends would not want to see any consequences result.
Putin’s Russia has learned a similar lesson, and the U.S. is complicit here. Ukraine’s government is trying to emulate a “campaign strategy” pioneered by Putin, but they aren’t important enough to get away with it. We talk to Putin about how we dislike his anti-democratic maneuvers, but he knows that there will be no real consequences in our relationship for such behavior, so he has no disincentive to continue it. “A decent respect to the opinions of mankind” on the part of the regime, as it was put in our Declaration of Independence, is actually critical for the success of internal regime-change efforts. With out it, the movement can be stamped out. But such respect will only exist when world opinion has bite to it; consequences rather than just platitudes. Now more than ever these events, and such things as the UN’s Oil-for-Blood scandal (UNSCAM) illustrate that we need a Commonwealth of Democracies, one willing to use teeth. But for anything along those lines to be successful, there will have to be a change in mindset among those who are always ready to offer another deal along the same lines as the one they’ve already violated to rulers like the Ayatollahs of Iran and Kim Jong Il of North Korea. In other words, they’ll have to be willing to open their eyes to the lessons of history, not keep them closed so they can repeat the same mistakes endlessly.
Jaques Chirac, explaining how France arrives at foreign policy positions:
"Well, Britain gave its support but I did not see anything in return. I'm not sure it is in the nature of our American friends at the moment to return favours systematically."
Unlike Chirac's close personal friend, Saddam Hussein, who lucratively rewards those who support him.
Tony Blair, with typical Anglo-American simplisime, believes countries are allied on the basis of common values and interests, while our more sophisticated and enlightened French betters know it's all about going with the highest bidder.
In 1998 the Clinton administration, with GOP support, abolished the United States Information Agency, which did this work, often ably, from 1948 onward. It was a Cold War operation waging what we used to call the "war of ideas." With the Cold War over, history ended, ideas passé and Congress in need of budget cuts that touched no member's pork, Washington terminated USIA as an independent agency and folded it into the State Department. There, like any rock in water, it sank to the bottom.
State's diplomatic culture doesn't much like competitors for its turf (its unmediated tensions with the Pentagon may yet lose the war in Iraq and sink the Bush presidency), and so the sharp edges of the U.S. public information effort were sanded smooth. For example, the Voice of America radio into the Middle East airs mostly music (its "ratings" are good).
Indeed, in recent years we closed formerly USIA-run American libraries and centers in such delightfully settled places as Yugoslavia, Ankara and Islamabad. America's image in all three places today is largely in the dumpster.
Now, we hear ad nauseam, the world "hates us." How could it not? . .
Official ambivalence now about "getting our message out" with a successor agency to the USIA is tied to fear of being seen as producing propaganda, a dirty word today. But that's a bit odd. The media world we inhabit is without exception a world of "spin." Most people, having given up on getting a set of unadorned facts, align themselves with whichever spin outlet seems comfortable.
The U.S. government isn't even in the game of shaping world opinion. And so the Bush administration gets spun by whichever ill wind is blowing through the media. This week it's the prison pictures. More to come.
We need to do a much better job of getting our side of the story out - whatever that story is. I've written before that it's high time we bring back the United States Information Agency.
Canadian PM Paul Martin has an idea - hey, what about a means of working out international problems that doesn't involve the UN?
Prime Minister Paul Martin pressed forward yesterday with his plan for a global-leaders forum to solve the world's thorniest problems, giving short shrift to the United Nations as he did so.
"We need to get the right mix of countries in the same room talking without a set script," he said. "We do believe a new approach directly involving political leaders could help break a lot of logjams."
Remember, you read it herefirst. Martin has some more work to do, of course. His list of the 20 countries to involve includes some non-democratic turkeys (Saudi Arabia & China for example). But he's starting to think outside of the UN box, which is good, because the UN's vices are inherent as I argued. Speaking of which, former Swedish PM Per Ahlmark has a piece on how the UN's vices don't seem to matter to many:
NO other organisation is regarded with such respect as the United Nations. This is perhaps natural, for the UN embodies some of humanity's noblest dreams.
But, as the current scandal surrounding the UN's administration of the Iraq oil-for-food program demonstrates, and as the world remembers the Rwanda genocide that began 10 years ago, respect for the UN should be viewed as something of a superstition, with Secretary-General Kofi Annan as its false prophet. . .
the culture of the UN: believe the best of barbarians, do nothing to provoke controversy among superiors, and let others be the butt of criticism afterwards. Even subsequent revelations about Annan's responsibility for the disasters in Rwanda and Bosnia did not affect his standing. On the contrary, he was unanimously re-elected and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. . .
Now, despite revelations about bribery in the UN's oil-for-food program for Iraq, the world is clamouring to entrust Annan with the future of more than 20 million Iraqis who survived Saddam Hussein dictatorship. That is because of who Annan is and what the UN has become: an institution in which no shortcoming, it seems, goes unrewarded.
Too true. For many, even questioning the UN and examining its record is a sign of ill-will.
Reader Marquis sends, via e-mail, a link to this article on China's continued interference with the democratic process in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's democracy movement is unlikely to simply accept this.
People have always said that the Chinese government wouldn't do anything to "kill the goose that laid the golden egg" in Hong Kong. But that implies that a corrupt post-communist oligarchy knows what the goose is. I've written before on the unlikelihood of that.
The answer, of course, is no. Just all the world's "Good People" are. You know, the ones who we're endlessly told we should listen to more and give authority over our policies. The ones that, when we don't defer to them, it's seen as a sign of our moral failings and lack of international spirit.
Mike Parker, via e-mail, reminds me of this article by Michael Ledeen from last October, on what China has evolved into as well as what we're fighting in the larger war. Check it out.
Of course, the comparison isn't exact, but there are parallels. David Keene explores them, and what it means. It starts with a point about China that I've discussed before here too:
The quasi-communists who run things on the Chinese mainland these days have been proceeding for more than a decade on the historically naive assumption that they can, in effect, have their cake and eat it too. In their desire to build a China that can compete in a world in which economic and military power are more interdependent than ever, they are trying to free up their country’s economic system without giving up an iota of political power. The very idea of a free-market totalitarian state may be difficult to grasp intellectually, but that seems to be what the folks in Beijing are trying to build and hold together.
I agree with those who say it won't work and that eventually there will be a shakeup resulting in, we hope, a democratic China. But the question is what happens along the way between now and then and how much damage it does to not only China, but China's neighbors in the meantime. That includes Taiwan:
And its very existence is making Beijing more nervous by the day. China’s rulers want Taiwan “back” not just because they consider the island a “renegade” province but also because the freedom its people enjoy presages a future that the rulers aren’t eager to embrace.
One of the things happening here is the Chinese oligarchy using nationalist passions to cling to power. Directing the attentions of the population towards some external goal - recovering China's glory and territory - is one way of doing that. It can hold on that way for some time, and create havoc and even war. Sure, eventually the Chinese oligarchy will fall, but it may not be a "soft landing" kind of fall. . .
Till then, we should no more abandon Taiwan for the convenience of getting along with China than we should abandon Israel for convenience:
Taiwan is not a client state or a nation that we support for the sake of convenience or realpolitik. It is a nation that has embraced the ideals for which we stand and turned them into a reality. For that, it deserves, and has earned, our support.
. . .as if any were really needed if one pays attention to the facts, that the problem isn't "Bush lied!" or "Blair lied!", but that Western intelligence agencies, as a whole, may have been mistaken.
Fixation on the wrong problem ("they lied to us!") is an obstacle to solving the real problem, and that is intelligence gathering. Western intelligence may have over-estimated Saddam's weapons stockpiles - though not his programs and intentions of maintaining a WMD capability (see here), but they underestimated Libya's, and before that North Korea's, and before that Pakistan's, and before that. . .
The point is the problem isn't primarily political manipulation. Leaders make decisions based on the information available. We need to insure that information is the best it can be, and also understand the limits of information-gathering abilities. That is, we need to work to reduce errors and we need to understand that life is never error free.
No doubt it's because Taiwan probably can't build anything that overmatches what the EU (mainly France) can supply to China, but we sure can provide much better to Taiwan.
Those of us who've paid even slight attention to the European press since Sept. 11th have noticed they favor stories that take it as a given that the Bush Administration has used those events to silence criticism - that's why you never hear from guys like Bill Moyers, Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, Paul Krugman, Al Gore, or Bob Scheer etc. anymore, and why Democrats like Kerry are afraid to say anything even mildly critical of the Administration.
Europe is immune to such things, of course. But Trent Telenko sends in this story:
Police arrested a leading investigative journalist yesterday on the orders of the European Union, seizing his computers, address books and archive of files in a move that stunned Euro-MPs.
Read the whole thing. Trent comments that it's another example that "[t]here is a reason why European papers and other media are stuck in an anti-American group think. Anyone in the media who points out the emperor has no cloths gets visited by the authorities."
It was bad enough to wake up last week to nearly two hundred dead and hundreds more injured in Spain. Developments since then have been disheartening at best. While there is heartening progress in Iraq, Europeans are more committed than ever in describing it as a disaster and accepting al-Qaeda's premise that the solution to terrorism is to give in to their demands. Yet again they demonstrate they are like the Bourbons, having forgotten nothing and learned nothing from history.
European allies like Spain throwing in the towel will no doubt give heart to elements here that want us to do the same and treat terrorism as a law enforcement matter. Whether they will prevail remains in doubt. But clearly Europeans are now in more danger than ever, not less. Are you more likely to discourage a behavior by showing it works, or encourage it? What conclusions are al-Qaeda and its sympathizers likely to take from this? That the attack had an impact, and that impact was not to fill Spain with resolve to continue moving forward, and not to fill Europe with resolve to stand up to them.
No, the impact was to cause Spain to pull back and Europe to speak of negotiation and dialogue, and clearly take the attitude that the solution to the problem is not standing up to those who commit terror, but rethinking the policies that offend them. The remarks of the President of the European Commission to that effect are now famous around the world and certainly will be noted by Osama bin Laden and his ilk. Are the Terror Masters likely to be discouraged, or heartened by words like this:
It is clear that using force is not the answer to resolving the conflict with terrorists
That's the view at the top in Europe, despite the fact that blaming the attack on Spain's siding with the U.S. on Iraq doesn't explain threats against France, which did everything they could to preserve Saddam's regime. Chirac's solution is to call for a "dialogue of cultures" rather than an effort to fight terror and regimes that sponsor and support it.
This is a further sign, if any were needed, of the "continental drift" that draws America and Europe further and further apart, and the Islamist Radicals are happy to exploit the gaps. The response of Europeans to Jihadist lamentations over the loss of Andalusia (Spain) and collapse of Ottoman power in Europe and use that as a rationale for attacks to undo these reverses and restore a Moslem Caliphate? To increasingly believe that Americans aim at world domination. And they say we're the ones detached from reality.
*My best Mr. Garrison imitation* Ok, class, pay attention. Check out this piece in the Washington Times. Now, here's your homework assignment - the following essay questions:
If Putin is so naturally popular, why did he feel it necessary to repress media outlets not favorable to him? Does habit explain it all?
The article postulates that Putin would clearly win a fair election. That being the case, why did he behave in a manner similar to Iran's Mullahs, though more subtle, in culling all parties and candidates that might possibly rival him?
Is democracy healthier? Would Russia be better off or worse off if it wasn't ruled by a strongman?
The Washington Times characterizes it this way:
All the same time, the Russian people appear to welcome Mr. Putin's competence, despite his occasional heavyhandedness.
Well, they say potato, I say potahto. Last December I put it this way:
Titles like "Maximum Leader", "Generalissimo", and "President for Life" are unfashionable, and the global elite don't mind undemocratic, but unfashionable is right out.
This time, the Washington Times sides with the global elite.
On the other hand, the Washington Times published this piece by Jack Kelly on milestones of progress in Iraq. Check it out.
The UN says Saddam was a good boy after '94 - a change from what they themselves were saying a year ago - but Russia helped Saddam's missile program into 2001. The Democrats think we should have gotten their approval before doing anything.
A bit belatedly, because I'm only finding it now, there is this piece by Tony Blankley discussing a book on George Bush's foreign strategy vision written by John Lewis Gaddis. Unfortunately the Boston Globe article Blankley mentions is now in their "paid only" archives. But read the Blankley article and, if you're so inclined, check out Gaddis' book.
"International law", in so far as it ventures beyond the law of the sea, is almost entirely bogus. The "principles of international law", allegedly held in such reverence by their advocates, have never been mandated by the peoples of the nations to whom they are meant to apply. They do not flow from the will of the citizens of any nation.
And they're most strenuously invoked against those nations that are democratic, invoked with laxness if at all against those which are not, and quite frequently - as in Iraq - invoked to shield and protect the most despotic and least representative regimes in the world. Which is why we need to shift to a international order that priviledges democracy and accountability, and away from one that treats all regimes as equals but gives a pass to the worst, where corruption is king and the concept of accountability is treated with indifference if not passive-aggressive hostility.
In the absence of a duly constituted international government, vindicated and authorized by the people whose actions its laws are intended to curtail, there is no explanation why those principles are supposed to compel obedience from anyone. The best answer to the question "What is the source of the authority of the principles of international?" is: Nothing. There isn't even substantial agreement as to what the principles of international law actually are. Their content varies wildly according to which lawyer is consulted.
The most plausible view to take about the bulk of international law is that it is a very successful con-trick: a forged coin which many people have been duped into thinking is the real thing. The Americans have seen through the forgery, and wisely refused to sign up to the creation of The International Criminal court in 1998, judging that its procedures would almost certainly include an attempt by countries who resent American power to frustrate it.
Exactly so. Final quote from the article, a reminder:
For instance, the war against Milosevic was not sanctioned by the United Nations. There was no "legal authority" either sought or given by any international organisation beyond Nato. That, however, did not stop Mr Blair getting involved - nor did it create political problems for him at home.
Pedantic Point: I would add to the Law of the Sea the laws regulating international air travel as an example of effective international law.
Responding to this post, M. Simon sends, via e-mail, links to this article and this post on the subject of a speech by a Europen MP, Ilka Schroeder, "The European Union, Israel, and Palestinian Terrorism", making the point that the EU's support for the Palestinians is part of a "hidden war" with the U.S. Read them both.
Via Glenn Reynolds we find this piece by Christopher Caldwell examining aspects of European anti-Americanism. This paragraph is particularly insightful on the changing shape of support for vs opposition to America:
In its diplomacy, as in its military strategy, the United States is discovering that it has a very shaky idea of who its real friends are. In the old days, it was very clear where the instinctive pro- Americans, or "Atlanticists" were to be found. They made up most of the Christian Democratic parties everywhere, and an influential right-wing rump of the Socialist parties in Germany, Scandinavia and Britain. And some of today's pro-Americans are still on the right: Germany's CDU still backs America, as do the British Tories, although not unanimously, and particularly not when Labour is in power. Beyond them, though, today's Atlanticists are an unfamiliar mix of New Labour (in its British and Dutch variants), continental human-rights activists (particularly in France), Eastern European ex-dissidents and post-cold war parties of the right (in Spain and Italy). It would be surprising if America's future foreign policy did not take some account of which Europeans like it, and which don't.
It's important to remember that the politics of other countries are no more static than ours. That seems like an obvious insight, but many people don't take that into account and tend to assume the deck chairs are fixed when it comes to the political players in various countries.
I've been particularly disappointed in some of the British Tories. I guess I've gotten over my disapointment with Chirac, but folks will remember that when he first became President, people predicted there would be warmer relations between France & America as a result because Chirac was perceived as more friendly to and less suspicious of America. It hasn't worked out that way.
I find this to be telling, too:
"The roots of European social democracy are anti-communist," says MacShane. "European social democracy has far more in common with American values, including the war on terrorism, than with any other ideology." The European left should never feel embarrassed about siding with the US, provided the US is a progressive force, MacShane thinks. In the 1980s, they should have remarked (but mostly they didn't) that Ronald Reagan was, by many measures, tougher on South Africa than Europeans were.
Well, I remember the '80s political situation, and European Social Democratic Parties hardly covered themselves in anti-Communist glory at the time. They should have, but many of them had forgotten their own anti-Communist roots and preferred to engage in varieties of Ostpolitik that often saw American anti-Communism as the problem and sometimes verged on blaming America for the Cold War. So we get to this section that Glenn quoted:
Europe's problem, as Bruckner sees it, is not that it has drifted too far to the left - for the left-right concept is one that he considers "totally discredited". Nor is Europe's problem simply anti-Americanism.
"Anti-Americanism can only be very ambivalent," he says, "where American culture sets the tone. The French are voting for America - in the market place - all the time." Rather, Bruckner says, "our great problem as Europeans is that we want to exit from history. Sometime after 1989, we developed the belief that barbarism could be refuted intellectually." Here, he makes clear, he is speaking primarily of France and Germany, not the UK.
I think that in large swaths of European opinion this started to be the mindset before 1989. It would be unfair to overestimate this: parties embodying that position did not win power in Germany or Britain during the '80s. But public opinion surveys of Europeans on key Cold War issues during the '80s arguably reflected that attitude: against military programs ("militarism"), against assertive stances in negotiations with the Soviet Union, in favor of the West taking unilateral steps to demilitarize and offer concessions in order to demonstrate goodwill, reduce tensions, and assuage Soviet suspicions that were presumed to be grounded in legitimate fears of our intentions.
After 1989 the attitudes this was based on flourished and became the dominant mindset of political opinion-leaders in Europe, expressing itself in the new context of the '90s until it reached it's currentl form in this century. But the roots are fairly deep. They're also understandable, given European experience with destructive wars. However, there seems to be a dichotomy in that the older generations that more directly experienced these conflicts seem to have more affinity for America than the younger generations that did not.
Of course, just as the chairs on the deck aren't static, everything isn't moving only in one direction (against the U.S.):
This implosion of Italy's party system may be laying the groundwork for a more durable pro-Americanism than the old Christian Democrats could offer - and, not for the first time, it could be pioneering a new trend in Europe. After all, Italy has been the only one of the EU's six founder nations to offer the US its steady support for the past two years.
As for the "more durable pro-Americanism", I'm tempted to say I'll believe it when I see it. But we will see. There certainly is some level of re-thinking and a number of European commentators warning against the pitfalls of anti-Americanism.
In Britain, Mark Leonard, director of the Blairite Foreign Policy Centre, says there is a new strain of Atlanticism which is "revolutionary rather than status-quo". This new strain attracts a certain number of Conservatives - Leonard names the Times columnist, Michael Gove, and the MP Michael Portillo - who believe in "a neo-conservative idea of democracy".
It's too bad that Portillo has a reputation as the "Tory Tony Blair" - that is, giving off a vibe of opportunism. If it wasn't for that, he might be CP Leader today.
Then there is this observation:
Israel is central to the ideological divide over Atlanticism. Much attention has been given on both sides of the Atlantic to the rising tide of anti-Semitism in many European countries, especially France. Less focus has been given to pro-Israeli movements and initiatives. Claude Goasguen says: "There are about a hundred pro- Israel people in the National Assembly, and it's among them that Atlanticists can be recruited."
That may be true, but the overall tone of politics in Europe on the subject of Israel is quite different than in America, and it certainly causes friction and division whenever policies that touch on the Middle East become the central issue. It's hard to overestimate the degree to which that affected European positions on the Iraq war, for example. Then there is the EU, and again it's hard to underestimate the role European integration played in the same discussions:
As European integration comes to revolve increasingly around foreign-policy questions - from defence, to the Turkish candidacy for membership - hard and unavoidable decisions present themselves. Politicians on both right and left feel that Atlanticism has become a zero-sum game: they cannot take a firm stand in favour of the United States (through bilateral agreements, for instance) without endangering the European project.
In large part this is a reflection of politics in Europe itself over integration. American policy has been to encourage European integration - almost without reference or recognition of the possible downside affect it could have on Europe's relations with the U.S.
But political debates in Europe on the extent to which they should cooperate with America are often posed, by pro-EU integrationists, as binary: Either Europe will "stand together" and have its own policy - which cannot be the same as America's - or be "bullied" by America. This they do more for internal reasons revolving around what they would like the EU to become - an integrated entity with a single foreign policy - than outright hostility to America. It's "domestic politics", perhaps at its worst. Invoking the need, or creating a perceived need, to be able to stand up to America, not be bullied by America, have their own distinct foreign policy, is a tool rather than an end in itself. A tool to push for consensus and, in effect, browbeat (bully) countries into accepting a uniform European position on these issues. To put it cruely and perhaps unfairly, this bundling of rods together with an axe in the middle has less to do with anti-Americanism per se and more to do with the vision of a United Europe directed by those who know best how to set its course, rather than letting nations go off making their own decisions separately, which is weakness. UNITY IS STRENGTH. So agreeing with America is described as subservience, while subservience to policy set by Brussels even if you don't agree with it is not:
France's Senator Francois- Poncet thinks Blair's stance is a dangerous one to imitate in the first place: "The British think they are in a better position by being largely subservient to the Americans," he remarks. "I would say that they wildly overstate their influence."
Again it is worth remembering that the people like Francois-Poncet who see the EU in such terms are not having things entirely their own way - which may explain the intemperate nature of their rhetoric which is a result of their frustration in the face of real differences of opinion on such things as the Draft EU Constitution which was their means of imposing this by mandate. Caldwell writes that:
The point, however, is that Britain is more important in Europe because it is now becoming evident that dealing with America and dealing with the EU are not separate issues. As Gianni Bonvicini of Italy's Institute for International Affairs put it, "There is an increasing feeling that the Europe relationship can't be monopolistic. It can't mean giving up other relationships."
So there are grounds for real optimism. Here, too:
Transatlantic ties are now shifting to different bases, but the bases still exist. Henry Kissinger is correct to say that the new generation of Europeans is not automatically pro-American. But neither need it be automatically anti-American. And others tend to miss the present Europe-wide unease about the European project. In the wake of December's Brussels summit, this unease has reached its highest level since the Maastricht agreement. The gloom arises, in part, from the failure at Brussels to find a constitutional voting formula acceptable to both the large countries (particularly Germany and France) and the medium-sized ones (particularly Poland and Spain.) But it also rests on the inability over the past year to find a common European voice on foreign policy, and specifically on the US.
I'd say that's a good thing, not a bad thing. Assertions of a "common foreign policy" always involved more bullying & browbeating than any American Administration - including this one - has ever imposed on the nations of Europe. If George Bush or even Donald Rumsfeld had ever said some of the intemperate, outrageous things that Chirac and his cronies did with respect to countries that refused to toe the line, well we'd never hear the end of it.
Then there is this:
It is with such considerations in mind that Devon Cross, an American philanthropist whose career has included service on the Pentagon's Defence Policy Board, showed up in London in January. Cross hopes to start an NGO that will link American policy-makers and strategists with European journalists and publics - and, she hopes, promote a better understanding of how American foreign- policy thinking works and what the American government is trying to do. While she is a longtime friend of Donald Rumsfeld, and might be called a neo-conservative in the US, Cross says she will make it a priority to bring to London the widest possible variety of foreign- policy voices, from Bush Republicans (she has invited the under secretary of defence, Paul Wolfowitz, to participate) to Clinton Democrats (such as the former CIA director James Woolsey) to the human-rights activists of the Democratic left (who cluster around the Freedom House Foundation and American organised labour). This varied coalition is what Americans naturally think of when they think of the political constituency for their foreign policy. But it is not what Europeans think of.
And that is just the point, according to Cross. Her view - that America is losing the battle for the world's hearts and minds by neglecting "public diplomacy", of the sort that its government, foundations and labour unions carried out throughout the cold war - is held quite widely in the US.
(Emphasis added) Which has been one of my arguments over the last year or so, too. We need to do a much better job at this, and I do think that "non-governmental" efforts, such as the one Cross is organizing, are of vital importance and more likely to make an impact than government or Administration efforts will, if only because of the natural inclination people have to distrust any government statement as propaganda, no matter who is making the statement or how eloquent it is. That said, I still think we should bring back the United States Information Agency.
Reformist Party to boycott elections as not being fair & free. Hopefully it's moving towards a political crisis that will ultimately result in the peaceful or near-peaceful (not too bloody) deposing of the Mullahs and replacement with a true representative democratic system.
Julie Cleeveley writes via e-mail in reaction to yesterday's post as follows:
Your correspondent David Preiser got it dead right. I am British, pro Bush and pro War on Terror. The BBC has whipped up a level of anti-Americanism and hysteria that has knocked me sideways. I find it very alarming to see how powerful propaganda is, how it can warp ordinary, generally intelligent laid back Brits. Last week was a good week, with Gavyn Davies, Greg Dyke and Andrew Gilligan all resigning. It was the best news since Saddam's capture. Through Hutton, the British establishment has sent a message to the BBC to clean up it's act, or risk losing the charter, and with it 2.8 billion of citizen's money. Any Americans e-mail you with tales of anti-Americanism in London-believe them, and please give them my apologies. Too many British people are possessed with this mob hysteria. I am convinced that half the BBC are stoned most of the time; this is the only way I can explain the arrogance, the irresponsibility, the rudeness and the ignorance. Forget SARS and bird flu, this anti-Americanism is the real danger to health. It is like a plague.
One of the reasons I've listened to the BBC World Radio News reports regularly is to keep up with how things are being reported. There is a steady, day-by-day theme to their reportage to the point that I can see how it would seem normal and form the picture of reality regarding the U.S. for much of the British population.
Even so I think that if anything I may have underestimated its impact. The mail, like Julie's, certainly emphasizes the point. I think that makes it all the more important for those of us on the "pro" side of the argument to be aware of and do what we can to tackle this. I also hope that policy makers are aware of the dangers. Given some of the speeches Blair has given, he seems to be, but perhaps he's not the right man to tackle this phenomenon credibly, given the undercurrent of distrust of him that seems prevalent in Britain.
The "We Don't Get It post generated some well-considered responses.
Jeff at Caerdroia has a post worth reading on the whole matter and the wider war. Of course, it's the fact that there is a wider war which makes fallout - both positive and negative - so important. If it were just a closed episode, that would be one thing. But the fact that all parties, friend and enemy, pro and against, know that it's a piece of the whole rather than the whole enhances the significance of everything related to it. The battle for "hearts and minds", not only outside the West, in the Islamic World, but within the Western World itself, is one part of the war. As I've noted in posts related to the "Humanities" the need to comprehend and value what makes our society relatively successful so those things can be implanted elsewhere is an important aspect of the war. Whether we like it or not, episodes like this fuels the movement that insidiously eats away at that, and at the confidence needed to defend ourselves: The belief that what we have is worth defending.
We're all familiar with aspects of "The Litany", anti-Western and ant-American interpretations of history that fairly or unfairly paint us as the bearers of a tradition worthy only of contempt. The problem here is that there is a high chance at the moment that fairly or unfairly, this will be added to the list. It's already being done. That's what I'm concerned about, because it does affect how people view our efforts.
M. Simon writes, via e-mail:
No WMDs?
Good. There were programs. We got to them before they could complete anything.
No WMDs?
There is great danger. They were working with other countries in a distributed system. Each had a piece of the puzzle so that none could be proved directly responsible. This is in fact David Kay's line.
Those are good points and I suppose my point is that we need to be as indefatigable in raising points like these, counter arguments, as the other side will be in promoting the "Bush Lied!" meme and its variants. Some have been blase about it, or seemed to be. Others would rather just move on to what were always, for many, stronger reasons for fighting the war.
I think we should stress those strong reasons, but always take the time to rebut this, lest it become the Official History that "everyone knows" is true. M. Simon goes on:
It would be a shame to lose the Brits in this war. The American people get it. For whatever reason (no Bali, 9/11?) the Brits don't. A shame but we can carry the load ourselves.
My answer to those who object to American policy? Do it your own way before we do it our way and we won't bother. Otherwise sit down and STFU.
It's an answer. I guess it's not mine, but it's an answer and ultimately, in the end, it'd be my answer too. It's not my preferred one and I think it will be a lot harder to succeed on our own than it will with at least some support. As the Caerdroia post points out, this isn't entirely a foreign problem. There are plenty of Americans with similar attitudes, and a danger that proportion could grow if we flag in waging the battle of ideas.
If anything, things are worse than I presented them. Some of the reaction I got to the post dealt specifically with the subject of anti-Americanism in Britain. None of the feedback argued that there was less than I thought. David Galway wrote from Ontario, Canada, via e-mail:
you wrote:
While I disagree with some of the specific points made in the piece, this one I believe is accurate. Oh, sure, one will find anti-Americanism in Britain among the usual suspects.
I'm not so sure I'd be so quick there ... perhaps things have changed, but when I attended the equivalent of high school in England I found anti-Americanism
